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Displaying: 81-100 of 1430 documents


commentaries
81. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 34 > Issue: 2
Mark Silcox Comments on “Nonfunctional Semantics in Plant Signaling” by Mark Bauer
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82. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 34 > Issue: 2
James Mock On Kenneth L. Brewer’s “There Will be Monsters: A Defense of Noël Carroll’s Definition of the Horror Genre”
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83. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 34 > Issue: 2
Paul Martens Reexamining Kierkegaard, Hegel, and Taylor: A Response to Andrew Rose
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open submission articles
84. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 34 > Issue: 2
Daniel Coren Always Choose to Live or Choose to Always Live?
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Bernard Williams (1973) famously argued that if given the choice to relinquish our mortality we should refuse. We should not choose to always live. His piece provoked an entire literature on the desirability of immortality. Intending to contradict Williams, Thomas Nagel claimed that if given the choice between living for a week and dying in fi ve minutes he would always choose to live. I argue that (1) Nagel’s iterating scenario is closer to the original Makropulos case (Čapek’s) that inspired Williams’s piece; (2) iterating versions of the choice given in the Makropulos case might well be less desirable than a one-time choice; and (3) Nagel’s mathematical induction premise is implausible. I discuss some useful implications of (1)-(3) for the broader discussion of Williams’s arguments and, more generally, for our understanding of the value of mortality and the possibility of mutually consistent but necessarily incompatible wants in ordinary human psychology.
85. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 34 > Issue: 2
Eugene Marshall What are Spinoza’s Inadequate Ideas of?
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86. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 34 > Issue: 2
Matt Rosen Reconceptualizing Species as Species-Towards-Extinction
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plenary session: ancient philosophy
87. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 34 > Issue: 1
Anne-Marie Schulz Stirring up America’s Sleeping Horses: Cornel West, Ta-Nehisi Coates, and Socratic Parrhesia (and Platonic Writing) in the Public Sphere
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plenary commentaries
88. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 34 > Issue: 1
R. Bensen Cain On the Valuing and Re-valuing of Socratic Parrhesia
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89. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 34 > Issue: 1
G. M. Trujillo, Jr., Terrell Taylor Socratic Oblivion and the Siren Songs of Academe: Responding to Anne-Marie Schultz’s “Stirring up America’s Sleeping Horses”
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articles
90. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 34 > Issue: 1
Robyn R. Gaier Self-forgiveness in the Moral Domain: Presidential Address
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91. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 34 > Issue: 1
Deborah K. Heikes Don’t be Ignorant
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“Ignorance” is receiving an increased amount of philosophical attention. The study of it even has its own name, “agnotology.” Some ignorance remains simply a case of not having enough information, but increasingly philosophers are recognizing a whole other type of ignorance, one that is socially constructed and often actively promoted. In the first section of this paper I examine perhaps the best known type of socially constructed ignorance, “white ignorance.” White ignorance reflects a lack of genuine understanding of the social realities of others and it creates injustice. In the second section of the paper, I consider what it means to “genuinely understand,” arguing that when it comes to issues of justice those with epistemic power have a moral obligation to at least attempt to understand others’ social realities.
92. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 34 > Issue: 1
E.M. Dadlez Kitsch and Bullshit as Cases of Aesthetic and Epistemic Transgression
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93. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 34 > Issue: 1
David Antonini Human Plurality as Object: An Arendtian Framework for Making Sense of Trump
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94. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 34 > Issue: 1
Dustin Nelson We Should Not Take Human Rights So Seriously
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95. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 34 > Issue: 1
Bob Fischer, Isaac Wiegman Disassociation Intuitions
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96. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 34 > Issue: 1
Justin Bell Depression Applied to Moral Imagination: Deweyan Tools for Moral Inquiry
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Based upon research done by evolutionary psychologists into the reason why human beings feel depression in social situations, I argue that philosophers have significant warrant to consider depression as an important feature conditioning moral imagination. The moral imagination come up with new enterprises and new ways of organizing social life. This reorganization would meet many of the goals put forth by pragmatist philosopher John Dewey. I argue that depression will work as a leading clue and unique imaginative “space” to reconstruct various social situations.
97. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 34 > Issue: 1
Thomas Metcalf An Epistemic-Virtue Solution to Some Peer Disagreements in Philosophy
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I present a new way to resolve some peer disagreements in philosophy. While a straightforward majority-based argument would be inconclusive, I show that some philosophical majorities are special cases. I focus on the example of moral realism. First, I discuss how mathematically, small variations in our justified confidence in some particular cognizer’s judgment entail large differences in our justified confidence in the decision of a populous voting bloc comprising such cognizers. Second, I argue that plausible considerations about epistemic and moral virtue justify putting slightly more trust in moral realists’ judgments than we would in other philosophers’ judgments. This inspires a new argument for resolving this debate in favor of moral realism, an argument that is stronger than a simple majority-based argument and has advantages over traditional arguments for moral realism. I conclude by suggesting how this tactic may apply to other philosophical debates that feature peer disagreement.
98. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 34 > Issue: 1
Kyle Bromhall Do Minds Change?: Calkins’s Self-Psychology and the Epistemology of Disagreement
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99. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 34 > Issue: 1
Raff Donelson Three Problems with Metaethical Minimalism
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100. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 34 > Issue: 1
Justin Morton A Dilemma for Streetian Constructivism
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In this paper, I pose a dilemma for a very influential kind of metaethical constructivism, advocated recently by Sharon Street. It is either true or false that, if an action is morally wrong for a certain agent, then that agent has a normative reason not to do it. If it is true, then the constructivist (of this kind) is committed to the counterintuitive claim that some apparently morally horrendous acts are not actually wrong. If it is false, then the constructivist cannot maintain a distinctively metaethical constructivism. Either way, this type of constructivism comes with a significant cost.