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Displaying: 91-100 of 2350 documents


special symposium
91. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 86 > Issue: 1
Richard Woodward, Towards Being
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92. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 86 > Issue: 1
Graham Priest, Lost in Translation: a Reply to Woodward
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book symposium
93. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 86 > Issue: 1
Tim Bayne, Précis of The Unity of Consciousness
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94. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 86 > Issue: 1
Robert Van Gulick, Phenomenal Unity, Representation and the Self
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95. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 86 > Issue: 1
Jesse Prinz, Attention, Atomism, and the Disunity of Consciousness
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96. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 86 > Issue: 1
Tim Bayne, Response to Commentators
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97. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 86 > Issue: 1
Recent Publications
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articles
98. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 85 > Issue: 3
Jennifer Nagel, Intuitions and Experiments: A Defense of the Case Method in Epistemology
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99. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 85 > Issue: 3
Jeff Speaks, On Possibly Nonexistent Propositions
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Alvin Plantinga gave a reductio of the conjunction of the following three theses: Existentialism (the view that, e.g., the proposition that Socrates exists can't existunless Socrates does), Serious Actualism (the view that nothing can have a property at a world without existing at that world) and Contingency (the view thatsome objects, like Socrates, exist only contingently). I sketch a view of truth at a world which enables the Existentialist to resist Plantinga's argument without givingup either Serious Actualism or Contingency.
100. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 85 > Issue: 3
Chandra Sekhar Sripada, What Makes a Manipulated Agent Unfree?
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Incompatibilists and compatibilists (mostly) agree that there is a strong intuition that a manipulated agent, i.e., an agent who is the victim of methods such asindoctrination or brainwashing, is unfree. They differ however on why exactly this intuition arises. Incompatibilists claim our intuitions in these cases are sensitive to the manipulated agent's lack of ultimate control over her actions, while many compatibilists argue that our intuitions respond to damage inflicted by manipulation on the agent's psychological and volitional capacities. Much hangs on this issue because manipulation-based arguments are among the most important for defending incompatibilist views of free will. In this paper, I investigate this issue from a experimental perspective, using a set of statistical methods well suited for identifying the features of hypothetical cases people's intuitions are responding to. Results strongly support the compatibilist view—subjects' tendency to judge that a manipulated agent is unfree was found to depend on their judgments that the agent suffers impairments to certain psychological/volitional capacities that compatibilists say are the basis for free will. I discuss the significance of these results for the use of manipulation cases in the philosophical debate about free will.