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1. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 2
Alexis Gros La antinomia husserliana ontología social-historicidad según Merleau-Ponty: Reflexiones en torno al vínculo entre fenomenología y ciencias sociales: The Husserlian Antinomy between Social Ontology and Historicity according to Merleau-Ponty: Reflections on the Connection between Phenomenology and the Social Sciences
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This work is part of a wider research project on the contributions that the analysis of the antinomy between social ontology and historicity in Edmund Husserl’s thought can bring to epistemological reflection in the social sciences. In Les sciences de l’homme et la phénoménologie, Merleau-Ponty takes as starting point Husserl’s diagnosis of the critical situation in which both philosophy and the human sciences are submerged since the beginnings of the 20th century. This is the crisis of rationality as basis of every possibility of knowledge, due, among other factors, to the developments of Lebensphilosophie and the dyad historicismsociologism. The urgent situation produced by the breakdown of the basis of reason locks epistemological thought in a difficulty of deciding whether a) to succumb to absolute relativism of historicism, or b) to take refuge in a non-historical rationalism, without paying attention to its critics. In the same way Merleau-Ponty affirms the currency of Husserl’s diagnosis in the France of his time, we reaffirm its actuality for the epistemological reflection on social sciences, in view of the advance of the so-called Post-metaphysical era, which could be seen as a re-edition of a sociologist-historicism. According to Husserl, empirical sciences must be based on eidetical sciences. This is to say, on researches that could discover the essence of the studied object—by means of the Wesensschau—founding regional ontologies. In the case of sociology, empirical research should be supported by a social ontology—which states clearly the essential social categories for all times and places that researchers use without any thoroughness. This ontology should ask itself, for example, about the essence of religion or art. However, how is the Wesensschau possible, if reason is nothing else than a mere historic-contingent product? Social sciences face, still nowadays, the paradox of being forced to base their rigor on the same Lebenswelt that they expect to know. The aim of this article is to present Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of the course of this antinomy in Husserl. Our hypothesis is the following: according to the French phenomenologist, Husserl’s thought on the relation between essences and historicity develops this way. a) The first Husserl, who still thinks as a Cartesian, conceives the sphere of essences as absolutely divorced from the contingency of history. b) The Husserl “of the later years”—as Merleau-Ponty refers to him—, that is, the Husserl from the Cartesian Meditations to the Crisis, faces the hard task of basing the essences on the Lebenswelt, and conceives an intrinsic bond between both spheres.
2. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 2
Mariana Chu Husserl y Scheler: una fenomenología del amor: Husserl and Scheler: A Phenomenology of Love
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As for Brentano, also for Husserl and Scheler love has a main ethical role, but with a wider reach, since the ethical meaning that phenomenologists see in love is founded in its ontological meaning. With the purpose of contributing some leads to the ontological sense of love, this paper approaches Scheler’s determination of the essential structure of love. Thereupon, it shows how it is possible to identify those features in Husserl’s reflection on the implications of loving. This will enable the author to show in which sense Husserl and Scheler coincide in the ethical meaning of love.
3. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 2
Melissa Garcia Tamelini, Daniela Ceron-Litvoc Fenomenologia da Mania: Phenomenology of Mania
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The goal of this article is to describe and discuss the concepts of Mania according to a phenomenological-structural approach. The mainstream of psychiatry defines mania on the basis of signs and symptoms, most of them merely behaviors. The phenomenological-structural thinking attempts to illuminate the structure which defines the pathology and determines the phenomena. The manifestation of mania will be divided in fundamental phenomenological categories such as Time, Space, and Interpersonal Contact in a dialogue with postulations of classical authors. The possibility of a similar structure for mania and melancholia is suggested in the last part of the article.
4. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 2
5. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 2
Maria Aparecida Viggiani Bicudo Compreendendo a matemática de um ponto de vista fenomenológico: Understanding Mathematics from a Phenomenological Point of View
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This paper attempts to present an introduction to Phenomenology and Mathematics. Phenomenology was created and developed by Edmund Husserl. He left an amazing production concerning one of the questions that haunted him throughout his life: “what is the nature of the objectivity of Mathematics”. The following items are here dealt with: the meaning ground of Husserl’s phenomenological conceptions; the meaning of mathematical idealities; and formalization and categorization as constitutive aspects of the Science of Mathematics.
6. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 2
Soraya Guimãres Hoepfner A dimensão do hoje: Heidegger e a temporalidade do discurso filosófico: The Dimension of the Today: Heidegger and the Temporality of Philosophical Discourse
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This paper proposes a reflection upon philosophy’s role in discussing contemporaneity. By questioning if it is the philosopher’s vocation to think our actuality, the author discusses the character and temporality of philosophical discourse itself. She argues, in a provocative manner, that it is only possible to philosophise about today. Recognizing philosophical discourse’s distinctive character as its possibility of understanding the today beyond today’s facts, she refers to an essential temporal dimension of the contemporary, the same that the temporality of philosophical discourse refers to. Concerning philosophical discourse, the author shows that its reference to the essential dimension of today not only is a signature of distinction from a mere historical-anthropological approach, but precisely that it is what determines its very mode of being. This interpretation is founded on the analysis of two distinct philosophical approaches to contemporaneity. First, it establishes a close dialogue with Martin Heidegger’s thinking of his own contemporaneity, making explicit how he thinks his actuality and how he had an insight into what it is [Einblick in das was ist] as a way of revealing the today in its phenomenological sense. !e second illustration, or the counterpoint, is made by an analysis of the lecture of Giorgio Agamben’s “What is the contemporary?” [Che cos’è il contemporaneo?], which portrays the predominant character of contemporary philosophical discourse about contemporaneity. Such a character is based on a conception of temporality that cannot grasp the essential dimension of the today and, as a result, thinking remains enclosed in the perspective of human agency. Heidegger’s approach to contemporaneity remains in the realm of philosophical discourse by grasping the essential temporality of the today. In general, philosophical discourses in our contemporaneity about contemporary issues remain attached to an interpretation of events in time that reinforces the agency of the human. In short, the author considers relevant the contrast between both discourses in order to claim that philosophical discourse should be always an insight into and beyond the today. The awareness of this essential temporality is what defines its philosophical status and most importantly gives philosophy the task of questioning contemporaneity—of truly thinking the world of today.
7. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 2
Germán Vargas Guillén An Overview of Living Meaning: Between Phenomenology and Hermeneutics
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A discussion of the need to complement phenomenology’s emphasis on description and first-person experience, in accounting for the human production of meaning, with hermeneutics’ emphasis on interpretation and third-person experience, partially through accounting for the roles of corrigibility and argumentation in the phenomenological method.
8. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 2
Luis Álvarez Falcón Merleau-Ponty: Lo humano y lo adverso: Merleau-Ponty: The Human and the Adverse
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On September 10th 1951, in the context of the Rencontres internationales of Geneva, Maurice Merleau-Ponty gave his lecture L’homme et l’adversité (“Man and Adversity”). In an accurate diagnosis of European culture, his analysis sprang from the phenomenological premises defined by Edmund Husserl in Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie, Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie that the post-World War II context modified in its epistemological, moral and political conceptions. !e urgency for an answer to the new situation of mankind’s condition will entail a transfor mation of human knowledge as well as of the sensitive areas of our experience. Consequently, a new experience of our condition will call into question the concept of “humanism” itself, demanding a profound revision of the regression of the dynamisms of experience that have ended up in a loss—or failure—of Western culture’s conceptions. This essay will try to reactivate and upgrade the serene testimony of a thought whose premises lie in the inconclusive origin of a radical crisis: the experience of contingency and adversity.
9. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 2
Carlos Belvedere On the Constitution of Social Order
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In this article, I deal with the problem of social order from a phenomenological standpoint. In the first place, I summarize Schutz’s position on constitutional analysis and its relevance for the Social Sciences. In the second place, I pose some questions related to the constitution of social realities in Husserl, which have also been acknowledged by Schutz. In the third place, I discuss the significance of the constitutional analysis of the thing in Husserl for a phenomenological approach to social facts in Durkheim’s sense. Finally, I sketch out some features of social order understood as a constituted region.
10. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 2
Rosemary R. P. Lerner Phenomenological Reflections on the Conditions of Cultural and Ideological Encounters and Conflicts
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This paper was mostly motivated by Peru’s intense social and economic problems that exploded in an internal armed conflict of exceeding violence, from 1980 to 2000. The A. uses the experience within her country as an exemplification of more global cultural and ideological antagonisms among countries, regions or hemispheres, and to ask whether an encounter beyond cultural differences and reconciliation beyond ideologically motivated antagonisms is at all possible, and upon which bases. Husserl left descriptions that indicate how “plurality” and difference dwell within the most intimate core of one’s “oneness” and “identity”, offering clues as to how we are able to conceive and build “common worlds”, “common truths” and even “objective truth”. The A. finally confronts these transcendental-phenome nological accounts with some elements of certain Amazonian ethnic groups’ worldview, which may seem totally “incompossible” with the Western view that finally nourishes some of Husserl’s basic notions.