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Displaying: 91-100 of 3933 documents


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91. The Monist: Volume > 95 > Issue: 2
Mark Alfano, James R. Beebe, Brian Robinson The Centrality of Belief and Reflection in Knobe-Effect Cases: A Unified Account of the Data
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Recent work in experimental philosophy has shown that people are more likely to attribute intentionality, knowledge, and other psychological properties to someone who causes a bad side effect than to someone who causes a good one. We argue that all of these asymmetries can be explained in terms of a single underlying asymmetry involving belief attribution because the belief that one’s action would result in a certain side effect is a necessary component of each of the psychological attitudes in question. We argue further that this belief-attribution asymmetry is rational because it mirrors a belief-formation asymmetry, and that thebelief-formation asymmetry is also rational because it is more useful to form some beliefs than others.
92. The Monist: Volume > 95 > Issue: 2
Shaun Nichols The Indeterminist Intuition: Source and Status
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Evidence from experimental philosophy indicates that people think that their choices are not determined. What remains unclear is why people think this. Denying determinism is rather presumptuous given people’s general ignorance about the nature of the universe. In this paper, I’ll argue that the belief in indeterminism depends on a default presumption that we know the factors that influence our decision making. That presumption was reasonable at earlier points in intellectual history. But in light of work in cognitive science, we are no longer justified in sustaining the presupposition that we know what influences our choices. As a result, I’ll suggest, our belief in indeterminist choice is unjustified.
93. The Monist: Volume > 95 > Issue: 2
Chris Zarpentine, Heather Cipolletti, Michael Bishop WINO Epistemology and the Shifting-Sands Problem
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By making plausible the Diversity Thesis (different people have systematically different and incompatible packages of epistemic intuitions), experimental epistemology raises the specter of the shifting-sands problem: the evidence base for epistemology contains systematic inconsistencies. In response to this problem, some philosophers deny the Diversity Thesis, while others flirt with denying the Evidence Thesis (in normal circumstances, the epistemic intuition that p is prima facie evidence that p is true). We propose to accept both theses. The trick to living with the shifting-sands problem is to expand epistemology’s evidentialbase so as to include scientific evidence. This evidence can provide principled grounds on which to decide between incompatible intuitions. The idea of resolving inconsistencies in an evidential base by adding more independent lines of evidence is commonplace in science. And in philosophy, it is simply Wide Reflective Equilibrium. We contend that the idea that epistemology would depend crucially on scientific evidence seems radical because many traditional epistemologists practice reflective equilibrium that is WINO,Wide In Name Only. We suggest five different lines of scientific evidence that can be, and have been, used in support of non-WINO epistemological theories.
94. The Monist: Volume > 95 > Issue: 2
Ram Neta Knowing from the Armchair that Our Intuitions Are Reliable
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In recent years, a growing body of experimental literature has called into question the reliability of our intuitions about hypothetical cases, and thereby called into question the use of intuitions in philosophy. In this paper, I critically assess one prominent example of this challenge, namely, Swain, Alexander, and Weinberg’s recent study of order effects on the Truetemp intuition. I argue that the very data that Swain,Alexander, and Weinberg find do not undermine, but instead support, the reliability of intuition. I also show how intuition can itself be marshaled in the service of figuring out just when we can and cannot expect to find order effects on our intuitions.
95. The Monist: Volume > 95 > Issue: 1
Erratum
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multiculturalism and cultural diversity
96. The Monist: Volume > 95 > Issue: 1
H.E. Baber Dilemmas of Multiculturalism: An Introduction
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97. The Monist: Volume > 95 > Issue: 1
Roy L. Brooks Cultural Diversity: It’s All About the Mainstream
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can multiculturalism be liberal?
98. The Monist: Volume > 95 > Issue: 1
Erik Christensen Revisiting Multiculturalism and Its Critics
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99. The Monist: Volume > 95 > Issue: 1
Frederik Stjernfelt Liberal Multiculturalism as Political Philosophy: Will Kymlicka
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group rights
100. The Monist: Volume > 95 > Issue: 1
Stephen Biggs Liberalism, Feminism, and Group Rights
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