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1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 66 > Issue: 2
Kirk Ludwig François Recanati’s Oratio Obliqua, Oratio Recta: An Essay on Metarepresentation
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2. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 66 > Issue: 2
Jennifer McKitrick The Bare Metaphysical Possibility of Bare Dispositions
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Many philosophers hold that all dispositions must have independent causal bases. I challenge this view, hence defending the possibility of bare dispositions. In part I, I explain more fully what I mean by “disposition,“ “causal basis,” and “bare disposition.” In part 2, I consider the claim that the concept of a disposition entails that dispositions are not bare. In part 3, I consider arguments, due to Prior, Pargetter, and Jackson, that dispositions necessarily have distinct causal bases. In part 4, I consider arguments by Smith and Stoljar that there can’t be bare dispositions because they would make for unwelcome “barely true” counterfactuals. In the end, I find no reason to deny the possibility of bare dispositions.
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3. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 66 > Issue: 2
William Blattner Heidegger, Language, and World-Disclosure
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4. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 66 > Issue: 2
Daniel Howard-Snyder, Frances Howard-Snyder, Neil Feit Infallibilism and Gettier’s Legacy
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lnfallibilism is the view that a belief cannot be at once warranted and false. In this essay we assess three nonpartisan arguments for infallibilism, arguments that do not depend on a prior commitment to some substantive theory of warrant. Three premises, one from each argument, are most significant: (1) if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then the Geltier Problem cannot be solved; (2) if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then its warrant can be transferred to an accidentally true belief; (3) if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then it can be warranted and accidentally true. We argue that each of these is either false or no more plausible than its denial. Along the way, we offer a solution to the Gettier Problem that is compatible with fallibilism.
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5. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 66 > Issue: 2
Lara Denis Kant’s Impure Ethics: From Rational Beings to Human Beings
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6. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 66 > Issue: 2
Anandi Hattiangadi Making it Implicit: Brandom on Rule Following
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In Making it Explicit, Brandom aims to articulate an account of conceptual content that accommodates its normati vity-a requirement on theories of content that Brandom traces to Wittgenstein’s rule following considerations. It is widely held that the normativity requirement cannot be met, or at least not with ease, because theories of content face an intractable dilemma. Brandom proposes to evade the dilemma by adopting a middle road---one that uses normative vocabulary, but treats norms as implicit in practices. I argue that this proposal fails to evade the dilemma, as Brandom himself understands it. Despite his use of normative vocabulary, Brandom’s theory fares no better than the reductionist theories he criticises. I consider some responses that Brandom might make to my charges, and finally conclude that his proposal founders on his own criteria.
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7. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 66 > Issue: 2
Andrew D. Cling Self-Supporting Arguments
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Deductive and inductive logic confront this skeptical challenge: we can justify any logical principle only by means of an argument but we can acquire justification by means of an argument only if we are already justified in believing some logical principle. We could solve this problem if probative arguments do not require justified belief in their corresponding conditionals. For if not, then inferential justification would not require justified belief in any logical principle. So even arguments whose corresponding conditionals are epistemically dependent upon their conclusions---epistemically self-supporting arguments---need not be viciously circular. R.B. Braithwaite and James Van Cleve use internalist and externalist versions of this strategy in their proposed solutions to the problem of induction. Unfortunately, their arguments for self-support are unsound and any theory of inferential justification that does not require justified belief in the corresponding conditionals of justification-affording arguments is unacceptably arbitrary. So self-supporting arguments cannot be justification-creating.
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8. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 66 > Issue: 2
Eric T. Olson Was Jekyll Hyde?
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Many philosophers say that two or more people or thinking beings could share a single human being in a split-personality case, if only the personalities were sufficiently independent and individually well integrated. I argue that this view is incompatible with our being material things, and conclude that there could never be two or more people in a split-personality case. This refutes the view, almost universally held, that facts about mental unity and disunity determine how many people there are. I suggest that the number of human people is simply the number of appropriately endowed human animals.
