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1. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 1
Thomas Paxson, Jr. A New Subjectivistic Theory Of Knowledge: A Critical Discussion
2. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 1
Ulrich Majer, Rainer Stuhlmann-Laeisz Das Verhältnis von Mathematik und Metaphysik in Kants Theorie der Naturwissenschaft
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Der Beitrag der Mathematik zur Naturwissenschaft besteht darin, Erkenntnisse a priori von den (empirischen) Gegenständen der letzteren zu gewinnen und — unter der Voraussetzung, daß es überhaupt Empirisches g i b t - , die Existenz solcher Gegenstände a priori zu sichern. Die Aufgabe der Metaphysik ist es, besondere Begriffe ( in bezug auf die körperliche Natur) zu bilden und die Prinzipien für deren mathematische Konstruktion zu entwickeln. Die so "metaphysischkonstruierten" Begriffe werden dann durch Angabe empirischer Modelle physikalisch interpretiert.
3. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 1
Terence Parsons A Meinongian Analysis of Fictional Objects
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This paper explores the view that there are such things as (nonexistent) fictional objects, and that we refer to such objects when we say things like "Sherlock Holmes is a fictional detective", or "Conan Doyle wrote about Sherlock Holmes". A theory of such objects is developed as a special application of a Meinongian Ontology.
4. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 1
Ronald E. Beanblossom In Defense of Thomas Reid's Use of 'Suggestion'
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Thomas Reid, the eighteenth century Scottish philosopher, was concerned with the proper use of ordinary language. P. G. Winch would have us believe that in spite of Reid's concern for observing the ordinary meaning of terms, Reid did not know the ordinary meaning of 'suggest'. Not knowing this ordinary meaning, Reid allegedly changed it in violation of his own criteria. Against this view I argue (1) Reid uses 'suggest' in a technical sense and gives reasons for doing so; (2) contrary to Winch's claim Reid does appropriately use 'suggestion' to describe perception.
5. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 1
Books Received
6. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 1
Keith Lehrer, Joseph Richard Remembering Without Knowing
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Memory sometimes yields knowledge and sometimes does not. It is, however, natural to suppose that i f a man remembers that p, then he knows that p and formerly knew that p. Remembering something is plausibly construed as a f o rm of knowing something which one has not forgotten and which one knew previously. We argue, to the contrary, that this thesis is false. We present four counterexamples to the thesis that support a different analysis of remembering. We propose that a person remembers that p (at t) if and only if the thought or conviction that p comes from memory (at t) when, in fact, it is true that p.
7. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 1
David W. Smith Meinongian Objects
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Meinong's object theory is primarily motivated by the needs of intentionality theory. I argue that Meinongian objects must be intensional entities if, as asked, they are to serve as the objects of thought in a purely object-theoretic account of intentionality. For Meinong, incomplete objects are the proper objects of thought. Complete objects are beyond our grasp; we apprehend them as best we can when we intend incomplete objects embedded in them. This yields, on a semantic plane, an account of failures or substitutivity of identity in intentional contexts. And this, I argue, forces incomplete objects to be intensional, and so therefore are complete objects.
8. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 1
Henri Sarlet Existenz und Prädikation: Sprachanalytische Untersuchungen zu Existenz-Aussagen
9. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 1
Franz Brentano Was an Reid zu Loben: Über die Philosophie von Thomas Reid. Aus dem Nachlaß
10. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 1
Ota Weinberger Wissensaussage und die Unmöglichkeit ihrer Objektivierung
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Knowledge is expressed in sentences about states of affairs of the type 'p' not in knowledge-sentences of the type 'W(p)'. Knowledge-sentences are results of a reflexion about a subject of knowledge and a knowledge-system. Objectivization of a knowledgesentence 'W(p)' is defined as the entailment of 'p' from the premis 'W(p)' based on the generally accepted sentence 'W(p)->p'. The author distinguishes three kinds of knowledge-sentences: a) self-reflective knowledge-sentences which are a result of the subject's S reflexion about his own knowledge 'WS*(p)';b) comparative knowledge-sentences which are result of a reflexion of the subject S2 about the knowledge of another subject S1 using the knowledge of S2 as a criterion for judging S1's knowledge; c) the sentence of S2 about the believing of S1, that S1 knows p. In neither of these cases an objectivization is logically justified.