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11. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 2
Adrián Bertorello, Julieta Bereiro Patterns of Narrative Identity in Heidegger and Winnicott: Proper, Improper and Pathologic
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This work aims at articulating Heidegger and Winnicott’s proposal regarding the issue of the concrete patterns of identity. First, we shall make a brief exposure of the multiplicity of subjective roles in each of the authors. Second, we shall propose a narrativist interpretation of the issue of the self in both of the aforementioned authors. This work shall not only limit to state the mainly narrative structure of Heidegger’s Selbst and of Winnicott’s Self, but it shall also aim at determining a concrete narrative pattern for each of these roles.
12. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 2
Guilherme Peres Messas Phenomenological Principles and the Notion of Biology in Psychopathology and Psychiatry
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This article develops a phenomenological contribution to the notion of biology in psychopathology and psychiatry. Grounded in the principles of transformation, heterogeneity, proportionality and particularity, a paradigm of phenomenological orientation allocates to biology a role different from that assumed by mainstream psychiatry. First, no clear definition of what is biological may be established a priori as of general application. Second, the research agenda in biological psychiatry necessarily intersects with investigation of the particularities of each individual clinical case. Finally, the continuity of the biological agenda needs to resume the construction and investigation of psychopathological categories that cohere with the reality of the mental universe.
13. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 2
Natalia Petrillo Expresión lingüística y expresión corporal: Linguistic Expression and Corporal Expression
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In the Logical Investigations, Husserl demonstrates the need to distinguish between the meaning of a linguistic expression and its relationship to an extralinguistic object in reality. Husserl distinguishes two kinds of signs: the “indicative sign” (Anzeichen) and the “expressive sign”, which he also calls “expression” (Ausdruck). He draws the distinction with the claim that an indicative sign “indicates” something but does not express a “meaning” (Bedeutung). In other words, he disentangles the expression, as the sign which expresses a meaning, from its usual entanglement with the indicative sign. In the First Investigation of the Logical Investigations, Husserl dwells on intersubjective discourse only long enough to isolate the expressive sign and attempts to capture the way contents and acts become thematic in communication by contrasting the expressive and the indicative function of the signs. In order to study the logical meaning of a sign, Husserl excludes as irrelevant the indicative sign and devotes his analysis to the logical expressions. The article first clarifies the basic concepts of Husserl’s theory of meaning. To appreciate his observations, we might recall how the process of communication comes up in Husserl (I). Furthermore, an attempt is made in this paper to show that meaning is not restricted to linguistic expressions (II). Since communication is contaminated by indications, it can no longer be totally expressive. As a consequence, it is only when communication is suspended that pure expressivity is regained. In order to restore pure expression, the relation with the other has to be suspended. This means that the process of expression does not owe anything to the empirical world, including the empirically spoken world. It also means that the solitary subject does not need indications in order to have a relation with itself. The reason is the immediate presence of conscious life to itself. According to this, there arises the problem of whether the corporal movements are expressions, too. In response to this difficulty, I will take up Husserl’s considerations of the constitution of intersubjectivity through corporal movements. The main purpose of this article consists in showing a possible way to answer this question. The conclusion summarizes the main points and recalls that there is also another kind of expressions that Husserl did not consider in the Logical Investigations.
14. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 2
Luis Román Rabanaque Cuerpo, cinestesia, nóema: Body, Kinaesthesis, Noema
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This paper aims to present some aspects of the noematical connections between kinaesthesis and the own Body that can be drawn following Husserl’s static and genetic analyses. These aspects concern: 1) the introduction of the concept of kinaesthesis as the phenomenological residuum of the “muscle sensations”, and in reference to the own Body as the bearer of all sensations; 2) the noematic constitution of the own Body both as a physical thing and as the “organ” of the I, the latter being constituted in turn in a sensing and a moving stratum; 3) the reference of the “I move” as a mode of the “I can (move)” to the I as subject of a system of practical capacities; 4) this system’s genetic structure in the living present as an habitual one whose noematic correlate can be described as a “schema” of possible orientations and typical presentations of things within the world; 5) the difference between kinaesthetical systems in plural and Kinaesthesis in singular as all-compassing unity.
15. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 2
Maria Aparecida Viggiani Bicudo, Maurício Rosa Mundo cibernético e horizontes educacionais: um ensaio: Cybernetic World and Educational Horizons: An Essay
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This article focuses on the cybernetic reality, asking about its ontological and epistemological aspects and about its possible educational horizons. We develop the ontological arguments about the cybernetic reality drawing from authors that deal with Virtual Reality (VR) such as Levy and Castells. They take VR as a concept and show us which of the concept’s characteristics are in opposition to those characteristics that do not belong to VR. These procedures present difficulties that are confronted when one tries to express the concept of cybernetic world reality. They concern space and time, and what is deemed real, virtual, probable, potential and actual. These difficulties are confronted, attempting to clarify the philosophical meanings of reality by drawing on presenting studies by Granger and Deleuze, and assuming the phenomenological conceptions of knowledge and world. The authors assume that cyberspace is a world reality, which reveals its own characteristics as being dynamic, fast, speeded, de-territorialized. !e cyberspace reality is supported by a strong scientific and technological apparatus and updates its potentialities through the possible intervention triggered by the actions of people living-in-the-world-with-others-and-with-the-media. The modalities of these interventions are actualized with the exchange among subjects during knowledge production and social communication. The apparatus of the cybernetic world makes possible the collaborative knowledge construction and distance education (e-learning). The authors present and discuss the educational horizons as well as the open region of possibilities that are posed at the world, which can be realized and can be worked in a cybernetic context.
16. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 5 > Issue: Part 1
Elizabeth Behnke The “Remarkably Incompletely Constituted” Body in Light of a Methodological Understanding of Constitution: An Experiment in Phenomenological Practice (I)
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Merleau-Ponty’s appropriation of Husserl’s reference to the lived body as a “remarkably incompletely constituted thing” transforms the sense of the phrase. My aim is to recover Husserl’s original sense by turning not only to his writings, but to the relevant experiential evidence. I show that any attempt to account for the constitution of the body as a thing necessarily presupposes a body that is constituting rather than constituted, then suggest how “constitution” can be understood methodologically rather than metaphysically, concluding with some reflections on how descriptions produced through Husserlian phenomenological practice both sustain and outrun specific positions in phenomenological philosophy.
17. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 5 > Issue: Part 1
Eugene Kelly In lumine Dei: Scheler’s Phenomenology of World and God
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The paper evaluates two theses central to Max Scheler’s philosophy of religion: that essential knowledge of God is universal to humankind, and that this knowledge is irreducible to any experience outside itself. We examine the phenomenology of the fivefold process whereby we obtain knowledge of the Absolute. The conclusion is that the first thesis is plausible, and the second less so. However, the defense of the second thesis led Scheler to a fruitful phenomenology of religious experience as seeing the world in the light of God. The paper evaluates this world-view as an alternative to the scientific Weltanschauung.
18. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 5 > Issue: Part 1
Caroline Rebecca Lundquist Recover the Tragic: Exploring the Ethical Dimensions of Rape-Related Pregnancy
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There are few phenomena more tragic than rape-resultant pregnancy; faced with such pregnancies, rape victims are forced to make incredibly difficult and often heart-rending decisions. Yet both public and academic discourse on rape-pregnancy fails to acknowledge the profoundly tragic nature of these decisions, and also tends to implicitly or explicitly blame victims who opt for abortion or adoption. This paper critiques the use of praise and blame in relation to rape-resultant pregnancies, emphasizing the harmful effects of moral judgments on pregnant rape victims, and calls instead for a new ethical paradigm that acknowledges the deeply tragic nature of this phenomenon.
19. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 5 > Issue: Part 1
Emma R. Jones On the Life That is ‘Never Simply Mine’: Anonymity and Alterity in Merleau-Ponty and Irigaray
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In this paper, I suggest that Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of anonymity in the Phenomenology of Perception bears a strong resemblance to Luce Irigaray’s discussions of the elemental. I argue that reading these two accounts together helps to counter some of the critiques waged by feminists against the language of anonymity, because anonymity—like the elemental—does not in fact function as a positive substratum that would shore up sameness and prevent the rupture of difference. Instead, anonymity names the way in which the subject is always already disrupted by its encounter with and belonging-to the natural world.
20. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 5 > Issue: Part 1
Zachary Davis Scheler and the Task of Human Loving
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Max Scheler’s late work takes a peculiar turn toward a more speculative approach to phenomenology, particularly the work carried out under the titles of philosophical anthropology and metaphysics. I argue in this paper that this shift in Scheler’s approach does not render this late work as abstract, but rather deepens his investigations into the meaning the most fundamental and concrete human act, the act of love. Scheler’s late work ultimately demonstrates that loving is the task of being human.