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1. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 48
Gottfried Seebass Die konditionale Analyse des praktischen Könnens
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Der Freiheitsbegriff ist im Kern als ein Möglichkeitsbegriff zu verstehen, der die Rede von einem „Anderskönnen" voraussetzt. Eine Explikation dieses Könnens bietet die konditionale Analyse, der zufolge ,,x kann h tun" etwa soviel bedeutet wie ,,x wird h tun, wenn x will, daß h, und x wird -h tun, wenn x will, daß -h". In der Analytischen Philosophie wird sie zumeist mit Moore und dem britischen Empirismus in Verbindung gebracht. Sie hat jedoch einen viel älteren theologischen Ursprung. Obwohl schon immer gewichtige Einwände gegen sie vorgebracht wurden, hat sie ihre Anziehungskraft auf ,,kompatibilistische" Freiheitstheoretiker bislang behalten. Der Aufsatz fragt, warum das so ist und worin der zentrale Defekt der Analyse besteht. Er liegt weniger in ihrer notorischen Unfähigkeit zur Erfassung der Willensfreiheit. Wichtiger ist, daß der Sinn der Rede vom ,,Können" unspezifiziert bleibt. Schließt man die Lücke, zeigt sich, daß die Konditionalanalyse selbst jenes ,,Anderskönnen" voraussetzt, das sie verabschieden wollte, sc. das Bestehen ontologisch offener Alternativen.
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2. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 48
Katalin Neumer Das wissende und wollende Subjekt in Wittgensteins Tractatus
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Der Aufsatz setzt sich mit der These, das Subjekt sei im Frühwerk Wittgensteins verschwunden, auseinander. In bezug auf das metaphysische Subjekt entdeckt er hier vielmehr eine ambivalente Rolle desselben, was u.a. von der willkürlichen Natur der Zeichensysteme einerseits, und andererseits von der These, man könne sich in der Logik nicht irren, herrührt. In bezug auf das wollende Subjekt meint die Autorin im Einklang mit manchen anderen Interpreten, es seien keine ausreichenden Gründe vorhanden, sein Verschwinden im Tractatus anzunehmen. In den Tagebüchern dagegen läßt sich wieder eher eine ambivalente Rolle des wollenden Subjekts entdecken.
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3. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 48
H.W. Enders Epistemische Notationen: Resultate einer Antinomientheorie
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Epistemische Notationen ist als Bezeichnung einer Schreibweise wie viele andere in der Philosophie gebräuchlichen Darstellungsmöglichkeiten eine Ausdrucks- und Redeeinführung. Dieselbe steht für eine sprachstufen- und typentheoretische Beschreibungsaltemative, die sowohl mit natürlicher Sprache als auch mit logisch-mathematischen Kalkülen verträglich ist. Vier Merkmale haben besonderes Gewicht: 1. E-Notationen (= Epistemische Notationen) sind wirklichkeitsrepräsentativ; 2. mengentheoretisch; 3. typentheoretisch; 4. sprachstufentheoretisch. Die durch Kombination dieser Charakteristika entstehende „Abstraktionszange" erlaubt es, normalsprachlich nicht faßbare „Interpretationskonstrukte" zu ,,lokalisieren". Die Entstehungsgeschichte der ,,Epistemischen Notationen" ist daher eng mit der Theorie der Antinomienbildung verknüpft. Insofern ist dieser approach auch für antinomientheoretische Untersuchungenbesonders geeignet. Die sprachanalytische Verwendbarkeit dieses Ansatzes ist jedoch so allgemein, daß sich damit eine ganze Reihe schwer faßbarer philosophischer Probleme auf neue Weise analysieren lassen. Vor allem sind es Fragen der Bedeutung, Außersprachlichkeit und Selbstbezüglichkeit, die Begriffe wie ,,exakt", „genau" oder „beweisbar" ins Licht einer zwar ungewohnten, aber kritisch befruchtenden Perspektive rücken. Epistemische Notationen sind deshalb ein erster Schritt zu einer realistischeren Einschätzung unserer künftigen philosophischen Möglichkeiten.
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4. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 48
Jacob Ossar Wittgenstein and McDowell on Sensations: A Reply to "One Strand in the Private Language Argument"
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5. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 48
Books received
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6. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 48
Alberto Voltolini Ficta versus Possibilia
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Although both belong to the domain of the nonexistent, there is an ontological distinction between ficta and possibilia. Ficta are a particular kind of abstract objects, namely constructed abstract objects which generically depend on authors for their subsistence. Moreover, they are essentially incomplete entities, in that they are correlates of finite sets of properties. - On the other hand, possibilia are concrete objects. Being a possible object is indeed being an entity that might have existed, that is, that might have been involved in the causal order. Besides, as an object existent in this sense may legitimately be qualified as complete, the incompleteness which pertains to possible objects is contingent, in that it regards them only with respect to the possible worlds in which they do not exist. This ontological distinction has a semantic correlate: whereas names for possibilia are full-fledged directly referential terms, names for ficta are synonymous with de facto rigid descriptions of a complex sort.
