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11. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 1
Xinyan Jiang Courage and Self-Control
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An important question about the nature of courage is whether it is a form of self-control. In this paper I argue that there are different kinds of courage and therefore the question whether courage is a form of self-control cannot be given a uniform answer. Courage exhibited in all cases may be classified as either spontaneous or deliberative courage. Spontaneous courage is not a form of self-control and usually is called for in emergency situations. It results from long-term moral cultivation, not a mindless impulse. Deliberative courage is usually shown in nonemergency situations. It may or may not involve self-control. In general, other things being equal, courage without exercising self-control is morally preferable. The absence of self-control is a necessary condition for ideal courage but ordinary courage is always accompanied by the exercise of will power.
12. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 1
Luc Langlois Fondation et application: de quelques apories de la Diskursethik de Karl-Otto Apel
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Dans ses travaux recents, Karl-Otto Apel s'est employe ä redefinir la structure architectonique de la Diskursethik, en distinguant en eile deux moments fondamentaux et interrelies. Un premier volet, fondationnel et deontique, vise ä retracer, ä partir des presupposes contrefactuels et inevitables de la communaute ideale de communication, le principe universaliste du jugement moral, qui comme tel fait abstraction de l'histoire et revendique une validite inconditionnelle. Dans son second volet par contre, la Diskursethik en tend jeter les bases d'une « ethique de la responsabilite sensible ä l'histoire », c'est-ä-dire attentive aux facteurs historico-culturels et aux circonstances de Taction qui empechent l'etablissement d'un dialogue sans contrainte. La Diskursethik se trouve par la enrichie d'une dimension teleologique, vouee ä la realisation progressive, et ä la preservation ä long terme, des conditions de l'entente rationnelle. Seule l'integration de ces deux volets, deontique et teleologique, permet d'acceder selon Apel ä une authentique «ethique planetaire», capable d'affronter les crises du temps present—au premier chef la crise ecologique, la crise du sous-developpement et la crise du sur-armement. Notre expose interrogera cette architectonique complexe de la Diskursethik. II soutiendra, contre Apel, que les questions de fondation des normes ne se laissent pas disjoindre du probleme de leur application. II reviendra aussi sur la these apelienne liant le probleme de l'application concrete des normes ethiques ä la relation dialectique des communautes ideale et reelle de communication. Nous suggererons plutöt qu'une « ethique de la responsabilite sensible ä l'histoire » peut se soutenir elle-meme sans la fiction d'une communaute ideale de communication.
13. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 1
Rodney G. Peffer World Hunger and Moral Theory
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I canvass the major contending normative theories /approaches concerning the world hungerabsolute poverty problem by going through a set of questions— some normative, some empirical, and some a mixture of both—in order to elucidate what the germane issues are in this ongoing debate and in order to provide a decision procedure for progressively weeding out the less plausible theories from the more plausible ones until we arrive at what I believe to be the most plausible and well-supported theory and solution to this momentous problem. Theories are eliminated if they are empirically unsupportable in terms of their analysis of the problem (or their recommendations aimed at solving the problems) and/or they are morally unsupportable in terms of not showing sufficient concern and respect for people in the design of the principles, rights, duties, and/or obligations they propose or, alternatively, not respecting the root values of autonomy and fairness. My main conclusion is that although Amartya Sen's capability ethic has made important contributions to moral theory, a Rawlsian theory (such as mine) that specifically accepts a Basic Rights principle is preferable to it since, for one reason, it is less vague in what policies are to be recommended on such issues as world hunger (given the same set of empirical assumptions). I also conclude that although Sen's empirical (economic and socialtheoretical) work on famines, hunger, and absolute poverty in general is to be much commended, it contains claims that are highly suspect.
14. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 1
Harun Tepe Volume Introduction
15. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 1
Harun Tepe Epistemological Dilemmas of Contemporary Ethics
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Contemporary ethics has often faced questions concerning its epistemological foundations. Thus epistemological problems of ethics have become a main interest in ethics, and ethics has begun to be considered mainly as meta-ethics or analytical ethics, mainly dealing with the foundation of ethical propositions or norms. However questions raised about the foundation of ethics have mostly ended in dilemmas. Today, moral dilemmas or epistemological dilemmas of ethics pose a challenge to contemporary ethics in the form of questions like "Is ethics normative?", "Is there any ethical knowledge?", "Are the statements of ethics bearers of truth-values? (these questions relate to what 1 call the Normativity Dilemma); and questions like "Are ethical judgements objective?", "Are values part of the world, out there, in the way that physical objects are?" (these questions relate to what 1 call the Objectivity Dilemma); and questions like "Is there any criterion to see which principles are correct?", "Do we have good reasons to do what is right?", "Can acting ethical ever be justified?" (these questions relate to what 1 call the Justification Dilemma). Are these dilemmas that are said to be epistemological genuine dilemmas, or are they only supposed to be so? In this paper I will tackle the epistemological foundations of these dilemmas and try to demonstrate that there are fallacies involved in them.
16. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 1
Per Bauhn Two Concepts of Courage
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In this paper I intend to present two concepts of courage, with the purpose of introducing two different ways in which the classical virtue of courage may serve goals of personal achievement and goals of collective flourishing respectively. The two forms of courage that I will distinguish are the courage of creativity and the courage of conviction, respectively. The courage of creativity is the ability to confront the fear of failure, this ability being directed by the agent's will to achieve, while the courage of conviction is the ability to confront the fear of personal transience, this ability being directed by the agent's sense of moral responsibility. While not necessarily being a moral virtue, courage in the first of its two forms constitutes an important component of the agent's capacity for self-fulfilment. In its other form it enables the agent to confront the fears of meaninglessness and of being a social outcast, involving her in a quest for objectivity and in doing the right thing rather than giving in to conventions.
17. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 1
Ulrich F. Wodarzik Zwischen Natur- und Sittengesetzlichkeit Objektivität, Leben und Normativität
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Der lebendige Mensch befindet sich immer zwischen Erfahrung und Metaphysik, er ist Natur und Freiheit zugleich. Anders gesagt erfährt sich der von Welt umgebende Mensch als ein freiheitliches Wesen, das unter einem bedingungslosen moralischen Sollensanspruch steht, der an keine Kontingenz geknüpft ist. Betrachten wir die moralische Dimension genauer, so erkennen wir moralischen Pflichten gegenüber uns selbst und anderen als Gebote Gottes.1 Das bewusste Leben selbst gibt uns Zwecke, die wir weder theoretisch noch praktisch auf den Begriff bringen können.2 Kant spricht vom Leben als ein Vermögen, dass einen inneren selbst-bestimmten Anstoß zum praktischen Handeln im Sinne einer inneren Kausalität darstellt. Wir müssen ein naturgemäßes Leben von einem guten Leben unterscheiden. Idealiter gesehen oder im Zustand der Glückseligkeit ist das natürliche und das moralisch gute Leben ein und das selbe.3 Ein natürliches und ein gutes Leben soll der Mensch führen, denn die Natur ermöglicht sittliches Handeln und sittliches Handeln macht natürliches Leben lebenswerter. Kant hat in seiner epochalen Kritik der Urteilkraft ein für alle mal gezeigt, dass nur der Mensch unbedingter Endzweck der Schöpfung ist, nicht als natürliches sondern als ein moralisches Wesen betrachtet, denn »im Menschen, aber auch in diesem nur als Subjekte der Moralität, ist die unbedingte Gesetzgebung in Ansehung der Zwecke anzutreffen, welche ihn also allein fähig macht, ein Endzweck zu sein, dem die ganze Natur teleologisch untergeordnet ist.4« So gesehen ist der Mensch sich eines physikotheologischen Verhältnisses bewusst und muss es aushalten, und es fragt sich wie der Hiatus zwischen Natur und Freiheit zu denken ist.
18. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 1
Taşkiner Ketenci Der Begriff ,,des Rationalen'' in der Kantischen Ethik
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In der aktuellen Diskussion werden die Begriffe "Vernunft" und "Rationalität" in Frage gestellt. Mit der "Rationalität" einer Handlung, einer Haltung oder einer Organisation bezeichnet man im Allgemeinen den Erfolg bei der Verwirklichung eines bestimmten Zweckes. Die "instrumentale Rationalität" als Grundlage einer Ethik, für die das Nachdenken über den Wert der Zwecke ohne Belang ist, wurde seit jeher heftig kritisiert. Kant verwendet das Wort "rational" in Bezug auf die Bestimmungsgründe des Willens. Nach Kant sind die Bestimmungsgründe des Willens entweder „subjektiv und empirisch" oder „objektiv und rational". Wenn der Wille "rational" bestimmt wird, so hat dies zur Folge, dass die Personen andere Personen nicht nur als Mittel, sondern auch als Zweck behandeln. Also in der Kantische Ethik weist das Wort "rational" auf ein Wesen hin, das selbst ein Zweck ist und deshalb als solcher behandelt werden soll. Schließlich bedeutet in der Kantischen Ethik das Wort "rational" eine "Rationalität" der Zwecke.
19. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 1
Halil Turan Does the Is-Ought Issue Suggest a Transcendental Realm?
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The principle that values cannot be derived from facts, though first explicitly formulated by David Hume, does not seem to be consistent with Hume's assertions that value becomes intelligible through experience, and that the will is determined by pleasure and pain. Moral reasoning involving pleasures and pains in the context of the peculiarities of human existence in society must be more complicated than reasoning involving ordinary, i.e. natural, pleasures and pains. Nevertheless, all pains and pleasures must be sensations. Hence Hume's moral philosophy becomes an example of an ethics in which facts, namely pleasures and pains, are related to values. However, many philosophers have argued that values must have a transcendental origin. Ludwig Wittgenstein's arguments concerning ethics and aesthetics constitute an interesting contemporary example of such transcendental conceptions of value. For Wittgenstein, the voice of conscience is God; the will can affect the subject at the limits of the world, and not things in the world; therefore, ethics must be transcendental (not expressible in the way facts in the world are). It seems that this attitude in ethics and aesthetics rules out any empirical discourse on values, which can hardly be called totally fruitless. An example of such discourse may even be one describable in Wittgensteinian terms: values can be defined through facts as modifications in the limits of the world, and through facts as things "in the world". If such descriptions are possible and expressible, a reference to a transcendental realm to account for the existence of conscience would become redundant.
20. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 1
Donald Ipperciel The Latimer Decision: A Case Study on Euthanasia
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I would like to use the highly publicized Latimer decision in Canada as a case study on euthanasia. In this case, Robert Latimer killed his severely disabled 12-year-old child in order, in his mind, to end her suffering. Consequently, he was convicted of first-degree murder. I will argue that condemning Robert Latimer's act 1) ensues from hermeneutically misconstruing the concrete situation; 2) does not respect the criterion of reasonableness, which is linked to the consideration of an ethos. The elaboration of the arguments will refer to the ruling of the Canadian Supreme Court (R. v. Latimer, 2001), which produced the most comprehensive case against Latimer's actions.