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Displaying: 11-20 of 597 documents

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11. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 2
Predrag Šustar Inventare il giusto e l’ingiusto: Saggio sull’etica di John Leslie Mackie
12. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 2
Matthew Nudds Common-Sense and Scientific Psychology
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In this paper I discuss the circumstances in which it would be right to revise a common-sense psychological categorisation -- such as the common-sense categorisation of emotions -- in the light of the results of empirical investigation. I argue that an answer to that question, familiar from eliminitivist arguments, should be rejected, and suggest that the issue turns on the ontological commitments of the explanations that common-sense psychological states enter into.
13. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 2
Josep E. Corbí Self and Sense in a Natural World
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A subject is a being who has a life to lead. In this paper, I explore the array of resources that are available to us (i.e., Westerners at the turn of the millennium) to articulate and assess our lives. Specifically, I shall reflect on the impact that such matters may have on our naturalist conviction that the world ultimately consists of a causal network where notions such as sense and value have no direct bearing. Sometend to assume that an implication of our naturalist world-view is that the notions of sense and value are inevitably relative to the subject’s desires and inclinations. This is, however, a line of reasoning that I would like to resist. For I am convinced that this approach unnecessarily restricts the number of resources to which we can legitimately appeal in order to lead our lives. This restriction will turn out to be quite serious because, as we shall see, it dramatically distorts our perception of the relevance that social ties may have in the life of a subject, as well as the conditions under which a human life may escape the absurd.
14. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 2
Barbara de Mori Human Rights and Concept of Person: Some Ethical Remarks
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The paper critically discusses the proposal of identifying the subject of human rights by means of the concept of moral person, reflecting on the inherent connection between the concept of person and that of human rights in their moral dimension, that is, in the light of an ethics of human rights, an ethics in which human rights represent fundamental moral values. The thesis defended is that the concept of moral person lends itself more than any other to the role of subject of human rights, if conceived as a relational, communicative and representative social value, that is as “the concept of an individual human being whose features enable him to join some segments of his life with others”.
15. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 2
Snježana Prijić-Samaržija Trust and Epistemic Cooperation
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In this paper, I defend a certain moderate version of Humean evidentialism against a Reidian non-evidentialist’s position. My proposal of cooperative viewpoint of trust is based on the following theses: (i) epistemic cooperation is a necessary condition for us to attain knowledge (because of the scope and complexity of the task, capacity inequalities and background information, etc.), (ii) any form of cooperative activity, including division of labor, requires that cooperators trust one another, (iii) in contrast to Reidian non-evidentialism, justified trust cannot be blind but has to rely on some evidence, (iv) crucial evidence that the hearer can have is evidence about the trustworthiness of informants, i.e., their moral and epistemic character, (v) the fact that we depend on other people for most of our knowledge can be a good reason to weaken Humean epistemic self-reliance and to accept as epistemically responsible and rational the trusting partly based on epistemic forward looking reasons (gathering of information).
16. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 3
Jasmina Čelica Self-Fulfillment
17. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 3
Jonathan Wolff John Rawls: Liberal Democracy Restated
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The paper starts with brief biographical details of John Rawls’s life, and indications regarding the significance of his proposal. The most relevant part of the article is dedicated to the discussion of the concept of democracy as it is included in Rawls’s theory of Justice. Rawls tries to find a solution to the incompatibility of two different motivations for democracy: the instrumental and the intrinsic defence. It followsfrom Rawls’s proposal that the two defences need not necessarily to be incompatible. Participation in public decision procedures helps citizens to improve their capacities. According to the author of the paper, the main criticisms of Rawls come not so much from doubts about the validity of these arguments, but from questioning the realism of his proposals.
18. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 3
Giovanni De Grandis Making Sense of A Theory of Justice
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The primary aim of this interpretive essay is to reconstruct some of the most important features of Rawls’s theory of justice, and to offer a hypothesis about how its assumptions and arguments are tied together in a highly structured construction. An almost philological approach is adopted to highlight Rawlsian ideas. First, I consider in what sense Rawls is an individualist and in what sense he is not. Fromthis I conclude that he ought not be charged of psychological egoism or atomism. Then I consider the role of rational choice, the contract and the relation of the latter to the criterion of reflective equilibrium. Here, pride of place is given to the reflexive method, while the role of contract and rational choice, though not denied, is downgraded. Finally, I enquire whether Rawls can be considered a universalist, and suggest that this category, owing to the theory’s practical aim and pragmatic method, is of little use. If successful, my reconstruction should offer a better insight into the theory and dispel some possible misunderstandings. But my presentation should not be read as either an assessment or a defense.
19. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 3
Carla Bagnoli, Elvio Baccarini The Philosophy of John Rawls: Thirty Years after A Theory of Justice
20. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 3
Matthew Clayton Rawls and Natural Aristocracy
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The author discusses Rawls’s conception of socioeconomic justice, Democratic Equality. He contrasts Rawls’s account, which includes the difference principle constrained by the principle of fair equality of opportunity, with Natural Aristocracy, which constrains the difference principle only by the principle of careers open to talents. According to the author, many of Rawls’s own arguments support NaturalAristocracy over Democratic Equality. In particular, Natural Aristocracy appears well placed to avoid a challenge that naturally arises in consideration of Democratic Equality, with respect to which formal distributive principle should deal with social and natural causes of inequality. The challenge is to cite a morally relevant distinction which supports the appropriateness of dealing with natural causes of inequality differently to those generated by social causes. In support of his proposal, the author also appeals to certain arguments in Rawls’s Political Liberalism.