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1. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 4 > Issue: Part 1
Mădălina Diaconu Der Konsumtempel als postmoderner Mythos und als verwirklichte Utopie der Posthistoire
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“The temple of consumption as a postmodern myth and the materialized utopia of post-history” deals with imaginary motifs connected with the shopping mall, which is currently called in German “temple of consumption.” A mall makes real somewhat the mythical Schlaraffenland (pays de Caucagne) of the late Middle Age. The architecture of the mall is postmodern, while that of the classical department store, is modern. Time manifests itself fourfold: as the subjective duration of shopping, the qualitative calendar of celebrations, the prohibition of history and the folding up of the past, present and future into the present. Finally, the customers’ behaviour expresses an escapist desire to desire and a perverted katharsis.
2. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 4 > Issue: Part 1
Thomas Franz Die Pluralität des Menschen: Die Anthropologien Eugen Finks und Heinrich Rombachs im Vergleich
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Martin Heidegger was the famous reviver of philosophical anthropology based on the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl. In his critique of the European anthropological tradition he conceptualizes human being as “Existenz” and “Dasein.” Following Heidegger, Eugen Fink (1905-1975) and Heinrich Rombach (1923-2004) developped a pluralistic anthropology within the concept of basic phenomena. For Eugen Fink there are five existential and co-existential phenomena: death, love, work, power and play, which are dialectically connected. These five phenomena are the transhistorical and transcultural constant factors of human persons as individual and social beings. Despite Fink’s criticism of Heidegger’s anthropological formalism, his anthropological conception can be defined as existential-ontological anthropology. Heinrich Rombach deepens this conception. There is no fixed existence of the basic phenomena for each person. Rombach argues, that each person has to find his own basic phenomenon. These phenomena are different in each historical epoch and culture. For example, love in the Roman Empire is totally distinct from love in postmodernism. There is no fixation on five basic phenomena, though each phenomenon can have the function of a basic phenomenon for a human being. Finally, Rombach makes the distinction between basic individual and social phenomena. While Rombach’s philosophy is focussed on a functional and processual ontology, which he himself calls structure ontology, his anthropological conception can be characterised as a structure anthropology at all.
3. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 4 > Issue: Part 1
Beate Beckmann-Zöller Adolf und Anne Reinach: Edith Steins Mentoren im Studium und auf dem Glaubensweg
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Adolf and Anne Reinach influenced Edith Stein (1891-1942) as mentors in her studies in Gottingen and in her religious experience. From 1909-1917 Adolf Reinach (1883-1917) held an important position as assistant professor to Edmund Husserl. After his early death in the First World War, his magnificent way of passing on the phenomenological method of Husserl’s Logical Investigations was confirmed by Roman Ingarden, Dietrich von Hildebrand, Hedwig Conrad-Martius, and other scholars. In this essay the biographies and works of the couple Adolf and Anne will be described in the perspective of Edith Stein, who helped to edit Reinach’s works (Gesammelte Schriften, Halle 1921).
4. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 4 > Issue: Part 1
Wolfhart Henckmann Uber die Ündefinierbarkeit des Menschen und die Grenzen der Weltanschauungen
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The article deals with three questions: What is to be understood by the undefinability of man? In which sense do worldviews have limits? What is meant by the “and” between undefinability and the limits of worldviews? A distinction is to be drawn between comparative and absolute undefinability. The former means that sciences have not yet come to an acceptable definition of man, the latter means that undefinability is the ground of existence of man, as it is experienced in border experiences (“Grenzerfahrungen”). A worldview can be understood as the apprehension of a meaningful coherence of man and world. A worldview is anthropocentric and is distinct from others in respect to the existential standpoint from where the connection of world and man is apprehended. From an unreflected lived worldview can be distinguished a reflected worldview. It is possible that it discovers a radical break between man and world. In quite different ways this is done by Dilthey’s interpretation of the border experiences of birth and death, by Nietzsche’s concept of the soul of nations (“Volksseelen”), and by Kant’s concept of “unsociable sociability.” The assumption of an absolute undefinability of man can be understood as the ground of a universal solidarity by which the antagonistic contradictions of different worldviews seem to be reconcilable, because it limits the claim on absoluteness of worldviews.
5. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 4 > Issue: Part 1
Anselm Böhmer Querungen der Welt: Eugen Finks untergründige Themenfelder
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The focal aspects of Eugen Fink’s philosophy are the world and the question of human life’s place within it. In the interplay of different topics such as basic phenomena of human being, the cosmic game and phenomenological problems of education, there is a development of various traits of dialectical thought hidden in his philosophy. This article tries to follow and to describe these crossing lines (e.g. meontic aspects, asubjectivity or the crossroads of the Greek hen kai pan within philosophy) in order to explore some guidelines for further research in philosophical anthropology.
6. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 1 > Issue: Part 2
Ichiro Yamaguchi Ki und Du: Versuch einer interkulturellen Phänomenologie
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This paper disputes the claim that the so-called soul-body dualism finds its solution in the analysis of the intersubjectivity from the viewpoint of Husserl’s genetic phenomenology and in the concept of selflessness in the philosophy of Mahayana-Buddhism. The intentionality of instinctual drive as the passive synthesis provides the reason for Husserl’s intersubjectivity and the possibility of Buber’s I-Thou relation. The selflessness in this relation is the concept of Buber’s thou and in Husserl’s intersubjectivity lies in the interesting connection with the non-egological dimension of Buddhism.
7. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 1 > Issue: Part 2
Norio Murata Habitualität und Zeitlichkeit
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The concept of the habituality is to consider in reference of the temporality, as far as it is acquired in the course of the time. On the one hand the habit is not the unique being in the time like event or fact, but it lasts for a while. On the other hand, the habit is not valid supertemporally or omnitemporally like the ideal objectivity, but it has the beginning and the end in the time. In this article it is tried to relate the habituality to the temporality. At first, the difficulty to determinate the habituality is clarified in reference of the temporality. To avoid this difficulty Husserl pays attention to the intentional relation to the past. Secondly, in the analysis of the horizontal network of intentions the habituality will be investigated in reference of the past as sedimentation and future as anticipation. At last it is shown that in Husserl’s late years the habituality bases on the instinct. There we try to interpret the instinct not as inherent ability but as pure activity.
8. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 1 > Issue: Part 2
Kazunori Watanabe Der junge Heidegger und das Problem der Kategorie
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In the decline of Heidegger’s life, he said that his early interest in the problem of category already suggested “the question of being (Seinsfrage)”. This paper deals with Heidegger’s interpretation about the category. I want to demonstrate two sources which permit him to accept that category in his own particular interpretation: that is to say Aristotle and Dilthey. Heidegger learned Dilthey’s “category of life (Lebenskategorie)” from which he read that category is life itself, has as its nature an articulation of its own self and a tendency toward the world. In addition, he reads about the “logos”-character of the category in Aristotle: namely, category means to speak about the world. The world is spoken, but it is our respective lives that express the world as such. In other words, the world at the same time speaks and is spoken by its self. This structure is analogical to the structure of “the question of being” because Being (Being of Dasein) is questioned and the same Being questions itself. Herein we can find a starting point of Heidegger’s thought.
9. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 4
Inga Römer Vorlaufende Entschlossenheit oder Schuld gegenüber der Vergangenheit? Überlegungen zu Heidegger und Ricoeur
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The essay confronts Heidegger’s notion of running ahead toward death in resoluteness with Ricoeur’s notion of indebtedness toward the past. A first section gives an interpretation of Heidegger’s concepts of an existential being guilty or responsible, the call of conscience and the running ahead toward death. The second section discusses Ricoeur’s critique of the Heideggerian conception of running ahead toward death and sketches Ricoeur’s own notion of death. A third section shows how Ricoeur modifies the Heideggerian notions of guilt and conscience. The essay closes with the integrative thesis that Heidegger’s understanding of death highlights the irreplacability of the individual and might, in spite of Ricoeur’s critique, very well find a place in Ricoeur’s temporal ethics.
10. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 4
Gerard Visser Das Ereignis der papiers collés im Werk Braques
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In the history of modern art impressionism and cubism are usually opposed to each other. The work of the impressionist is held to be based on sensation, that of the cubist on form. Essentially, however, in both the same revolution takes place. The motif of the enveloppe in the work of Monet in his later life and that of an espace tactile in the cubist experiments of the young Braque provide evidence of the search for a more authentic and original image space than the perspectival. In this respect the discovery of the papiers collés in 1912 can be conceived as the turning point in a mystical night, where the traditional outlook dies, to give way to a new image space, the direction whereof is entrusted to an emptiness that has been released from the confines of perspectival space.