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9. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 66 > Issue: 2
Jonathan Kvanvig Simple Reliabilism and Agent Reliabilism
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10. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 66 > Issue: 2
John Greco Précis of Putting Skeptics in Their Place: The Nature of Skeptical Arguments and Their Role in Philosophical Inquiry
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11. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 66 > Issue: 2
Raimo Tuomela Dynamics in Action, Intentional Behavior as a Complex System
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12. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 66 > Issue: 2
Wlodek Rabinowicz, Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen Tropic of Value
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The authors of this paper earlier argued that concrete objects, such as things or persons, may have final value (value for their own sake), which is not reducible to the value of states of affairs that concern the object in question.Our arguments have been challenged. This paper is an attempt to respond to some of these challenges, viz. those that concern the reducibility issue. The discussion presupposes a Brentano-inspired account of value in terms of fitting responses to value bearers. Attention is given to a yet another type of reduction proposal, according to which the ultimate bearers of final value are abstract particulars (so-called tropes) rather than abstract states or facts. While the proposal is attractive (if one entertains the existence of tropes), it confronts serious difficulties. To recognise tropes as potential bearers of final value, along with other objects, is one thing; but to reduce the final value of concrete objects to the final value of tropes is another matter.
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13. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 66 > Issue: 2
John Greco Further Thoughts on Agent Reliabilism: Replies to Cohen, Geivett, Kvanvig, and Schmitt and Lahroodi
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14. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 66 > Issue: 2
R. Douglas Geivett Is “Simple Reliabilism” Adequately Motivated?
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15. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 66 > Issue: 2
Barbara Montero The Epistemic/Ontic Divide
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A number of philosophers think that, while we cannot explain how the mind is physical, we can know that it is physical, nonetheless. That is, they accept both the explanatory gap between the mental and the physical and ontological physicalism. I argue that this position is unstable. Among other things, I argue that once one accepts the explanatory gap, the main argument for ontological physicalism, the argument from causation, loses its force. For if one takes physical/nonphysical causation and ontological physicalism to be equally mysterious, as physicalists who accept the explanatory gap are inclined to do, there is little justification for accepting ontological physicalism rather than rejecting the causal closure of the physical.
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16. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 66 > Issue: 2
Christopher Knapp De-moralizing Disgustingness
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Understanding disgustingness is philosophically important partly because claims about disgustingness play a prominent role in moral discourse and practice. It is also important because disgustingness has been used to illustrate the promise of “neo-sentimentalism.” Recently developed by moral philosophers such as David Wiggins, John McDowell, Simon Blackburn, Justin D’Arms and Dan Jacobson, neo-sentimentalism holds that for a thing to be disgusting is for it to be “appropriate” to respond to it with disgust. In this paper, I argue that from what we currently know about the disgust response, these accounts are mistaken. Instead, disgustingness is best understood as a descriptive property: fundamentally, things that are disgusting-for-S are things that possess triggers for S’s disgust mechanism. Theoretically, my account puts pressure on neo-sentimentalists to show that the responses they appeal to can anchor normative properties. Practically, my account shows that we must abandon authoritative claims that certain things really are---or are not---disgusting.
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17. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 66 > Issue: 2
Ishtiyaque Haji Self-Governance & Cooperation
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18. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 66 > Issue: 2
Roberto Poli Husserl or Frege?: Meaning, Objectivity, and Mathematics
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19. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 66 > Issue: 2
Stewart Cohen Greco’s Agent Reliabilism
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20. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 66 > Issue: 2
Hamid Vahid Externalism, Slow Switching and Privileged Self-Knowledge
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Recent discussions of externalism about mental content have been dominated by the question whether it undermines the intuitively plausible idea that we have knowledge of the contents of our thoughts. In this article I focus on one main line of reasoning (the so-called ‘slow switching argument’) for the thesis that externalism and self-knowledge are incompatible. After criticizing a number of influential responses to the argument, I set out to explain why it fails. It will be claimed that the argument trades on an ambiguity, and that only by incorporating certain controversial assumptions does it stand a chance of establishing its conclusion. Finally, drawing on an analogy with Benacerraf’s challenge to Platonism. I shall offer some reasons as to why the slow switching argument fails to reveal the real source of tension between externalism and privileged self-knowledge.
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