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11. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
Paul Humphreys An Occasion for Celebration
12. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
Horia-Costin Chiriac Tor Nørretranders, Iluzia utilizatorului
13. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
Panayot Butchvarov Generic Statements and Antirealism
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The standard arguments for antirealism are densely abstract, often enigmatic, and thus unpersuasive. The ubiquity and irreducibility of what linguists call generic statements provides a clear argument from a specific and readily understandable case. We think and talk about the world as necessarily subject to generalization. But the chief vehicles of generalization are generic statements, typically of the form “Fs are G,” not universal statements, typically of the form “All Fs are G.” Universal statements themselves are usually intended and understood as though they were only generic. Even if there are universal facts, as Russell held, there are no generic facts. There is no genericity in the world as it is “in-itself.” There is genericity in it only as it is “for-us.”
14. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
Sanford Goldberg Assertion, Testimony, and the Epistemic Significance of Speech
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Whether or not all assertion counts as testimony (a matter not addressed here), it is argued that not all testimony involves assertion. Since many views in theepistemology of testimony assume that testimony requires assertion, such views are (at best) insufficiently general. This result also points to what we might call the epistemic significance of assertion as such.
15. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
Teodor Dima Logos & Episteme: A New Environment for Philosophical Debate
16. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
Stephen Hetherington The Gettier Non-Problem
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This paper highlights an aspect of Gettier situations, one standardly not accorded interpretive significance. A remark of Gettier’s suggests its potential importance. And once that aspect’s contribution is made explicit, an argument unfolds for the conclusion that it is fairly simple to have knowledge within Gettier situations. Indeed, that argument dissolves the traditional Gettier problem.
17. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 1 > Issue: 2
Notes to Contributors
18. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 1 > Issue: 2
Notes on the Contributors
19. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 1 > Issue: 2
Sorin Costreie Frege‘s Context Principle: its Role and Interpretation
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The paper focuses on Gottlob Frege‘s so called Context Principle (CP hereafter), which counts as one of the most controversial points of his philosophy. Due to its importance and centrality in Frege‘s thought, a detailed discussion of the principle requires a detailed analysis of almost all aspects of his philosophy. Obviously, such a task cannot be successfully accomplished here. Thus I limit myself to address only two questions concerning the CP: what role does the principle play (in Grundlagen) and how can we interpret it. Addressing the first problem is required in order to address the second. Most authors interpreted CP from the perspective of Frege‘s later distinction between sense and reference, which I will call the ‗semantic interpretation‘. Although I accept this perspective as valuable and important, I will initially inverse the action and I will try to approach CP, and generally Grundlagen, in a more natural way, contextually, namely setting them in the initial logicist plan of the Begriffschrift. Finally, I will try to provide an interpretation concerning the alleged conflict between CP and Frege‘s compositionality thesis such that they could coherently stay together.
20. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 1 > Issue: 2
Steven D. Hales No Time Travel for Presentists
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In the present paper, I offer a new argument to show that presentism about time is incompatible with time travel. Time travel requires leaving the present, which, under presentism, contains all of reality. Therefore to leave the present moment is to leave reality entirely; i.e. to go out of existence. Presentist "time travel" is therefore best seen as a form of suicide, not as a mode of transportation. Eternalists about time do not face the same difficulty, and time travel is compossible with eternalism.