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1. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi / Cilicia Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
Argun Abrek Canbolat A Brief Study on Qualia Epiphenomenalism
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This work constitutes a discussion related to qualia epiphenomenalism, which is the view that qualia do not affect anything, but that they can be affected. After presenting contemporary debates on the issue, it is argued that qualia epiphenomenalism is untenable as a result of some epistemic problems, and a version of an epistemic argument that can be referred to as the intentionality-based epistemic argument is represented and defended.Bu çalışma, qualianın hiçbir şeyi etkileyemeyeceğini fakat kendisinin etkilenebilir olduğunu savunan qualia epifenomenalizmi üzerine tartışmaları içermektedir. Bu konudaki güncel tartışmalar sunulduktan sonra, birtakım epistemik sorunlar nedeniyle qualia epifenomenalizminin savunulabilir olmadığı belirtilmektedir. Bu yapılırken hakkındalığa dayanan epistemik argüman olarak adlandırılabilecek bir çeşit epistemik argüman aktarılmakta ve savunulmaktadır.
2. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi / Cilicia Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
Thom Brooks Hegel and The Problem of Poverty
3. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi / Cilicia Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Erhan Demircioğlu The Puzzle of Consciousness
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In this article, I aim to present some of the reasons why consciousness is viewed as an intractable problem by many philosophers. Furthermore, I will argue that if these reasons are properly appreciated, then McGinn’s so-called mysterianism may not sound as far-fetched as it would otherwise sound.
4. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi / Cilicia Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Bosuk Yoon A Critique of Epistemological Disjunctivism
5. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi / Cilicia Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
William Simkulet On Derivative Moral Responsibility and the Epistemic Connection Required for Moral Responsibility
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Derivative moral responsibility is not moral responsibility at all. Much of the confusion found in the literature concerning moral responsibility and the free will problem can be traced back to a penchant to reconcile our philosophical theories of moral responsibility with our folk commonsense linguistic accounts of moral responsibility, a tradition that is notable for its utter lack of making two important distinctions - (1) the distinction between derivative moral responsibility and non-derivative moral responsibility (what Galen Strawson calls “true moral responsibility”) and (2) the distinction between the scope and degree of one’s moral responsibility.1 The failure to make such distinctions, ultimately, leads to confusion in interpreting the content of folk intuitions about moral responsibility, and as a result leads many philosophers to adopt watered down, or overly complex theories of moral responsibility. In “The Epistemic Requirements for Moral Responsibility,” Carl Ginet fails to make such distinctions, and as a result the requirement he arrives at is unwieldy at best. By making such distinctions, I will provide a much more straightforward account of what moral responsibility requires.
6. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi / Cilicia Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Soraj Hongladarom Metaphysics of Change and Continuity: Exactly What is Changing and What Gets Continued?
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This is a metaphysical and conceptual analysis of the concepts ‘change’ and ‘continuity’. The Buddhists are in agreement with Heraclitus that all are flowing and nothing remains. However, the Buddhists have a much more elaborate theory about change and continuity, and this theory is a key element in the entire Buddhist system of related doctrines, viz., that of karma and rebirth, the possibility of Liberation (nirv na) and others. Simply put, the Buddhist emphasizes that change is there in every aspect of reality.According to a later developed form of the Buddhist teaching, change is absolutely pervasive, and even these particles are subject to change as they are nothing more than putative objects which are conceptualized to be such and such, and without the conceptualization they are ‘nothing’ at all. (This is known as the Doctrine of Emptiness). Hence it seems that continuity is not possible. But in fact according to the later theory, change is not only possible, it is accepted as part and parcel of everyday life. The fact that nothing at all remains the same does not imply that continuity is not possible, since continuity does not always have to be that of an inherently existing object. A changing object can be continued also, in roughly the same sense as we say that an event, like a drama, continues even though everything in it is changing. The thread that ties the disparate elements of the event together in this case lies within our own conceptual imputation. This does not imply that everything is subjective, since the distinction between subject and object presupposes the idea of an absolutely existing individual self, which all Buddhist schools rejects. So in this later theory, absolute change is not possible because there is, ultimately speaking nothing to change, and when there is no change there is no continuation either. This is not to deny the empirical fact of changes and continuities that are present to us; things are there and they are indeed changing. What is being denied here is the belief that that there are essences to things which endure through all the changes. Since things are empty (of inherently existing nature) they can change, and continuity is only possible, not because there is something that exists and endures, but because there is change. A drama that does not move cannot be continued.The foregoing discussions of the Buddhist theories have many implications for the dialog between science and religion. One point is that science still seems to subscribe to the object/subject distinction. But if change and continuity are not real in the ultimate sense, then perhaps the distinction should be reconsidered. Another point concerns how to find continuity amidst all the change. But perhaps in some important sense continuity depends on us.
7. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi / Cilicia Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 3
Barry Stocker Ethical Life in Kierkegaard and Williams
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A discussion of how the criticisms of ethical theory in Søren Kierkegaard and Bernard Williams both reinforce each other and also provide some challenges to each other. Despite Williams’ brief and dismissive encounter with Kierkegaard around the reading of a ancient tragedy, both oppose any tendency to see the characters in those tragedies as lacking in agency. Both are consistently concerned with how the individual struggles for some ethical agency and how no individual can be free of the influence of chance or error. Kierkegaard and Willliams are shown to both oppose relativism and communitarianism in ethics, along with utilitarianism and to both have an interest in plurality of ethical ideas of how to live.
8. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi / Cilicia Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 3
Susan Haack Epistemology: Who Needs It?
9. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi / Cilicia Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 3
Gert-Jan van der Heiden Technology and Formation: Stiegler on Event and Self-Care
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This essay critically examines how Bernard Stiegler addresses the question of present-day technological developments and how they affect our understanding of education and self-formation. The first section is devoted to an account of the basics of Stiegler’s understanding of the relationship between technology and humanity as well as of his characterization of the specific problems that characterize technology today. The main part of the essay analyzes how the questions of self-care, self-formation and education are addressed in relation to these specific problems. Stiegler addresses these problems in terms of the Derridean vocabulary of the pharmakon, and accounts for the present-day technological inventions in terms of pharmacological events. It is shown that Stiegler’s account of education is difficult to combine with his attention to the pharmakon as well as to the event. In the concluding section, it is suggested that the question of self-formation in relation to pharmacological events should be reinterpreted in terms of the concept of experience.
10. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi / Cilicia Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 3
James Wetzel Scenes of Inner Devastation: Confessional Improvisation
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Wittgenstein and Cavell have both been alerting me over the years to unsettling possibilities: that secularization is not always a lessening of religious intensity, that philosophy can be a religious calling, that God is less real in our theories than in the grammar of our lives. In short, I have been made aware of the possibility of a secular confession, not as an amputated version of the religious original, but as a genuine improvisation: a way of speaking to God without having to say much, if anything, about God. When Cavell’s hefty memoir came out in 2010, some thirty years after my first encounter with his writing, I assumed I would have my chance to test this possibility. This essay is the outcome of that testing.
11. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi / Cilicia Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 3
Nicholas Rescher Ideas
12. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi / Cilicia Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 3
Ralph D. Ellis Moral Hermeneutics, Coherence Epistemology, and the Role of Emotion
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Coherence requires more than logical consistency. Self-consistent viewpoints notoriously conflict with each other. Besides avoid logical selfcontradiction, coherent viewpoints must of course be consistent with empirical facts, including any social and interpersonal emotional facts that may be shared by all humans. But since these sets of facts are inherently probabilistic, they again lend themselves to motivated hermeneutical tweaking to make them fit one’s initial prejudices and presuppositions, trapping us again in the “hermeneutic circle” – the fact that we cannot know how much our previously-existing worldview motivates selective facts, proliferation of ad hoc hypotheses, choice of “moral intuitions,” etc. The problem of ad hoc hypotheses thus becomes crucial. Proliferation of ungrounded assumptions is motivated emotionally in the same way that believing a “conspiracy” theory requires positing unproven assumptions. Moral theory requires studying the way our emotions play into these moral “conspiracy theories.” Contemporary neuropsychology of emotion suggests that a certain kind of inner conflict model – one that grants autonomy to the exploratory drive, but in conflict with other hermeneutically relevant emotions – is especially useful in addressing the complexities of incoherence in ethical thinking.
13. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi / Cilicia Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
Erhan Demircioğlu Against McGinn’s Mysterianism
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There are two claims that are central to McGinn’s mysterianism: (1) there is a naturalist and constructive solution of the mind-body problem, and (2) we human beings are incapable in principle of solving the mind-body problem. I believe (1) and (2) are compatible: the truth of one does not entail the falsity of the other. However, I will argue that the reasons McGinn presents for thinking that (2) is true are incompatible with the truth of (1), at least on a fairly standard conception of the terms ‘naturalist’ and ‘constructive’, which McGinn himself seems to take for granted.McGinn’in gizemcilik adı verilen görüşü açısından iki iddia merkezi önemdedir: (1) zihin-beden probleminin doğalcı ve yapıcı bir çözümü vardır ve (2) insanlar zihin-beden problemini ilkesel olarak çözemezler. (1) ve (2), çelişik iki tez değildir: birinin doğruluğu diğerinin yanlış olmasını gerektirmez. Fakat savunacağım iddia odur ki, McGinn’in (2)’nin doğruluğuna dair verdiği gerekçeler (1)’in doğruluğu ile – McGinn’in kendisinin de varsaydığı, ‘doğalcı’ ve ‘yapıcı’ terimlerinin standart yorumlarını hesaba kattığımızda – çelişik durumdadır.
14. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi / Cilicia Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Hilmi Demir What is Conditional Probability?: In Defense of Lowe’s Definition(s)
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In the standard and traditional view, the concept of conditional probability is defined with what is known as the ratio formula: the probability of B given A is the ratio between the probability of A and B and the probability of A. It is well known that this definition does not match the conceptual and mathematical expectations that we have from conditional probability, especially for the probability values at the limits. Thus, as pointed out by several philosophers such as Popper and Hájek, it is fair to conclude that we have yet to have a satisfactory definition for the concept of conditional probability. E.J. Lowe, in a debate with Dorothy Edgington, proposed two different definitions of conditional probability, and unfortunately his definitions have gone unnoticed in the literature. In this paper, my main aim is to renew interest in Lowe’s definitions. I achieve this aim by showing that E.J. Lowe’s definitions have great potential in providing us with a satisfactory definition of conditional probability.Standard Olasılık kuramında bir olayın bir diğer olaya koşullu olasılığı rasyo formülü olarak bilinen bir formül ile tanımlanmaktadır. Bu formüle göre B olayının A olayına koşullu olasılığı (A ve B) olayının olasığının sadece A olayının olasılığına bölünmesi ile bulunan değerdir. Bu standard tanımın özellikle limitlerdeki olasılık değerleri için kavramsal ve matematiksel beklentilerimizi karşılamadığı bilinen bir durumdur. Aralarında Popper ve Hájek gibi isimlerin de bulunduğu birçok felsefecinin de belirttiği gibi, bu durumdan elimizde tatmin edici bir koşullu olasılık tanımı olmadığını çıkarsamak yanlış olmayacaktır. E.J. Lowe, Dorothy Edgington ile girdiği bir tartışma bağlamında koşullu olasılığın iki alternatif tanımını önermiştir. Ne yazık ki, literatürde bu tanımlara gereken önem verilmemiştir. Literatürdeki bu eksikliği gidermeyi hedefleyen bu makalenin genel amacı, Lowe’ün önerilerinin tatmin edici bir koşullu olasılık tanımı sunma potansiyeline sahip olduğunu göstermektir.
15. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi / Cilicia Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 3
Erdinç Sayan, Tevfik Aytekin Philosophy and Cartoons: Their Relevance To Each Other
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Our aim in this essay is to take a look at cartoons under philosophical light. What are some of the similarities between philosophy and the art of cartooning? In what ways can cartoons be helpful to philosophy? What are some of the problems cartoons pose for philosophy? Perhaps the most basic philosophical question concerning cartoons is, “What is a cartoon?”. We argue that it is not easy to pin down necessary and sufficient conditions for something being a cartoon. We defend the view that cartoons form a class whose members are interconnected with the Wittgensteinian “family resemblance” relations. We then look into the problems involved in finding a connectionist parallel-processing correlate of the Wittgensteinian notion in the context of cartoons.
16. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi / Cilicia Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 3
Serdar Tekin How Could Aristotle Defend The Self-sufficiency Of Political Life While Claiming The Superiority Of Contemplative Life?
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In Nicomachean Ethics X.7, Aristotle argues that perfect happiness consists in contemplation alone. The question that I want to take up in this essay is whether the superiority of contemplative life fits with Aristotle’s argument for the self-sufficiency of the political life, according to which politics can lead us to happiness without being guided by philosophical knowledge of the highest sort. My basic argument is that, paradoxical as it may seem, Aristotle is led to acknowledge that contemplative life is superior to political life by the same strand of argumentation which makes him plea for the self-sufficiency of the political life in the first place. In order to show how this argument unfolds, I take my point of departure from Aristotle’s analysis of phronēsis as stated in Nicomachean Ethics VI and bring it to bear on his discussion of the respective virtues of the contemplative and political ways of life in Politics VII.
17. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi / Cilicia Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Erhan Demircioğlu On the Differentia of Epistemic Justification
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How are we to distinguish epistemic justification for believing a proposition from other sorts of justification one might have for believing it? According to what I call the received view about the differentia of epistemic justification, epistemic justification is intimately connected to “the cognitive goal of arriving at truth” in a specific way no other sorts of justification can possibly be. However, I will argue that the received view is mistaken by showing that there are cases in which pragmatic justification for believing a proposition is related to the cognitive goal of arriving at truth in a way epistemic justification is supposed to be. The paper will close with a brief assessment of two possible rejoinders the received view might make to my objection.Epistemik gerekçelendirmeyi diğer tür gerekçelendirmelerden nasıl ayırmalıyız? Hâkim görüş diyebileceğimiz bir fikre göre, epistemik gerekçelendirme “doğruya varma” diyebileceğimiz bilişsel hedefe diğer tür gerekçelendirmelerin olamayacağı şekilde yakın bir biçimde irtibatlıdır. Bu yazıda, hâkim görüşün yanlış olduğunu iddia edeceğim. Bu iddiam, bazı olası durumlarda pragmatik gerekçelendirmenin de doğruya varma hedefiyle olan irtibatının epistemik gerekçelendirmenin o hedefle kurduğu iddia edilen irtibatın aynısı olduğunu gösteren bir düşünce deneyine dayanıyor. Yazı, hâkim görüşün sunduğum itiraza karşı geliştirebileceği iki yanıtın kısa bir değerlendirmesi ile sonlanıyor.
18. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi / Cilicia Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Sena Işikgil An Analysis on McGinn’s Mysterianism: Reply to Erhan Demircioglu
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This paper discusses Erhan Demicioglu’s approach to McGinn’s mysterianism. Demircioglu argues that the reasons why McGinn considers his cognitive closure idea to be true with respect to the solution of the mind-brain problem are not compatible with his claim about the existence of a naturalist solution to the mind-brain problem. However, I consider such a criticism to be the result of missing some important details in McGinn’s thesis on cognitive closure. In this study by analysing McGinn’s mysterianism I show that no contradiction exists between the reasons why McGinn presented his cognitive closure thesis and the existence of a naturalist solution to the mind-body problem.Bu makale Erhan Demircioğlu’nun McGinn’in gizemcilik görüşüne yaklaşımını tartışmaktadır. Demircioğlu’nun iddiası şudur ki; McGinn’in beden-zihin probleminin çözümüne ilişkin olan bilişsel kapalılık görüşünün doğruluğunu göstermek için öne sürdüğü gerekçeler, beden-zihin probleminin doğalcı bir çözümü olduğuna ilişkin görüşü ile çelişik durumdadır. Fakat ben bu gibi bir eleştirinin McGinn’in bilişsel kapalılık tezinde ortaya koyduğu bazı önemli detayların gözden kaçırılmasının bir sonucu olduğunu düşünmekteyim. Bu makalede McGinn’in gizemciliğini analiz ederek göstereceğim şey şudur ki; McGinn’in bilişsel kapalılık tezi için sunduğu nedenler ile beden-zihin probleminin doğalcı çözümünün varlığı arasında herhangi bir çelişki yoktur.
19. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi / Cilicia Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 2
Aydan Turanli Martin Heidegger on Technology: A Response to Essentialist Charge
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Martin Heidegger is one of the major philosophers influencing discussions of the condition of technology in the modern era especially with his very much debated article, “The Question Concerning Technology.” However, his views of technology are variously interpreted. Andrew Feenberg and Don Ihde accuse Martin Heidegger of being “essentialist.” Feenberg also implies that Heidegger is a technological determinist and a strong pessimist. On the other hand, Iain Thomson asserts that Heidegger’s view of technology is not essentialist in the traditional sense. David Edward Tabachnick also underlines that essentialism in Heidegger does not necessarily include determinism. In this article, I defend Heidegger against Feenberg’s essentialist charge. First, I summarize Feenberg’s interpretation of Heidegger. Secondly, I criticize Feenberg to show that his accusations against Heidegger are unjustified.Martin Heidegger, özellikle çok tartışılan “Teknolojiye İlişkin bir Soru” makalesiyle modern dönemde teknolojinin durumuyla ilgili tartışmaları etkileyen en önemli filozoflardan biridir. Ancak, onun teknoloji görüşleri çeşitli şekillerde yorumlanmıştır. Andrew Feenberg ve Don Ihde, Heidegger’i, özcü olmakla suçlarlar. Feenberg, ayrıca da Heidegger’in teknolojik determinist ve güçlü anlamda pesimist olduğunu ima eder. Diğer yandan, Iain Thomson, Heidegger’in teknoloji görüşünün geleneksel anlamda özcü olmadığını iddia eder. David Edward Tabachnick’de, Heidegger’de özcülüğün, determinizmi içermediğinin altını çizer. Bu makalede, Feenberg’in özcü suçlamasına karşı Heidegger’i savunacağım. İlk olarak, Feenberg’in Heidegger yorumunu özetleyeceğim. İkinci olarak, Heidegger’e karşı suçlamalarının temelsiz olduğunu göstermek için Feenberg’i eleştireceğim.
20. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi / Cilicia Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 2
Çetin Balanuye Education of Emotions as a Possibility of Handling Value Conflicts
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It is widely accepted that one of the most crucial issues in philosophy of education is related to the concept of value. The contemporary debates on the concept of value and the power of education to deal with value conflicts revolve around two basic questions. First: How can I live personally flourishing life with a responsibility for the universe in general and others in particular? Second: In what ways can education help us find a common ground between living well and being morally good? It is argued in this piece of work that education of emotions can be reconsidered as a promising remedy for this dilemma. A Deweyian account of desirable habit formation is elaborated, endorsed and defended, yet possible objections to the account is taken into consideration.Eğitim felsefesinin en merkezi sorunlarından birinin değer kavramıyla ilişkili olduğu büyük ölçüde kabul görür. Hem değer kavramı, hem de eğitimin değer çatışmalarının çözümünde ne ölçüde etkili olabileceğine ilişkin çağdaş tartışmaların iki temel soru çevresinde dolaştığı görülmektedir. Birincisi: Genel olarak evrensel çevre ve özellikle de insani çevreye karşı sorumlu, ama aynı zamanda kişisel açıdan mutlu bir yaşam sürmek nasıl olanaklı olur? İkincisi. Bu çerçevede, eğitim, iyi yaşamak ile iyi biri olmak arasında bir uzlaşım geliştirmemize hangi biçimlerde yardımcı olabilir? Bu çalışmada duyguların eğitimi olarak özetlenen yaklaşımın sözü edilen sorunsalı aşmak açısından ümit verici olduğu savunulacaktır. Bu amaçla, Deweyci bir ‘yeğlenebilir alışkanlık biçimlendirme’ yaklaşımının ayrıntılandırılması ve savunusu yapılmakta, ayrıca bu yaklaşıma yöneltilebilecek itirazlar da gözden geçirilmektedir.