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11. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Victoria Gritsenko Contemporary Marxism and Post-Industrial Economy
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Karl Marx scientifically predicted the appearance of some extraordinary tendencies of social development that in the second half of the XX century were given a common name of post-industrial or informational society and interpreted as post-bourgeois, post-capitalist, post-business society and late capitalism. Autonomist Marxism and Perm philosophy school had separately come to a conclusion that all the phenomena noticed by the post-industrial theory could be adequately explained if we consider the historically new form of material labor, appeared now. Marx, who predicted this new form, named it automated, scientific, or universal labor. With the appearance of the universal labor the wealth of the society depends on the universal human powers that help to involve the extensive powers of nature into the production process. Universal labor cannot be averaged or measured by the labor time as the abstract labor; it implies high complexity and creativity. Involving increasingly powerful forces of nature and human society, it appears to be the labor of another essence and by its essence it doesn’t create value.
12. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Lai He The Democratizing Trend of Philosophy: An Important Dimension of Understanding the Spirit of Modern Philosophy
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A significant achievement in thought, reached with the change from theoretical to practical philosophy, is that the popular taste for aristocratism is on the wane. Meanwhile, philosophy is turning away from authoritarianism towards democracy. This is a radical change in the spiritual character and disposition of philosophy. The desire of privileged class and the noble men lies in philosophy as a traditionally rooted complex, which is represented by an idea of truth (that conception is being), an idea of values (that idea is the perfect good) and an idea of history (that reason is the road). Philosophy’s renouncement of noble mentality does not mean the degradation of philosophical development, but indicates a kind of theoretical self-consciousness and self-enlightenment regarding the rational mode of philosophy and its function. This keeps us alert for the dogmatism and arbitrariness of philosophy. And also it shows that it is vital to highlight the democratic spiritual disposition of philosophy both for philosophy and for those who work on it.
13. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Boris Gubman Philosophical Universalism and Plurality of Cultural Worlds
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In the rapidly globalizing world, contemporary philosophy should work out a strategy combining universalism and critical approach to a mosaic of its cultural reality. After the demise of classical metaphysics, philosophy is no longer able to address culture with its ideal image portraying the teleological path of its perfection. However, despite its new roles of mediator and witness bridging gaps between different cultural forms, philosophy should not lose its capacity of a self-founding thinking. Otherwise, it may degenerate into a kind criticism aimed at the unique phenomena and producing no general meanings nourishing cultures. The hermeneutical reason is moving to a new kind of critical universalism getting into prolific negotiations with a variety of cultures, learning from them and producing general meaningful interpretations of human world problems that are directed against any form of power abuse and violence existing in society.
14. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Ivan Brian Inductivo Process Identity: Inheritance as the Key to the Trans-temporal Knot
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Disputations on the trans-temporal identity have been a perennial predicament of philosophy. Despite the many array of theories, the persistence of identity through time presents hackneyed and relentless arguments which seeks to suffice our appropriation of identity. Identity is absolute if taken in the strictest sense and in sheer idem-identity. But identity, especially of ipse-identity, does not just constitute of absolute sameness alone but also of the recognition of self and the inevitable inclusion of temporality. In the gamut of works of Charles Hartshorne held in scrutiny, process philosophy has offered a neoclassical paradigm in approaching this interminable trans-temporal knot of identity, i.e., a partial (personal) identity through the novel injunction of the concept of inheritance. This study aims to present a tenable option for identity that serves as a plausible alternative to the problem of persistence through temporal passage and of continuity of character without resorting to “substance-like” metaphysics (Aristotelian) and absolute connectedness or absolute discreteness.
15. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Jörg Löschke Reasons for Love: A Holistic Account
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In the philosophy of love there is discussion about the reasons for love and how to understand them. According to the property-approach, reasons for love are grounded in features of the beloved; according to the relationship-approach, they are grounded in facts about the relationship. The property-approach seems to be intuitively the more plausible view, but it faces the problems of fungibility and continuity. The talk defends the property-approach by applying Dancy’s holistic conception of reasons to this question. This can solve the fungibility problem, since it only arises when reasons of love are understood atomistically. Furthermore, the continuity problem can be solved by applying the distinction of favorers (the features of the beloved) and enablers (the fact that it is this specific person who instantiates the features). If the beloved is understood as a general enabler, it is conceivable that the reasons for love change with the propertis of the beloved, making a continuity of love possible when the properties of the beloved change.
16. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Jurate Morkuniene Philosophy in the Contemporary Social Space
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Contemporary philosophy generalizes the most complicated and rapidly changing objects such as society and person. In this sense, philosophy is an incomplete, relatively open and, thus, theoretically “imperfect”, “non-systematic”, and vulnerable theory. Philosophy develops by reconsidering the problems of order and disorder, complexity and simplicity, evolution, truth and error, etc. In the 21st century philosophy revives to the degree its methods correspond to the present paradigm of science. Sciences find instability, imbalance, probability, or irreversibility everywhere. This cannot be avoided neither by social sciences nor philosophy, although they are much more inert. The methods of philosophy are, first of all, modified by understanding that history is incomplete and cannot be stopped at a certain phase by declaring to be the absolute solution of human needs, aspirations and problems. New concepts are being adopted in philosophy. What proceeds is a conceptual synthesis, a “joining”, or introducing into philosophy the methods and the language of the other sciences.
17. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Vladimir Orlov Contemporary Marxism and the Global Concept of the Universe
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Having been developed in the way of concept extension, Marx-ism appears to be nowadays a concrete-universal theory, in which originally imperfect transition program from abstract-universal to concrete-universal concepts of logic and sense is realized on materialistic foundation. This very program that was brought about in K. Marx’s “Capital” has not been sufficiently expressed in classical or contemporary philosophy. The base of this new Marxist philosophical form is not constructed by the terms of overall matter, movement and development, but by the conception of the general naturally de-termined universal process of infinite movement from lower to superior forms of matter. We are aware of four of them: physical, chemical, biological and social matter. Representing the eternal world as the progressive whole, modern materialism makes nature as the proper place of each fundamental science understandable, and helps to clarify the location and development of future trends of the Man in the World.
18. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Robin M. Muller McDowell’s Romantic Conceptualism
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My paper is motivated by two thoughts: (1) that there’s significant overlap between J. G. Herder’s romanticism and, what I call, the ‘late’ conceptualism of John McDowell; (2) that recognizing this helps to settle a dispute in contemporary epistemology concerning the contents of perception. I argue, on the basis of that overlap, that “romantic conceptualism” avoids two pressing criticisms of conceptualism: It offers a reply to the argument from the fineness of grain of perceptual experience and it explains the relationship between human perceptual experience and the perceptual experiences of non-human animals. I start with the interpretation of McDowell’s views, tracing the significant revisions in the period following the publication of Mind and World; then I try to compare his views with Herder’s, trying to establish a framework for responding to the more trenchant criticisms of McDowell’s non-conceptualist opponents, and the explanatory force of conceptualist hypotheses beyond the context of contemporary epistemology. The first arc of the paper, therefore, traces the evolution of McDowell’s thought concerning perceptual contents. The second attempts to demonstrate where (and with what consequences) that view converges with a romantic philosophy of mind.
19. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Yiouli I. Papaioannou Deontology or consequantialism?: An Intertemporal Dispute in Light of Contemporary Science
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One of the most important dispute in the history of philosophy is the conflict between the proponents of deontology who claim that our choices must be guided and assessed of what we ought to do, and the supporters of consequentialism who maintain that choices are to be morally assessed solely by the states of affairs they bring about. Today, the interest in this conflict has increased dramatically because of the recent scientific advances which present evidence that consequentialism, in comparison to deontology, is the best approach to morality.In particular, according to recent scientific findings, the moral assessment of our choices and actions grounded on consequences and results is more rational than the moral assessment grounded on duties and intentions. In an interesting study of the way in which brain process moral dilemmas, researchers found significant differences in the neural processes of subjects, depending upon whether they were considering moral dilemmas in relation with their consequences or with duties and intentions. Our moral responses in relation to consequences seem to evolve under more rational brain processes than morals responses which emerge from a sense of duty.However, a more assiduous consideration of the philosophical concepts of duty/intention and of consequences demonstrates that it is impossible to establish morality without taking into consideration both of the notions of intention and consequences.
20. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Michel Paquette On Defining
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We offer a formulation of a set of rules for definitions that is informed by modern logic. We aim to be as precise as possible in our formulation. The set of rules that we discuss derives from Aristotle’s treatise on the art of dialectic, Topics. The concern about rules for definitions can be traced back at least to Socrates, as represented in Plato’s early dialogues. Since we view our task as belonging to general philosophical methodology and as being central to it, we approach the rules for definitions from a general perspective and try to avoid adjudicating controversial issues in scientific methodology or contemporary theories of meaning. We discuss some philosophical difficulties as we proceed. First, we distinguish three components in a rule: a principle, a criterion and a motivation. Secondly, we discuss the logical form of definition sentences and the properties of the relation “…=df …”. Thirdly, we account for six classical rules, highlighting the components for each rule. The rules address issues about extensional equality, essential predication, circularity, negative definitions, synonymous expressions and metaphorical language. Our formulation makes it apparent that the principles of definition are either logical requirements or pragmatic rules.