Narrow search


By category:

By publication type:

By language:

By journals:

By document type:


Displaying: 11-20 of 277 documents

0.033 sec

11. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1/2
Stanislav Sousedík Tomistická teorie predikace: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
12. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1/2
Jiří Polívka Sensus Compositionis a Sensus divisionis v kontextu problému modalit v Ordinatio I, 39 Jana Dunse Scota: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
In Ordinatio I, 39 Scotus distinguishes two ways in which the distinction between sensus compostionis and sensus divisionis can be made: According to the first way the „composition and division“ relates to two different (sensus divisionis) or one and the same (sensus compositionis) instants of time; according to the other the distinction is made between an assertion of compossibility of the contradictory predicates in one and the same instant of time (sensus compositionis) and an assertion of actuality of the one and possibility of the other of the contradictory predicates in one and the very same instant of time (sensus divisionis). The author presents a formal logical analysis of all these various senses of modal propositions and shows how Scotus strictly separated modality from temporality, and contingency from mutability.
13. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1/2
Anthony Kenny Tomismus papeže Jana Pavla II. Encyklika Fides et ratio: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
14. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1/2
Lukáš Novák Sémantika vlastních jmen a identitní teorie predikace: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Saul Kripke denies that the reference of a proper name is mediated through a sense (an intension, a concept), and claims that it has to be immediate for „rigidity“ of a proper name to be saved. On the other hand, the version of the Identity Theory of predication according to which predication is characterised as intentional identification of the conceptual content of the predicate with the object represented by the subject-concept requires that there be a concept (sense of the term) at the places both of the subject and of the predicate. This paper is an attempt to propose a conception that purports to maintain the Identity Theory of predication with its demand for proper names to have senses and respond to Kripkean arguments while retaining the rigidity of proper names. Two main theses are defended: 1) Whether a term refers rigidly or non-rigidly does not depend on the nature of the term (i. e. whether it is a name or a description), but on the intention of the speaker/writer. Consequently, both names and descriptions can be used both rigidly and non-rigidly. 2) There is a „minimal sense“ to any proper name which can generaly be described as follows: „the person who has been given the name so-and-so“. The expression „has been given the name“ describes a „relation of reason“, which must be strictly distinguished from the relation of reference of the name, in order to avoid a vicious circle in reference determination, something against which Kripke warned.
15. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1/2
Pavel Materna Úvod do logické syntaxe a sémantiky: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
16. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1/2
Petr Dvořák Tomášova Teorie Predikace ve Světle Obecné Sémantické Teorie (Zkrácená Verze): A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
17. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1/2
Michal Chabada Rozumová intuícia podl'a Jána Dunsa Scota – základné prístupy: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
The problem of the intuition of the individual as such, i. e. of its individuality (the „principle of individuation“) gave rise to many controversies. The problem becomes especially urgent in the light of the Christian revelation, since Christianity in the first place relates to the singular and individual (and therefore contingent), whereas the universal assumes only a secondary rôle. John Duns Scotus deals with this theologico-philosophical problem and sets out to defend intellective intuition of the individual as a whole. He distinguishes three kinds within this type of cognition: perfect intuitive intellective cognition which is possible only in patria, direct but imperfect (i. e. not penetrating the principle of individuation) intuitive intellective cognition which relates to contingent truths and spiritual acts, and, finally, imperfect and indirect intuitive intellective cognition, i. e. acts of recalling the past intuitive cognitions. In these three examples the fundamental Scotus’s arguments are exhibited and the extent to which Scotus transgresses the limits of Aristotelian epistemology is made clear.
18. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1/2
Tomáš Nejeschleba Jezuité v přírodních vědách a ve filosofii 17. a 18. století: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
19. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 10 > Issue: 1
Theodore Scaltsas Relations as Plural-Predications in Plato
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Plato was the first philosopher to discover the metaphysical phenomenon of plural-subjects and plural-predication; e.g. you and I are two, but neither you, nor I are two. I argue that Plato devised an ontology for plural-predication through his Theory of Forms, namely, plural-partaking in a Form. Furthermore, I argue that Plato used plural-partaking to offer an ontology of related individuals without reifying relations. My contention is that Plato’s theory of plural-relatives has evaded detection in the exegetical literature because his account of plural-subjects through the Theory of Forms had not been recognised for what it is. I further submit that Plato’s handling of related individuals through plural-predication is not only a “first” in philosophy, but also an “only”, having remained a unique account in the metaphysics of relations. I hope that Plato’s account will introduce a fresh approach to contemporary debates on the subject.
20. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 10 > Issue: 1
Derek von Barandy How to Save Aristotle from Modal Collapse
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
On Jaakko Hintikka’s understanding of Aristotle’s modal thought, Aristotle is committed to a version of the Principle of Plenitude, which is the thesis that no genuine possibility will go unactualized in an infinity of time. If in fact Aristotle endorses the Principle of Plenitude, everything becomes necessary. Despite the strong evidence that Aristotle indeed accepts that Principle of Plenitude, there are key texts in which Aristotle seems to contradict it. On Hintikka’s final word on the matter, Aristotle either endorses the Principle of Plentitude or Aristotle is simply inconsistent. Without challenging Hintikka’s interpretation of the relevant texts, I show how Aristotle may accept a form of the Principle of Plenitude that allows for genuine unactualized possibilities in the world. What allows me to reconcile theseemingly inconsistent data is to show how Aristotle is only committed to a de re version of the Principle of Plenitude. After I lay out my proposal, I show how it opens up new ways in which we might understand Aristotle’s attempt to reject fatalism in his De interpretatione 9.