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11. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 4 > Issue: Part 2
Tamás Ullmann Die zwei Dimensionen des Sinnes
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In the framework of a comparative analysis the article tries to show structural similarities and parallels between Husserl’s phenomenology and Wittgenstein’s late philosophy. The first step is to present their common conviction that the traditional concept of consciousness in the Modernity – based on the concept of “interiority” and that of re-presentation (Abbildung) – is not able to solve the real problems of meaning and experience. The second step is to show that their response to this metaphysical difficulty are not completely different, but have some strange complementarity, based on the concept of rule. Time and rule on one hand, and rule and language-game on the other determine the two different aspects of sense.
12. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 4 > Issue: Part 2
Peter Reynaert A Nonrepresentationalist Approach to Phenomenal Consciousness
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The question of a naturalistic explanation of human existence ultimately means naturalizing conscious embodiment. This requires two steps. First we need a sound definition of the socalled phenomenal consciousness that is typical of embodiment. Secondly, we need to clarify the nature of a naturalistic explanation of this phenomenal consciousness. The paper argues that classical phenomenological analyses of embodiment (Husserl and Merleau-Ponty) can be relevant here.Phenomenology’s noetico-noematic analysis can help to distinguish phenomenal consciousness from so-called qualia. In accordance with recent representationalism, qualia are to be understood as phenomenal properties of the perceived object, and are elements of representational or intentional content (noema). Noematic phenomenology of the experience of the lived body further permits an identification of the phenomenal properties of the lived body, and a complementary noetic phenomenology identifies a specific bodily self-awareness as the proper phenomenal consciousness (subjective experience) of embodiment. Phenomenology thus leads to the clarification of several central issues in the actual discussion about the possibility of naturalizing consciousness, and more precisely to a defense of a nonrepresentatonalist conception of phenomenal consciousness. This clarification substantiates the claim for a more radical naturalistic explanation of conscious embodiment.
13. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 4 > Issue: Part 2
Thomas Vongehr „Der liebe Meister“: Edith Stein über Edmund und Malvine Husserl
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In this biographically orientated paper, I investigate the relation between Edith Stein and the family of Edmund Husserl, with specific emphasis on the relation between Stein and Husserl’s wife Malvine. Stein followed Husserl from the University of Gottingen to the University of Freiburg, where in 1916 she received her doctorate of philosophy with a dissertation written under Husserl’s supervision: “On The Problem of Empathy.” Between 1916-1917 Edith Stein was Husserl’s assistant. Despite the fact that Husserl did not support her in obtaining a professorship, she maintained, after a break of some years, contact with the Husserl family. After Husserl’s death in 1938 Stein reestablished her relationship with Malvine Husserl through a correspondence. Stein gave her some advice concerning her conversion to Catholicism. A step which Stein had taken some years before.
14. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 4 > Issue: Part 2
Jürgen Trinks Der symbolische Stifter Gott und das Phanomen der Liebe in Kleists „Amphitryon“
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Th is analysis of Heinrich von Kleist’s comedy „Amphitryon“ develops the thesis that its comical can be seen in the correlation but insoluble difference between the phenomenality of love and the “symbolical institution” (Marc Richir) which goes along with the diff erence and connection between the symbolical institution of language-system (langue) and its phenomenological life (langage).
15. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 4 > Issue: Part 2
Michael Staudigl The Many Faces of Violence A Phenomenological Inquiry
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This article investigates phenomenology’s potential to deepen our understanding of violence. Its major aim consists in elaborating an integrative approach to the many faces of violence, i.e. to physical, psychic, social, and cultural violence. Approaching these various forms from the unifying viewpoint of the subject’s embodiment opens a renewed perspective on understanding violence. Displacing the very architectonics of Husserl’s “constitutive analysis,” this undertaking requires far reaching revisions of phenomenological method, which will be explicated respectively.
16. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 4 > Issue: Part 2
Hans Rainer Sepp Urpraxis der Epochē
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This is an attempt to analyze the process of practising a non-theoretical epochē by a phenomenology of transcendental-bodily emotion. It will be realized in four steps pointing out 1. the possibility of epochē within the scope of the structure of the life-world; 2. the conditions to carry out the epochē; 3. the response of the epochē to the threats for life; and 4. possible results of a non-theoretical epochē.
17. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 4 > Issue: Part 2
Notes on Contributors
18. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 4 > Issue: Part 2
Andrzej Leder Borders of Consciousness in Husserl’s Logical Investigations: Can Husserl’s Concept of Consciousness Serve as a Starting Point for the Development of a Th eory of Not-Conscious?
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We intend to prove that the concept of consciousness is impossible without assuming the existence of what is not conscious. And that the need of such assumption stems from a rigorous analysis of intuitive data. We wish to put phenomenology to its own test and to demonstrate that in its essence Husserl’s analysis radically goes beyond the sphere of what is understood as “conscious”. Our argument is that in his studies on the structure of the object of consciousness Husserl developed highly creative and important ideas which may be used as a starting point for the reformulation of the concept of the unconscious which has so dominated contemporary thinking, and the relation between conscious and what is not conscious.By viewing an intentional act, or even its ideal object, as a certain phenomenon of consciousness, we entirely change its nature and its ontological status. It ceases to be an act by which an object was constituted and it turns to be an object constituted by another act. We shall demonstrate that Husserl was, at least partly, aware of that.We wish to demonstrate that the metaphor of the absence, an empty space in which an object of consciousness is constituted corresponds with Husserl’s notion of the intention which he developed in his “Logical Investigations”. It is also a metaphor which makes one recognise some intentional space, the space where an intuitive object of consciousness constitutes itself, the space which is a prerequisite for the object to be constituted, the space which is itself not intuitive and not conscious.
19. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 1 > Issue: Part 1
Kim Hongwoo Living in the Risk World: Ulrich Beck in the Shadow of Husserl and Heidegger
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Th is essay is an attempt to inquire into the recent literature on risk and bring out a fundamental category of humanity, which is the unpreparedness of man’s Being-in-the-World. It will begin with Ralph Nader’s Unsafe at Any Speed (1965) and follow through to Ulrich Beck’s Risk Society: Toward a New Modernity (1986). These points will then be related to the arguments of Husserl and Heidegger. In this way, the fundamental category of modern man is disclosed in its Being-in-the-World-for-which-no-one-Being-prepared.
20. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 1 > Issue: Part 1
Kohji Ishihara Reductionism in the Synthetic Approach of Cognitive Science and Phenomenology: Rethinking Dreyfus’ Critique of AI
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Drawing on Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, Hubert Dreyfus criticized classical AI in 1970s. While classical AI was based on symbolic manipulation, AI research of recent years has been based on the neural network approach and the synthetic approach. In this essay I would like to reexamine Dreyfus’ critique of AI and his Heidegger interpretation to suggest another aspect of Heidegger’s thought and Husserl’s phenomenology of reciprocal recognition which would provide a perspective from which to resist the reductionism in the recent approaches in cognitive science.