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7. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 48
Achim Stephan Theorien der Emergenz - Metaphysik oder?
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Emergenztheorien werden stets dann interessant, wenn orthodox monistische und orthodox dualistische Antworten auf metaphysische Fragen nach der Natur bestimmter Phänomene nicht überzeugen können. So ist der nichtreduktive Physikalismus, eine Spielart des synchronen Eigenschaftsemergentismus, eine Reaktion auf die vermeintlichen Schwierigkeiten mit ,,Brentanos Problem" und dem Qualia-Problem. Von den reduktionistischen Positionen unterscheidet sich der Eigenschaftsemergentismus durch die Behauptung, einige systematische Eigenschaften seien irreduzibel bezüglich der Eigenschaften und Relationen der Bestandteile des betrachteten Systems. Die Charakterisierung eines Phänomens als emergent erfolgt nach positivistischer Auffassung stets relativ zu einer Mikrostruktur und einer Theorie; daher sei es sinnlos, einen absoluten metaphysischen Begriff der Emergenz verwenden zu wollen. Dagegen spricht das „explanatory gap"-Argument für die Annahme absolut emergenter Eigenschaften. Ein absoluter Emergenzbegriff, der die Einwände der Positivisten ernst genug nimmt, wird vorgeschlagen.
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8. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 48
Jan Woleński Logic from a Rhetorical Point of View
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9. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 48
Yuval Steinitz Russell's Reductionism Revisited
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Is pure mathematics - arithmetic as well as geometry - reducible to formal logic? Russell answered in the affirmative, considering this so significant as to constitute a fatal blow to Kant's synthetic-apriori philosophy of mathematics. But either pure arithmetic and pure geometry include the full, extra-logical content of their unique axioms and hence their unique theorems, or they do not. If they do, then this reductionism is trivially unsound. It they do not - if they include only the logic of demonstration and exclude everything else - then it is trivially true, but insignificant. In fact this would accomplish no reduction at all, but rather a harmless formalization.
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10. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 49
Peter Simons New Categories for Formal Ontology
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What primitive concepts does formal ontology require? Forsaking as too indirect the linguistic way of discerning the categories of being, this paper considers what primitives might be required for representing things in themselves (noumena) and representations of them in a thoroughly crafted large autonomous multi-purpose database. Leaving logical concepts and material ontology aside, the resulting 32 categories in 13 families range from the obvious (identity/difference, existence/non-existence) through the fairly obvious (part/whole, one/many, sequential order) and the surprisingly familiar (illocutionary modes, mass/count, indexical/descriptive) to the controversial (moment/fundament, transparent/opaque) and the arcane (modes of class delimitation, taxonomic rank, aspects of designators). Any such list is speculative and tentative, but the test of this one will be in its implementation, a new departure for philosophical category theories.
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11. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 49
Henri Lauener How to Use Proper Names
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According to relativized transcendentalism, the meaning of expressions, consisting in their intension and extension, is provided by a set of (syntactical, semantical and pragmatical) rules which prescribe their correct use in a context. We interpret a linguistic system by fixing a domain (of the values of the variables) and by assigning exactly one object to each individual constant and n-tuples of objects to predicates. The theory says that proper names have a purely referential role and that their meaning is therefore limited to the individual they designate. Since all singular terms must refer to exactly one referent there are no so-called empty names. A proper name is defined as a syntactically unstructured term in a language L used in a context C such that the truth condition for a sentence (Φα in L and C consists in the fact that, in accord with the rule which maps items from the set of individual constants into the set of objects, a refers to an object x and x satisfies Φ. It is shown how - by using this theory - puzzling problems concerning Frege's morning star and evening star, allegedly empty names, changes of name etc. can easily be solved.
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12. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 49
Nenad Mišćević Naturalism and Modal Reasoning
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A naturalistic theory of modal intuitions and modal reasoning inspired by Hintikka's theorizing should start from the principle that advanced modal reasoning has its roots in commonsense intuitions. It is proposed that the naturalist can rely on the assumption of uniformity: the same set of basic principles is used in reasoning about actual and counterfactual dependencies - modal cognition is conservative. In the most primitive cases the difference between a model of an actual situation and of a merely possible one lies in its functional and indicational roles, not in its internal make-up. This conjecture enables one to derive important aspects of modal reasoning from the non-modal one. In the final section of the paper a simplified account of such derivation is proposed, drawn partly from connection- ist literature.
