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Displaying: 91-100 of 2376 documents


book symposium
91. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 86 > Issue: 3
Robert Merrihew Adams Consciousness, Physicalism, and Panpsychism
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92. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 86 > Issue: 3
Lynne Rudder Baker Pereboom's Robust Nonreductive Physicalism
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93. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 86 > Issue: 3
Daniel Stoljar Qualitative Inaccuracy and Unconceived Alternatives
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94. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 86 > Issue: 3
Derk Pereboom Replies to Daniel Stoljar, Robert Adams, and Lynne Baker
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95. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 86 > Issue: 3
Recent Publications
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articles
96. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 86 > Issue: 2
Jessica Brown Experimental Philosophy, Contextualism and SSI
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97. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 86 > Issue: 2
Storrs McCall Does the Brain Lead the Mind?
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98. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 86 > Issue: 2
Joseph Shieber Toward a Truly Social Epistemology: Babbage, the Division of Mental Labor, and the Possibility of Socially Distributed Warrant
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In what follows, I appeal to Charles Babbage's discussion of the division of mental labor to provide evidence that—at least with respect to the social acquisition, storage, retrieval, and transmission of knowledge—epistemologists have, for a broad range of phenomena of crucial importance to actual knowers in their epistemic practices in everyday life, failed adequately to appreciate the significance of socially distributed cognition. If the discussion here is successful, I will have demonstrated that a particular presumption widely held within the contemporary discussion of the epistemology of testimony—a presumption that I will term thepersonalist requirement—fails to account for those very practices of knowers that I detail here. I will then conclude by suggesting that an alternate account of testimonial warrant, one that has heretofore been underappreciated, ought to be given more serious consideration—in particular because it is well suited to account for those actual practices of knowers that the personahst requirement leaves unrecognized.
99. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 86 > Issue: 2
Thor Grünbaum Seeing what I am Doing
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100. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 86 > Issue: 2
Stephen Puryear Leibniz on the Metaphysics of Color
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Drawing on remarks scattered through his writings, I argue that Leibniz has a highly distinctive and interesting theory of color. The central feature of the theory is the way in which it combines a nuanced subjectivism about color with a reductive approach of a sort usually associated with objectivist theories of color. After reconstructing Leibniz's theory and calling attention to some of its most notable attractions, I turn to the apparent incompatibility of its subjective and reductive components. I argue that this apparent tension vanishes in light of his rejection of a widely accepted doctrine concerning the nature of bodies and their geometrical qualities.