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1. Reflective Analysis: Year > 2011
Lester Embree Experiencing
2. Reflective Analysis: Year > 2011
Lester Embree Accounting
3. Reflective Analysis: Year > 2011
Lester Embree Examining + Closing Remarks
4. Reflective Analysis: Year > 2011
Lester Embree Analyzing
5. Reflective Analysis: Year > 2011
Lester Embree Reflecting
6. Reflective Analysis: Year > 2011
Lester Embree Preface for Instructors + Introduction
7. Reflective Analysis: Year > 2011
Lester Embree Willing, Valuing, Believing
8. Reflective Analysis: Year > 2011
Lester Embree Observing
9. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 4 > Issue: Part 2
Marek Maciejczak Terms Denoting Natural Kinds: Prototype’s Effect and Consciousness
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This essay shows links between linguistic (mental) meanings and perception, and proposes that cognitive theories of language acquisition should find some foundation in phenomenological evidence. A need for the sharp distinction between linguistic and extra-linguistic is questioned because regularities of categorization processes, manifested in the meanings of terms denoting natural kinds, are the regularities of perceptual processes and language. In this the role of language as the one and only determinant of the structure of experience is limited. The first part deals with Merleau-Ponty’s theory of immediate perception to show the place for spontaneous normalization and its norms. The second part takes into account a more general view on consciousness in order to show the domain where the connection between perception and language is being created.
10. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 4 > Issue: Part 2
B. M. Mezei Plato, Husserl, and Theistic Intentionality
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In what follows I offer a comparison between two significant instances of the doctrine of intentionality, the view of Plato, and that of Edmund Husserl. My purpose is to show four things. (1) I shall argue that the notion of intentionality goes back to Plato. (2) I argue too that the notion of Platonic intentionality entails the notion of personal intention. (3) While Platonic intentionality is theistic in a certain way, Husserlian intentionality is not. (4) This omission in the Husserlian conception of intentionality is due to an unsolved problem in Husserlian metaphysics.