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Displaying: 1-10 of 187 documents

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1. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1/2
Stanislav Sousedík Vorwort: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
2. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1/2
Stanislav Sousedík Slovo úvodem: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
3. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1/2
Daniel Heider Leibnizova Disputatio metaphysica De Principio Individui A F. Suárez: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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The article examines the first fruit of Leibniz´s philosophical endeavour, which is his baccalaureate thesis Disputatio metaphysica de Principio Individui, on thebackground of the comparison with Suárez´s conception of individual unity in his Disputationes Metaphysicae. Despite Suárez´s more differentiated attitude to the issue of individuation in general, the author is convinced that one can find strong parallels between both authors, namely the following: purely ontological treatment of the problem of the principle of individuation; search for a single principle which is common both to material and nonmmaterial substances; nominalist tendency, which is apparent not only in the positive statements of the two authors, but also in their criticisms of rival solutions in general, and theScotist conception in particular. The similarities are not limited only to the principle of individuation or to the problem of individual unity in general but they also extend to the problem of the distinction between essence and existence, the conception of transcendental unity and its relation to ens, or to the problem of reification of hylemorphic components of material substances.
4. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1/2
Stanislav Sousedík G. Frege a aristotelská ontologie vztahů: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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The doctrine put forth by G. Frege and now almost universally accepted, according to which a predicate expressing a relative notion has to be supplemented by two (or more) subjects, in order for a statement to arise, appears to be a source of certain difficulties. In the paper, the author defends the view that this doctrine goes against our natural understanding of language, and shows that as soon as an attempt to determine the extension of such “relative” predicates is made, a contradiction in the doctrine is laid bare.
5. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1/2
Lukáš Novák Problém Abstraktních Pojmů: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
6. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1/2
Petr Dvořák K modálnímu ontologickému důkazu: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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The article deals with various modal versions of the ontological argument from N. Malcolm’s to P. Tichý’s interpretation of Anselm’s second proof. Three key presuppositions of the modal proof are pin-pointed and examined. The principal problem with the proof seems to be the notion of necessary existence attributed to God. More precisely, the question is whether this is not too strong an attribute, for then there would not be a situation, i.e. a possible world, consistently thinkable which precludes the existence of God. However, this seems to be wrong.
7. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1/2
M. J. Loux Nutné a možné: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
8. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1/2
Stanislav Sousedík, Joannis Caramuel Lobkowitz Nevyužitý pramen k problematice pronikání karteziánství do českých zemí v 17. století: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
9. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1/2
Stanislav Sousedík Tomistická teorie predikace: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
10. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1/2
Jiří Polívka Sensus Compositionis a Sensus divisionis v kontextu problému modalit v Ordinatio I, 39 Jana Dunse Scota: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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In Ordinatio I, 39 Scotus distinguishes two ways in which the distinction between sensus compostionis and sensus divisionis can be made: According to the first way the „composition and division“ relates to two different (sensus divisionis) or one and the same (sensus compositionis) instants of time; according to the other the distinction is made between an assertion of compossibility of the contradictory predicates in one and the same instant of time (sensus compositionis) and an assertion of actuality of the one and possibility of the other of the contradictory predicates in one and the very same instant of time (sensus divisionis). The author presents a formal logical analysis of all these various senses of modal propositions and shows how Scotus strictly separated modality from temporality, and contingency from mutability.