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1. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 3 > Issue: Part 2
Pau Pedragosa Aproximación a una Interpretación Fenomenolágica de la Arquitectura
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The purpose of this paper is an attempt to interpret Architecture from the point of view of Phenomenology. We consider that the work of architecture reacquires it self such a way of approaching. We will take Husserl’s phenomenology as the reference because of his extraordinary attention to the senses, the sensibility, the perceptual world, the body and its movements; these are the “materials” the architect works with. We will also study some relevant aspects of Le Corbusier’s Ville Savoie—a masterpiece of the XX Century Architecture—which will serve us as an exemplary case study.
2. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 3 > Issue: Part 1
César Moreno Fenómenos y manifiestos: La fenomenologia en el horizonte de la vanguardia
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Th e aim of this contribution is to think about contemporary phenomenology in comparison to its vanguard between 1910 and 1935. This encounter would have been fruitful and possibly transgressive for Husserl’s Phenomenology and that of others. Husserl and Heidegger provided an immense “openness of phenomenality,” the consequences of which were not noticed by themselves with enough lucidity. For this reason, today it would be interesting to think that this encounter, which in fact never took place, between contemporary phenomenology and its vanguard, that is, between phenomena and manifestos, is an attempt to pay an historical debt.
3. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 3 > Issue: Part 1
Joan González Fenomenología Estática de los Actos de Compra
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In this paper we intend to lay the grounds for a Phenomenology of money. We start from the pre-theoretical comprehension of money as an “entity for”, that is to say, as a tool. Within this pre-theoretical comprehension, money is always understood according to its teleology (money is always “something to buy with”). Also, in this pre-theoretical framework money is hardly ever defined as “something to sell with”, or as “something being the result of my work”. Thus, in our daily experience the being of money becomes undistinguishable with the act of purchasing, which in turn underlines the deeply projective nature of money’s essence. In order to grasp this projective quality, we will have to develop a phenomenlogy of the purchasing act. “To purchase” is “to get something by means of money”. But, what is this thing that we get anyway? Whatever it is, it has a distinctive character: it is a merchandise. Through the appropiate phenomenologial descriptions, we will try to show how the description of the spatiality of the merchandise is essential to understand the effects of money upon the spatiality of the surrounding world.
4. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 2 > Issue: Part 1
Anibal Fornari Narracion (Ricoeur) e Interpelacion (Levinas): la identidad personal como acontecimiento generador de historia
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Th is paper deals with the ontological-critical question about identity as posed in the productive confrontation between “narrative identity” (Ricoeur) and “prescriptive identity” (Levinas). It examines the structural character of the human disproportion disclosed in action as an ontic relationship invested with the totalizing and at once alterative dynamism of desire. The analysis of desire, in which both authors converge, dismisses, on the one hand, the projective modes of identifi cation and, on the other hand, stresses a mode of identity conceived as a selfhood that emerges as an ontic-alterative traumatization of desire-ofbeing and of being-in-time. An ontic and experiential event, as a historical possibility that unexpectedly corresponds to human disproportion, makes the selfhood of the ego come to pass through the revelation of the Other/other as an untimely presence that takes over and surmounts narrative mediation and ethical interpellation by introducing hope.
5. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 2
Alexis Gros La antinomia husserliana ontología social-historicidad según Merleau-Ponty: Reflexiones en torno al vínculo entre fenomenología y ciencias sociales: The Husserlian Antinomy between Social Ontology and Historicity according to Merleau-Ponty: Reflections on the Connection between Phenomenology and the Social Sciences
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This work is part of a wider research project on the contributions that the analysis of the antinomy between social ontology and historicity in Edmund Husserl’s thought can bring to epistemological reflection in the social sciences. In Les sciences de l’homme et la phénoménologie, Merleau-Ponty takes as starting point Husserl’s diagnosis of the critical situation in which both philosophy and the human sciences are submerged since the beginnings of the 20th century. This is the crisis of rationality as basis of every possibility of knowledge, due, among other factors, to the developments of Lebensphilosophie and the dyad historicismsociologism. The urgent situation produced by the breakdown of the basis of reason locks epistemological thought in a difficulty of deciding whether a) to succumb to absolute relativism of historicism, or b) to take refuge in a non-historical rationalism, without paying attention to its critics. In the same way Merleau-Ponty affirms the currency of Husserl’s diagnosis in the France of his time, we reaffirm its actuality for the epistemological reflection on social sciences, in view of the advance of the so-called Post-metaphysical era, which could be seen as a re-edition of a sociologist-historicism. According to Husserl, empirical sciences must be based on eidetical sciences. This is to say, on researches that could discover the essence of the studied object—by means of the Wesensschau—founding regional ontologies. In the case of sociology, empirical research should be supported by a social ontology—which states clearly the essential social categories for all times and places that researchers use without any thoroughness. This ontology should ask itself, for example, about the essence of religion or art. However, how is the Wesensschau possible, if reason is nothing else than a mere historic-contingent product? Social sciences face, still nowadays, the paradox of being forced to base their rigor on the same Lebenswelt that they expect to know. The aim of this article is to present Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of the course of this antinomy in Husserl. Our hypothesis is the following: according to the French phenomenologist, Husserl’s thought on the relation between essences and historicity develops this way. a) The first Husserl, who still thinks as a Cartesian, conceives the sphere of essences as absolutely divorced from the contingency of history. b) The Husserl “of the later years”—as Merleau-Ponty refers to him—, that is, the Husserl from the Cartesian Meditations to the Crisis, faces the hard task of basing the essences on the Lebenswelt, and conceives an intrinsic bond between both spheres.
6. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 2
Mariana Chu Husserl y Scheler: una fenomenología del amor: Husserl and Scheler: A Phenomenology of Love
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As for Brentano, also for Husserl and Scheler love has a main ethical role, but with a wider reach, since the ethical meaning that phenomenologists see in love is founded in its ontological meaning. With the purpose of contributing some leads to the ontological sense of love, this paper approaches Scheler’s determination of the essential structure of love. Thereupon, it shows how it is possible to identify those features in Husserl’s reflection on the implications of loving. This will enable the author to show in which sense Husserl and Scheler coincide in the ethical meaning of love.
7. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 2
Luis Álvarez Falcón Merleau-Ponty: Lo humano y lo adverso: Merleau-Ponty: The Human and the Adverse
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On September 10th 1951, in the context of the Rencontres internationales of Geneva, Maurice Merleau-Ponty gave his lecture L’homme et l’adversité (“Man and Adversity”). In an accurate diagnosis of European culture, his analysis sprang from the phenomenological premises defined by Edmund Husserl in Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie, Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie that the post-World War II context modified in its epistemological, moral and political conceptions. !e urgency for an answer to the new situation of mankind’s condition will entail a transfor mation of human knowledge as well as of the sensitive areas of our experience. Consequently, a new experience of our condition will call into question the concept of “humanism” itself, demanding a profound revision of the regression of the dynamisms of experience that have ended up in a loss—or failure—of Western culture’s conceptions. This essay will try to reactivate and upgrade the serene testimony of a thought whose premises lie in the inconclusive origin of a radical crisis: the experience of contingency and adversity.
8. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 2
Natalia Petrillo Expresión lingüística y expresión corporal: Linguistic Expression and Corporal Expression
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In the Logical Investigations, Husserl demonstrates the need to distinguish between the meaning of a linguistic expression and its relationship to an extralinguistic object in reality. Husserl distinguishes two kinds of signs: the “indicative sign” (Anzeichen) and the “expressive sign”, which he also calls “expression” (Ausdruck). He draws the distinction with the claim that an indicative sign “indicates” something but does not express a “meaning” (Bedeutung). In other words, he disentangles the expression, as the sign which expresses a meaning, from its usual entanglement with the indicative sign. In the First Investigation of the Logical Investigations, Husserl dwells on intersubjective discourse only long enough to isolate the expressive sign and attempts to capture the way contents and acts become thematic in communication by contrasting the expressive and the indicative function of the signs. In order to study the logical meaning of a sign, Husserl excludes as irrelevant the indicative sign and devotes his analysis to the logical expressions. The article first clarifies the basic concepts of Husserl’s theory of meaning. To appreciate his observations, we might recall how the process of communication comes up in Husserl (I). Furthermore, an attempt is made in this paper to show that meaning is not restricted to linguistic expressions (II). Since communication is contaminated by indications, it can no longer be totally expressive. As a consequence, it is only when communication is suspended that pure expressivity is regained. In order to restore pure expression, the relation with the other has to be suspended. This means that the process of expression does not owe anything to the empirical world, including the empirically spoken world. It also means that the solitary subject does not need indications in order to have a relation with itself. The reason is the immediate presence of conscious life to itself. According to this, there arises the problem of whether the corporal movements are expressions, too. In response to this difficulty, I will take up Husserl’s considerations of the constitution of intersubjectivity through corporal movements. The main purpose of this article consists in showing a possible way to answer this question. The conclusion summarizes the main points and recalls that there is also another kind of expressions that Husserl did not consider in the Logical Investigations.
9. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 2
Luis Román Rabanaque Cuerpo, cinestesia, nóema: Body, Kinaesthesis, Noema
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This paper aims to present some aspects of the noematical connections between kinaesthesis and the own Body that can be drawn following Husserl’s static and genetic analyses. These aspects concern: 1) the introduction of the concept of kinaesthesis as the phenomenological residuum of the “muscle sensations”, and in reference to the own Body as the bearer of all sensations; 2) the noematic constitution of the own Body both as a physical thing and as the “organ” of the I, the latter being constituted in turn in a sensing and a moving stratum; 3) the reference of the “I move” as a mode of the “I can (move)” to the I as subject of a system of practical capacities; 4) this system’s genetic structure in the living present as an habitual one whose noematic correlate can be described as a “schema” of possible orientations and typical presentations of things within the world; 5) the difference between kinaesthetical systems in plural and Kinaesthesis in singular as all-compassing unity.
10. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 3
María-Luz Pintos Aron Gurwitsch: un modelo de cómo servirse de Husserl como modelo para movernos hacia una actitud ecologista
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The current ecological crisis should be confronted by phenomenology. In accordance with this conviction, this essay pursues a threefold aim: 1) To recapture Husserl´s attitude and methodology with regard to the crisis of his time as a model for us to face our current crisis. In this essay, we try to pick up Husserl´s attitude as a very valid model for us today when seeking to found the need for an environmentalist reason. 2) We analize the way as Aron Gurwitsch assumes and reproduces in himself this Husserlian attitude when he decides to unmask the causes of the Nazism, which he interprets as another consequence from the objetivism denounced by Husserl and from a nihilism grafted on to the Western thought. The Husserlian attitude and methodology were as well a model for Gurwitsch to face in a direct way the grave ideological-historical circumstances of his time. 3) Both examples of Husserl and Gurwitsch can be good for us to dare to confront the current ecological crisis from phenomenology and to found the necessity that we humans accept the great moral responsibility that is implicit in being rational.