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1. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 1
Thomas Paxson, Jr. A New Subjectivistic Theory Of Knowledge: A Critical Discussion
2. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 1
Terence Parsons A Meinongian Analysis of Fictional Objects
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This paper explores the view that there are such things as (nonexistent) fictional objects, and that we refer to such objects when we say things like "Sherlock Holmes is a fictional detective", or "Conan Doyle wrote about Sherlock Holmes". A theory of such objects is developed as a special application of a Meinongian Ontology.
3. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 1
Ronald E. Beanblossom In Defense of Thomas Reid's Use of 'Suggestion'
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Thomas Reid, the eighteenth century Scottish philosopher, was concerned with the proper use of ordinary language. P. G. Winch would have us believe that in spite of Reid's concern for observing the ordinary meaning of terms, Reid did not know the ordinary meaning of 'suggest'. Not knowing this ordinary meaning, Reid allegedly changed it in violation of his own criteria. Against this view I argue (1) Reid uses 'suggest' in a technical sense and gives reasons for doing so; (2) contrary to Winch's claim Reid does appropriately use 'suggestion' to describe perception.
4. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 1
Books Received
5. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 1
Henri Sarlet Existenz und Prädikation: Sprachanalytische Untersuchungen zu Existenz-Aussagen
6. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 1
Keith Lehrer, Joseph Richard Remembering Without Knowing
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Memory sometimes yields knowledge and sometimes does not. It is, however, natural to suppose that i f a man remembers that p, then he knows that p and formerly knew that p. Remembering something is plausibly construed as a f o rm of knowing something which one has not forgotten and which one knew previously. We argue, to the contrary, that this thesis is false. We present four counterexamples to the thesis that support a different analysis of remembering. We propose that a person remembers that p (at t) if and only if the thought or conviction that p comes from memory (at t) when, in fact, it is true that p.
7. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 1
David W. Smith Meinongian Objects
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Meinong's object theory is primarily motivated by the needs of intentionality theory. I argue that Meinongian objects must be intensional entities if, as asked, they are to serve as the objects of thought in a purely object-theoretic account of intentionality. For Meinong, incomplete objects are the proper objects of thought. Complete objects are beyond our grasp; we apprehend them as best we can when we intend incomplete objects embedded in them. This yields, on a semantic plane, an account of failures or substitutivity of identity in intentional contexts. And this, I argue, forces incomplete objects to be intensional, and so therefore are complete objects.
8. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 1
Franz Brentano Was an Reid zu Loben: Über die Philosophie von Thomas Reid. Aus dem Nachlaß
9. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 1
Michael Hooker Descartes' Argument for the Claim that his Essence is to Think
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Two previous attempts to discern the argument Descartes intended to establish the claim that his essence is to think have failed to meet with success. I examine those arguments and offer an interpretation of my own that follows one of Descartes' strategies in the cogito passages. The suggested interpretation involves discarding every candidate that falls victim to hyperbolic doubt. However, while my strategy may have been intended by Descartes, it does not successfully yield his conclusion.
10. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 1
Roderick M. Chisholm Individuation: Some Thomistic Questions and Answers
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The epistemological problem of individuation concerns the conditions under which we can individuate or identify particular things. I t is argued that these conditions presuppose that each of us can apprehend his own individual essence or haecceity. The metaphysical problem of individuation concerns the question: In virtue of what can it be said that two things which are counterparts of each other are two and not one? It is argued that here, too, we must appeal to the concept of an individual essence or haecceity. The views presented here seem to be in accord with those of St. Thomas Aquinas.