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1. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 1 > Issue: Part 1
Jin Xiping, Had he to understand the meaning the Being, so far as he is a human?: A critical assessment of Heidegger’s Idea on language in 1928
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Heidegger said in 1928: “die Frage nach dem Sein [ist] keine beliebige und [wird] nicht von aussen dem Menschen zugetragen, sondern in ihm mehr oder minder wach ist, sofern er ueberhaupt als Mensch existiert…” The author is very critical of this assertion. If it is really the case, are the people who speak non Indo-European language still human beings or not? Is it possible the non-Indo-European language speaking people could have latent understanding of the meaning of being without the word being at all in their language? If the second one were a reality, could the assertion of Heidegger be correct that Sprache is “das von Sein ereignete aus ihm durchgefuegte Haus des Seins”?
2. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 5 > Issue: Part 1
Lester Embree, Disciplines beyond Philosophy: Recollecting a Phenomenological Frontier
3. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 1
Leung Po-Shan, 從物的存在看歷史即現狀: View History as the Existing Situation from the Being of Thing
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View History as the Existing Situation from the Being of Thing. The question of “What is a thing?” is closely related to that of Being. Heidegger had dealt with the research of thing repeatedly since 1919. The following article will show that, regardless of his inspiring thinking about “ready-to-hand” of thing in Being and Time, his research was more extensively developed in his later years at the end of 1940s. By exploring the possibilities of viewing a thing, Heidegger continuously attempted to reveal the serious limitation of Platonic tradition in the western philosophy. This article will analyze in detail the crucial role of History of Being in Heidegger’s understanding of thing through an example of jug. Heidegger in his piece not only suggests a change of attitude to view a thing, but also “viewing a thing” as not simply a passive activity. It is rather a kind of “step backward” of thinking, which means how to let the representative, analytical and interpretative art of thinking return to its pre-reflective, pre-conceptual and intuitive state of existence.
4. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 1
Hsieh Sheng-Yu, 歷史處境中的行動主體:馬克思哲學與現象學的交互觀察: The Active Subject in the Hiistorical Situation: An Inter-Observation between the Philosophy of Marx and Phenomenology
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The active subject in the historical situation: An interobservation between the philosophy of Marx and phenomenology. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, Phenomenology and Marxism have been two major paradigms in human science based on their contribution to ontology about human being instead of methodology. The phenomenological analysis of the ability of sense-giving of human-being made man as a being-active in the world, while the historical materialism of Marx defined man as a passive-being within the particular historical situation. However, these two discourses may easily open to misconception. Phenomenology was once seen as under the banner of solipsism and the philosophy of Marx as an economical or material determinism. In fact, in Husserl’s Ideas II, Husserl had noticed the role and the function of the body in constitutive act and then the human being had been thought as a passive-being, a corporeal-being-in-the-world, in phenomenology. On the other hand, for Marx, his historical materialism had never negated man as a being-active in the historical process. But both of these two philosophical systems cannot successfully describe human being as being-active meanwhile as being-passive. Therefore, I suggest that it is propitious moment to clarify the unclear dimensions of these two philosophical discourses through the dialogue between them. In addition, I will attempt to propose some new statements on the relationship between the body, will and history.
5. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 1
Wong Yiu-Hong, 時間性、死亡與歷史:後海德格的反思: Temporality, Death and History: A Reflection after Heidegger
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Temporality, death and history: a reflection after Heidegger. This paper aims to evaluate how Heidegger deals with the problem of time in Being and Time. The fundamental issue in that magnum opus is to explain the question of the meaning of Being under the horizon of time. But what kind of philosophical resource could make Heidegger be capable to resolve the problem in the most effective way? The phenomenological interpretation of time takes the first priority in consideration. Although in Being and Time Heidegger has literally made a very little reference to Husserl, the influence of Husserl is too obvious to be denied. Heidegger, however, finds Husserl’s elucidation of time has ever dissolved the dimension of time into the immanence sphere of subjectivity. By making the position of the subject in an all too mighty status, the phenomenon of time has not been rendered faithfully in a phenomenological sense, the motto “zu die Sache selbst”. And, Heidegger would regard Husserl’s working on time has not fully observed this highest norm. Bearing the problem in mind when starting to compose Being and Time, Heidegger has to find a new way to avoid the same “mistake” as his master, and the overall contribution of his great work could in turn be assessed under the same evaluative principle. Has Heidegger successfully saved up “time” from the over dominance of the subject? Has he re-disclosed time as objectively as time itself (die Sache selbst)? This paper focus especially on how Heidegger’s thinking of the past and the future moments in Being and Time. Then, we can see that, when comparing with two other phenomenologists’ treatments on the same issue, Gadamer and Levinas, Heidegger resolutions on “past” and “future’ obviously show their weakness. And, the promise of removing the dominance of the subject is doomed to failure. Moreover, the underlining structure of organizing Being and Time has not fully escaped the way of metaphysical thinking. In his later period, which is so called the “turning”, Heidegger attempts to break down the metaphysical thinking about “foundationalism”, behind this thinking is the presupposition of dichotomy between founding and founded. Judging from this perspective, Being and Time has found no way out of the labyrinth.
6. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 54
Sun-Hye Kim, Introduction for Philosophical Therapy ‐ Self-Awareness, Self‐Care, Dialogue as the Three Axes of Philosophical Therapy
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The modern times proclaimed ‘God’s death’ and the post‐modern times did ‘the death of Man/Subject. And recently our society suffers from ‘the death of the humanities’. The death appearing along with is ‘the death of philosophy’. What on earth does the notice of death of philosophy mean by in the life of human beings living in the modern times? This writer is groping for the point to revive the modern significance of philosophy facing the tragic situations called ‘Death’ through the inquiry of the rendezvous between philosophy and therapy. This writer will study the features of the philosophical therapy in philosophizing in the ancient times, firstly in the relation of philosophy and therapy, secondly the soul as the subject and object of mind‐therapy, thirdly the self‐awareness (gnôthiseautón) as the way of mind‐therapy, fourth the self‐care (epimeleia heautou) as the goal of mind‐therapy, and finally the dialogue as the method of mind‐ therapy, during which I am going to form a solid foundation instead to study the spirit of philosophical therapy dwelling in philosophizing.
7. Schutzian Research: Volume > 1
Chung-Chi Yu, 舒茲的社會理論思想 (The Social Theory of Schutz and Phenomenological Psychology): 從胡塞爾的現象學心理學來看
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In this paper, I try to argue that what Schutz enterprises can be integrated into what Husserl calls phenomenological psychology. My interpretation is based on Schutz’s own remarks, which are though more or less dismissed by most of the interpreters of Schutz. Beginning with an articulation of the social theory of Schutz, I explore the meaning of phenomenological psychology in Husserl as next in order to point out that despite the disagreement with Husserl’s transcendental approach to intersubjectivity Schutz has a closer adherence to Husserl than commonly held.
8. Schutzian Research: Volume > 1
Wei-Lun Lee, 心理治療的倫理現場 (Psychotherapy as a Locale for Ethical Care): 反面置身的抵達 (The Reaching into Situated Negativity)
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The aim of this paper is to advance the understanding of psychotherapy as ethical care, a mode of healing practiced in societies rich in the phenomenaconcerning the operations of collective life. By contemplating and establishing the four concepts: situated negativity, therapeutic locale, bodily experience(insituated negativity), and speech as action, the author is able to delineate the modes of therapeutic interactions right at the locale between the therapist andthe patient in order to disclose the structure of interpersonal thwartedness and connectedness within psychotherapy. Viewed in this perspective, psychologicalsuffering is always the suffering of situated negativity. Healing, however, is not to cancel this negativity but to let it become a source of new ways of existence.This reverse of attitude toward negativity involves ways of “talking” into bodily experience in psychotherapy. The meaning of ethical care thus can be describedas: what the therapist aims to approach through speech is not positive normative ethics, the socially recognized “should-be,” but the situated negativity whichdenotes an expelled position from normative interpersonal ordering and which is to be experienced as nameless and full of forces. Situated negativity is not thatwhich to be eliminated but the source to be appreciated by both the therapist and the patient.
9. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 2
Shaoyu Zhang, 明确哲学的研究对象
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What is philosophy ,what is the natrue and the task of philosophy and what is the function of philosophy? These basic knowledge of philosophy is the topic which is always argued and confered by the field of philosophy. After researching Metaphysics, the author think that Aristotle had already answered these questions. Philosophy is a knowledge which regards bing and its interdependence as obiect, regards the reason and nature as its target ,and why practice as its purpose. The nature of philosophy is wisdom. The task of philosophy is that the knowlege which is about four reasons and three primal thing and principle is aquired.Philosophy has three functions: First, philosophy provide basic frame and demonstration method for knowledge and science. Second, philosophy put the common sense thinking into logic thinking. Third, philosophy provide choices for people practice.
10. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 2
Xia Jingqing, Laozi Philosophy Dialectical Thought and Its Modern Significance
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1, this article chooses three famous sayings, discusses the laozi philosophy the dialectical thought and its modern significance. And the suggestion, the philosophy needs to make the contribution for the world peace 2, the atomic bomb and the violence, threaten humanity's life, is this century characteristic. The science is developed, the humanity has not obtained the perfect happiness, on the contrary actually is the threat which the world trend perishes. Take this fact as the example, has proven the Laozi "为学日益,为道日 损." Dialectical thought. 3, "民不畏死,奈何以死惧之" Laozi speech, its meaning is, regarding the death, feared with did not fear, is relative, may transform. Resolves the contradiction with the military force, died threatens others, if others do not fear death, you do not have themeans. Explained person's will, it cannot use the military force to conquer. Must solve the various countries dispute, is impossible with the military force. 4, the Laozi thought what the world is weakest is the water, it may have the flood tremendous strength, is because has an invariable intention. Always unceasingly flows, achieved the horizontal position, or the condition is tranquil, only then stops. But the humanity similarly has one forever invariable intention, is requests the equality, request peace. Therefore people's intention, is the invincible tremendous strength. This is a truth.