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13. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 49
Jan Von Plato Illustrations of Method in Ptolemaic Astronomy
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Mathematical Astronomy as the most developed branch of ancient exact sciences has been widely discussed - especially epistemological issues e.g. concerning astronomy as a prime example of the distinction between instrumentalist and realist understanding of theories. In contrast to these the very methodology of ancient astronomy has received little attention. Following the work of Jaakko Hintikka and Unto Remes Aristarchus' method of determining the distance of the Sun is sketched and Ptolemy's solar model is discussed in detail.
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14. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 49
Rudolf Haller Investigating Hintikka
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15. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 49
Ilkka Niiniluoto Hintikka and Whewell on Aristotelian Induction
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According to the standard interpretation, Aristotle has two accounts of induction (epagoge): intuitive induction (which is not an inference) and complete induction (which is not a kind of non-demonstrative inference). Hintikka has challenged the usual interpretation of Aristotle's "official account" in Analytica Priora II, 23. In this paper, Hintikka's view is compared with a similar, but in some respects perhaps even more plausible, interpretation that William Whewell gave already in 1850. Both Hintikka and Whewell argue convincingly that Aristotelean induction is connected to concept formation. According to Whewell, the key to Aristotle's account is not the exhaustiveness or completeness of the sample of special cases, but rather its representativeness for the purpose of generalization.
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16. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 49
Rudolf Kaller From Archives to Editions
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In the ideal case archives are the official places or institutions where all the biographical, bibliographical, published and unpublished material of one or several authors are collected and presented as well as their correspondencies, material belonging to them or their families, secondary literature etc. As there is hardly any ideal archive to be found some archives - more or less related to Austrian Philosophy - and their work are sketched and a rough scheme for the order of the literary estate of some author is suggested. By the example of the Meinong-Gesamtausgabe a fruitful combination of archival and editorial work is presented and finally some problems concerning present philosophical editions (Franz Brentano and Ludwig Wittgenstein) are discussed.
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17. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 49
Paul Weingartner A Note on Jaakko Hintikka's "Knowledge and Belief"
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Jaakko Hintikka's concept of belief (aBp) as presented in his Knowledge and Belief is such that in his epistemic logic aKp —> aBp is a thesis. This concept (B-belief) is one important kind of belief and can be contrasted with a different concept of belief (G-belief, denoted by 'aOp') not discussed in Hintikka's book. It is to some extent opposite to the one above in the sense that it is knowledge-exclusive, whereas Hintikka's is knowledge-inclusive. This is shown by the thesis aKp —> —laGp or aGp —> —laKp. My thesis is that this kind of belief is used as the belief in scientific hypothesis and as religious belief. Both G-belief and B-belief are applied to examples from physics and religion and consistency criteria are discussed for either concept.
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18. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 49
John Passmore Editing Russell's Papers
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This paper is both a slice of history, a warning and a congratulation. The history is about how the Russell papers found their way to a steel-town in Canada and how it came about that they have gradually been published. The warning is that it is extremely difficult to conduct such an enterprise on a co-operative basis, which may help to explain why so many enterprises of this kind have issued in failure. The congratulations are for those who have edited volumes of very different kinds, as a result of Russell's versatility, in a manner which throws new light on his intellectual history. All of this had to be described in a very schematic way. But it will, I hope, lead readers to the volumes themselves. Only there will they find the answer to the exercise I set towards the end of the article.
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19. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 49
Matti Sintonen Knowing and Making: Kantian Themes in Hintikka's Philosophy
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Jaakko Hintikka's Kantianism in philosophy of logic and mathematics is known to go further than Kant's own, for he argues that mathematical reasoning involves the "language-games" of seeking and finding. Therefore, logic mirrors the structure of this activity. But Hintikka also pushes the Copemican Revolution further to epistemology and philosophy of science. He agrees that "reason has insight only into what which it produces after a plan of ist own", but gives the idea a new logical turn. Kant thought that reason imposes certain architectonic constraints on the possible outcome of inquiry, but Hintikka's interrogative model of inquiry also emphasizes the activity of and therefore the strategy in, putting questions to Nature.
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20. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 49
Allan Janik How Did Hertz Influence Wittgenstein's Philosophical Development?
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In his efforts to demonstrate graphically that alternative modes of presentation of the principles of mechanics could eliminate the difficulties surrounding such problematic notions as "force" in mechanics that tormented scientists and philosophers alike, Heinrich Hertz delivered Ludwig Wittgenstein with a highly original hermeneutic technique, which would influence all of the latter's thinking, and in fact become the cornerstone of his mature philosophical method. All of the features of Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy in fact emerge from his early scientific background only to be complimented and embellished, but in no sense fundamentally altered by his later encounters with the likes of Bertrand Russell, G.E. Moore or Frank Ramsey. The Hertzian origin of Wittgenstein's philosophizing clearly indicates 1) why Wittgenstein was never tempted by positivism and at the same time 2) why he remained a "scientific" philosopher his whole life long and 3) reduce the charges of irrationalism that have been raised against him to absurdity.
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