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1. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1/2
Virgil Ciomoş Phénoménologie et Théologie: sur les deux sens de la sécularisation selon Hegel
2. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1/2
Cristian Ciocan La Vie et la Corporalité dans Être et Temps de Martin Heidegger: Ière partie: le problème de la vie. Ontologie fondamentale et biologie
3. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1/2
Emilio Brito Déification, Dédivinisation, et Divinisation selon Heidegger
4. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1/2
Philippe Capelle Phénoménologies, Religion et Théologies chez Martin Heidegger
5. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1/2
Ion Copoeru Centration et Décentration dans la Phénoménologie Pure Husserlienne: le cas du noyau noématique
6. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 1 > Issue: 3/4
Jocelyn Benoist Sens et fonctions de l’intentionnalité dans les Recherches Logiques
7. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 1 > Issue: 3/4
Françoise Dastur Espace et intersubjectivité
8. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 1 > Issue: 3/4
Cristian Ciocan La Vie et la Corporalité dans Être et temps de Martin Heidegger Iième partie: Le problème de la corporalité
9. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 10
Guillaume Fréchette L’intentionnalité et le caractère qualitatif des vécus.Husserl, Brentano et Lotze
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Lotze’s influence on the development of the XIXth and XXth century philosophy and psychology remains largely neglected still today. In this paper, I examine some Lotzean elements in Husserl’s early conception of intentionality, and more specifically in his rejection of the Brentanian concept of intentionality. I argue that Husserl and Lotze, pace Brentano, share a qualitative conception of experiences, what they both call the Zumutesein of experiences. Furthermore, I discuss other issues upon which Husserl and Lotze share common intuitions: the perception of space, the theory of local signs, the realisations of thinking (Leistungen des Denkens) and phenomenology.
10. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 10
Gilbert Gérard La constellation de l’être: Lecture d’Identité et différence de Heidegger
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This article inquires into that which articulates the two texts brought together by Heidegger in Identity and Difference. It sets out from the indications provided in the Preface of the work concerning the “harmony” that reigns between what is at stake at the heart of the two texts, namely what Heidegger respectively calls the Ereignis (event of appropriation) and the Austrag (reconciling difference). The understanding of this harmony makes it possible to approach that which unveils itself as the articulation of Being, but in so doing also raises the difficult problem of the very possibility of thinking Being setting out from its essential withdrawal.
11. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 10
Frédéric Seyler La fonction quasi-performative de la Phénoménologie de la vie et son enjeu éthique
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Michel Henry’s phenomenology of life or radical phenomenology understands life as immanent and transcendental affectivity. From this point of view, ethics can be characterized as the ethics of affectivity, the central stake of which lies in the recognition of life. However, the question is to what extent a philosophical discourse can be held on a reality that, being immanent, is principally inaccessible for intentionality and how such discourse is in fact possible. As radical phenomenology relies on certainty opposed to evidence, it can be shown that both the possibility and the practical effectiveness of its discourse are ultimately rooted in life’s self-revelation. Henry’s works may then be understood as mediation towards the recognition of life, especially through the concepts of quasi-performativity and translation.
12. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 10
Alain Loute Identité narrative et résistances: Le travail de la mise en intrigue
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The objective of this article is to reflect on the impact that Ricoeur’s work on psychoanalysis (following his book on Freud) might have on his concept of narrative identity. In these texts, one of the points he draws from psychoanalysis is that resistance mechanisms can hamper the process of self-recognition of the subject through the story that he tells himself about himself. These resistance mechanisms cannot be put to an end simply by understanding them intellectually. These writings teach us that, in order to be brought to an end, these resistance mechanisms require more than the willingness to appropriate one’s own narrative identity. An appropriate technique to handle energies must be put into place. This explains why the production of a narrative identity can sometimes take the form of a real work.
13. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 10
Christophe Perrin L’origine et les fondements de la question cartésienne chez Heidegger
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Showing a very early interest in Descartes, after having first considered him as a Christian thinker in the perspective of a deconstruction of religious life, Heidegger soon regards him as the major obstacle to the phenomenological analyses he wants to develop, as part of the first ontological search he gave himself: that of a hermeneutics of facticity. Therefore, the latter immediately takes in his work the shape of a hermeneutics of the I think, therefore I am, its author being blamed for having entirely ignored the sense of being in the I am, focused as he is on the thinking ego, the ins and outs of which he develops. But the criticism also applying to Husserl, it is by laying the blame on his master, that Heidegger intends to radicalize the project of his own master, hence the necessity to throw light on the origin and the foundations of what we can call the Cartesian question in Heidegger.
14. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 10
Maria Gyemant Objet et contenu: L’intentionnalité husserlienne face à son héritage psychologiste
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This paper aims to show how Husserl’s concept of intentionality detaches itself from the background of a thorough and recurrent argument that Husserl makes against psychologism. Noting that the concept of intentionality was first recovered by Brentano’s psychology, it seemed to us important to show how Husserl’s intentionality, as it is conceived in the Logical Investigations, distinguishes itself from the “intentional inexistence” that Brentano describes in his Psychology from an Empirical Stand­point. Showing which parts of Brentano’s psychology were rejected and which were maintained in Husserl’s theory is indeed the first concern of those who intend to study the phenomenological concept of intentionality.
15. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 10
Pierre-Jean Renaudie La psychologie et le « chemin de croix » de la phénoménologie transcendantale
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This article focuses on the analysis of the highly problematic relationship between Psychology and Phenomenology in Husserl’s Crisis of European Sciences, in order to show that this last writing allows us to reconsider the criticisms addressed to descriptive psychology since the first breakthrough of phenomenology. Husserl not only tries to bring psychology back into phenomenological field by describing it as a privileged “way to reduction”, but he more fundamentally shows that the closest examination of the crisis-structure of psychology is essential to the understanding of subjectivity. The psychological dimension of subjectivity is neither a mere difficulty of transcendental philosophy, nor an accident in the history of subjectivity, but it discloses the problem upon which lays the transcendental meaning of subjectivity. According to this point of view, Psychology has to deliver its fullness of content and its empirical richness to subjectivity, and so to give phenomenology back its descriptive dimension.
16. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 10
Raoul Moati De l’intentionnalité à la pulsionnalité: La subjectivation du Todestrieb
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The aim of this article is to examine the scope of the commentary made by Jacques Lacan in his Séminaire on the concept of phenomenological intentionality. By re-writing the object of the drive in a topological space / curve, Lacan intended to give full value to a certain number of defining traits of Freudian drive against its interpretation into any kind of non-critical intentionalism. This specifically required that the French psychoanalyst emphasize the vicariousness of the drive in relation to any defined object / goal which induces the irreducible “perverse polymorphic” nature of any drive. Our article also seeks to demonstrate that Lacan did not agree with the repudiation of the concept of “intention” which he had inherited from phenomenology and which he had reworked under Freud’s patronage, but had subverted its scope in the passage from intentionality to pulsionality by which he expected to achieve disidentification of the desired objective / goal from the pulsional satisfaction goal. Through this complication, we seek to re-open the issue of limits that the concept of intentionality encounters when it meets post-Freudian metapsychology.
17. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 11
Roberto Terzi La contamination et le retard: Phénoménologie de l’historicité et de la tradition chez Derrida
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Through an immanent reversal of Husserl’s approach to the problems of genesis, writing, and time, Derrida radicalizes the phenomenology of historicity in the direction of a contamination between the empirical and the transcendental. In this paper, I argue that this also entails a transformation of the very concept of tradition: every tradition is always already tainted by the possibility of constitutional crisis and oblivion and it can only be questioned by thought after the historical fact. I conclude with an account of the general meaning of Derrida’s analysis of Husserl’s phenomenology, and indicate its importance for his later work.
18. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 11
Eric Pommier La phénoménologie de la vie de Renaud Barbaras
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Renaud Barbaras wants to show that only the concept of life can help us understand how the subject may be a condition as well as a part of the world. The failures of the former phenomenological theories on this point is due to “the ontology of death” they assume, which leads to separate the conscience and the body. It is thus required to realise an epochè of death so as to think the unity of the subject. Ultimately, Renaud Barbaras is led to define life from desire.
19. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 11
Grégori Jean Quand peut un corps? Corporéité, affectivité et temporalité chez Michel Henry
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One of Michel Henry’s major contributions to the phenomenology of the body consists in his proposal, based on his reading of Maine de Biran, to understand the subjective corporeity from the angle of the ability of action. Subjective corporeity acquires its ontological autonomy and its reality only through its own temporality. In reference to several unpublished texts, this article tries to clarify the nexus between ability and time, and thus to emphasize the crucial importance of the past for a “phenomenology of life”, in his paradoxical connection with the necessity to think a “coming in presence” of the world.
20. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 11
Claudia Șerban Fungierende Leiblichkeit: le rôle méthodologique du corps dans la phénoménologie de Husserl
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The phenomenological problem of the body (Leib) goes further than its treatment as a theoretical object, insofar as it concerns the meaning and the accomplishment of the phenomenological method itself. Both reduction and intuition, the two major poles of this method, imply in their specificity the reference to an operative corporeity (fungierende Leiblichkeit). The primordial sphere of absolute givenness cannot thus reduce the body proper without sacrificing the very principle that allows delimiting it. But this seems to lead to an unavoidable subjectivation of the phenomenological experience, whose model remains the object of perception (internal or external) and its ideal of intuitivity. In the last part of the paper it is however argued that corporeity is more than the resort of such a subjectivation, appearing also to be, within the framework of expression, the key to intersubjective comprehension.