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Displaying: 1-10 of 216 documents

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1. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
Jacek Wojtysiak On the Principle of Sufficient Reason
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The aim of this paper is to defend the ontological Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR-O). I analyse various versions of this principle and various ways of justifying it. Then I attempt to challenge some counterexamples allegedly refuting a universal application of the PSR-O. There are standard and non-standard versions of the PSR-O. The PSR-Ostand can only be valid if there are no chains of contingent reasons and outcomes with first modules, i.e. all chains are actually infinite. However, there are serious arguments against this possibility. The necessary condition of the PSR-Onon-stand is the existence of a necessary substance: that substance would be a direct reason of certain contingent states of affairs obtaining in its domain, and those states of affairs would then be indirect reasons for all other contingent states of affairs and things. There are two advantages of the PSR-Onon-stand: a nomological unity of the world and explanatory simplicity.
2. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
Sebastian Tomasz Kołodziejczyk, Jan Woleński Editorial
3. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
Peter Simons Abstraction, Structure, and Substitution: Lambda and its Philosophical Significance
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λ-calculi are of interest to logicians and computer scientists but have largely escaped philosophical commentary, perhaps because they appear narrowly technical or uncontroversial or both. I argue that even within logic λ-expressions need to be understood correctly, as functors signifying functions in intension within a categorical or typed language. λ-expressions are not names but pure viable binders generating functors, and as such they are of use in giving explicit definitions. But λ is applicable outside logic and computer science, anywhere where the notions of complex whole, substitution, abstraction and structure make sense. To illustrate this, two domains are considered. One is somewhat frivolous: the study of flags; the other is very serious: manufacturing engineering. In each case we can employ λ-abstraction to describe substitutions within a structure, and in the latter case there is even a practical need for such a notation.
4. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
Bartosz Gostkowski Externalism: Putting Mind and World Back Together Again
5. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
Jan Woleński Two Critical Contributions to the Problem of Truth and Meaning
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This paper critically discusses two points concerning some recent views about the concept of truth. Firstly, contrary to Davidson, it shows that meaning of sentences cannot be explicated by T-equivalences. In particular, “is true” is an extensional predicate, but “means that” an intensional one. Secondly, the minimalist account of truth does not provide a satisfactory analysis of the concept of falsity. In this respect, minimalism does not satisfy Russell’s claim that any adequate truth-theory must be a theory of falsity as well.
6. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
Susan Haack The Legitimacy of Metaphysics: Kant’s Legacy to Peirce, and Peirce’s to Philosophy Today
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Part of Kant’s legacy to Peirce was a lasting conviction that metaphysics is not irredeemable, but can and should be set “on the secure path of a science”. However, Peirce’s “scientific metaphysics”, unlike Kant’s, uses the method of science, i.e., of experience and reasoning; but requires close attention to experience of the most familiar kind rather than the recherché experience needed by the special sciences. This distinctively plausible reconception of what a genuinely scientific metaphysics would be is part of Peirce’s legacy to philosophy today, enabling us to steer clear of both apriorism and of scientism - the Scylla and Charybdis of recent metaphysics.
7. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
Paweł Rojek If Tropes
8. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
Janusz Salamon Faith and Philosophical Analysis: The Impact of Analytical Philosophy on the Philosophy of Religion
9. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
Jan Hauska Dispositions and Meinongian Objects
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Questions concerning casual involvement of empirican properties have recently given rise to a lively philosophical controversy known as the debate about dispositions. I begin with a description of the focal points of the debate: the issue of the viability of the conditional analysis of dispostions, the question of whether or not they ultimately constitute a distinct kind of properties, the conundrum concerning their causal efficacy, and finally the bold suggestion that all properties are dispositional. Along the way I sketch current theories of the anture of dispositions. Then I draw a fuller picture of dispositionalism, i.e. of the family of positions united by embracing the ontological distinctness of dispositions and their causal efficacy. I conclude by defending dispositionalism against the objection, raised by David Armstrong, that it is committed to the existence of Meinongian objects.
10. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
Paweł Łuków What is the Problem of Freedom of the Will?
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I argue in the paper that the problem of freedom has been misconstrued. There is no one problem of freedom but many problems concerning individual agents’ responsiveness to principles and reasons. The problem of free will results from attempts to incorporate the notion of freedom, which belongs to the order of guiding action, into a determinist framework of explanation. My view could be seen as compatibilist because it denies the existence of a fundamental conflict between freedom and determinism. However, since libertarian accounts of local indeterminism are pointless on my view, it cannot be easily place with the compatibilism/libertarianism distinction. Instead of entering the hopelessly unproductive metaphysical debates about freedom and determinism, I propose to turn attention to the domain of ethics. Problems of freedom are questions about the deliberative processes that terminate in action and about reasons and principles on which they are based. To say that an action is free is not to claim that it is independent from causal determination; rather, it is to say that it has been decided upon.