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Displaying: 81-100 of 1101 documents


twentieth-anniversary reflections
81. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 21 > Issue: 1
Paul Copan After Twenty Years: Personal Reflections
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This autobiographical article commemorates the twentieth anniversary of Philosophia Christi—the journal of the Evangelical Philosophical Society (EPS). I give my own personal narrative of the EPS’s influence on my life beginning in the mid-1980s as a master’s-level graduate student. This narrative then recounts my deepened involvement with the Society starting in the late 1990s, when it began going through pioneering structural and leadership changes and key developments over the past twenty years.
symposium on the christology of andrew loke
82. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 21 > Issue: 1
C. Stephen Evans A Kenotic Theologian’s Response to Andrew Loke’s “Kryptic Model” of the Incarnation
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In this article I compare the kryptic model of the Incarnation, developed by Andrew Loke, with two other models, the “two-minds” model and the kenotic model. All three models succeed in showing the logical coherence of the doctrine of the Incarnation, and I concede that Loke’s model has some of the advantages of both of the other two, while avoiding some perceived disadvantages. However, I argue that Loke’s model also has some of the disadvantages of both of the other models. In conclusion I argue that the alleged superiority of the kryptic model over a kenotic model vanishes if one is willing to question the reliability of our a priori rational intuitions about the nature of God on the basis of a view of the divine nature that seems to fit better with the biblical picture of God.
83. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 21 > Issue: 1
Oliver D. Crisp Loke’s Preconscious Christ
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In several recent articles and a monograph, Andrew Loke has outlined a particular model of the Incarnation, which he calls the Divine Preconscious Model (DPM). In this article I provide a critique of this model, drawing on recent work by James Arcadi in order to show that there are serious theological costs involved in adopting the DPM.
84. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 21 > Issue: 1
Andrew Loke Reply to Panelists
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I explain why my model of the Incarnation avoids the problems with alternative models and reply to objections concerning my model’s coherence with scripture (for example, Heb. 4:15), the understanding of personhood and natures (using resources from Islamic tradition concerning Jesus’s human nature), the concrete–abstract distinction, the human soul of Christ, the lack of the unconscious in Christ, and the incompatibility with a strong sense of immutability and simplicity. I conclude that my model stays faithful to scripture and can help to secure unity in the body of Christ concerning the doctrine of the Incarnation.
articles
85. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 21 > Issue: 1
Elizabeth Jackson, Andrew Rogers Salvaging Pascal’s Wager
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Many think that Pascal’s Wager is a hopeless failure. A primary reason for this is because a number of challenging objections have been raised to the wager, including the “many-gods” objection and the “mixed strategy” objection. We argue that both objections are formal, but not substantive, problems for the wager, and that they both fail for the same reason. We then respond to additional objections to the wager. We show how a version of Pascalian reasoning succeeds, giving us a reason to pay special attention to the infinite consequences of our actions.
86. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 21 > Issue: 1
Troy Catterson Grounding the Good: On Self-Predication, Self-Fulfilling Goals, and Moral Naturalism
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I argue that moral goodness is necessarily self-predicating. That is to say, the property of being morally good is morally good. I then argue that reductions of moral goodness to natural properties, particularly utilitarian specifications, are not necessarily self-predicating. Therefore, such reductions are not successful. Finally, I consider the possibility of defining the good as “fulfilling God’s design plan.” I show that, under an Aristotelian construal of property existence this property is provably self-predicating.
87. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 21 > Issue: 1
Perry Hendricks The Nature of Skeptical Theism: Answering Nonstandard Objections to Skeptical Theism
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Skeptical theism is a popular response to arguments from evil. Recently, Matthew A. Benton, John Hawthorne, and Yoaav Isaacs have argued that the theses that ground skeptical theism are either false or limited in scope. In this article, I show that their objections rest on dubious assumptions about the nature of skeptical theism. Along the way, I develop and clarify the ambiguous parts of skeptical theism. The upshot of this is that—once the nature of skeptical theism is made clearer—it is far more difficult to resist.
88. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 21 > Issue: 1
Travis M. Dickinson Virtuous Faith: An Evidentialist Model
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The notion of faith has been variously understood throughout the course of Christian intellectual history. It has been common to construe faith in epistemological terms, especially by critics of religious faith. In this paper, I argue that faith, especially faith that is had in the context of relationships, should be understood as an act of ventured trust. This is not to say that beliefs and the evidence for the truth of those beliefs are unimportant. Indeed, I argue that acting on the basis of good evidence is what makes faith virtuous.
89. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 21 > Issue: 1
Jonathan Ashbach The Phenomenological Moral Argument: A New Formulation of a Classic Theistic Defense
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The moral argument for the existence of God is a popular and rhetorically effective element of natural theology, but both its traditional ontological and epistemological forms rely upon controversial premises. This article proposes a new variant—the phenomenological moral argument, or PMA—that is exclusively empirical in form. The PMA notes several empirical aspects of moral experience (seven are discussed in the version presented here) that cohere much more naturally with a theistic than with an atheistic account of conscience’s origins. It therefore concludes that divine creation best explains the nature of moral experience, and thus, that God exists.
90. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 21 > Issue: 1
William Lane Craig Is Penal Substitution Unsatisfactory?
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It might be objected to penal substitutionary theories that punishing Christ could not possibly meet the demands of divine retributive justice. For punishing another person for my crimes would not serve to remove my guilt. The Anglo-American system of justice, in fact, does countenance and even endorse cases in which a substitute satisfies the demands of retributive justice. Moreover, Christ’s being divinely and voluntarily appointed to act not merely as our substitute but as our representative enables him to serve as our proxy before God, so that when he is punished, we are punished, to the satisfaction of divine justice.
91. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 21 > Issue: 1
James T. Turner, Jr. The Mind of the Spirit in the Resurrected Human: A Mereological Model of Mental Saturation
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The Scriptures suggest that Christians are to grow up into the “mind of Christ” or, as Craig Keener calls it, the “mind of the Spirit.” While there have been a few recent works that discuss how mental sharing between the human person and the divine person(s) might contribute to sanctification (for example, Alston), there are not any that discuss a mereological account of how the mental union works with reference to the bodily resurrection. Since I understand the human’s eschatological union with the divine to be the occasion of theosis, I offer in this paper a metaphysical model of at least one aspect of theosis: a part/whole relationship between the mind of a human and the mind of the Spirit, with reference to the eschatological bodily resurrection. I call the union “mental saturation.”
philosophical notes
92. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 21 > Issue: 1
John C. Wingard, Jr. Theism and the Metaphysics of Free Will: A Review Essay
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Two recently published collections of essays—Free Will and Theism, edited by Kevin Timpe and Daniel Speak, and Free Will and Classical Theism, edited by the late Hugh McCann—represent the state of the art in current analytic philosophy and analytic theology with respect to issues at the intersection of the metaphysics of free will and Christian theism that have vexed philosophers and theologians throughout Christian history. Despite a marked imbalance of incompatibilist (mostly libertarian) authors over compatibilist authors in both volumes, the essays in these collections advance the discussion in significant ways, and I indicate some of those ways.
93. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 21 > Issue: 1
Myron Bradley Penner The Unknown Mover (Or, How to Do “Natural” Theology in a Postmodern Context): A Review Essay
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Andrew Shepardson contends in Who’s Afraid of the Unmoved Mover that the combined postmodern objections of Carl A. Raschke, James K. A. Smith, and me, to natural theology, fail. Here I focus only on the issue of idolatry and natural theology, as one way of demonstrating a fundamental inadequacy characteristic of Shepardson’s rebuttal of postmodern challenges to evangelical appropriations of natural theology. I argue that contrary to Shepardson’s contention, Acts 17 does not support evangelical appropriations of natural theology, but operates with a view of reason consistent with my postmodern one and opens postmodern possibilities for understanding natural revelation.
94. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 21 > Issue: 1
Andrew I. Shepardson General Revelation and the God of Natural Theology: A Response to Myron Bradley Penner
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In Who’s Afraid of the Unmoved Mover? Postmodernism and Natural Theology, I defend natural theology against its postmodern evangelical detractors, including Myron Bradley Penner. Penner rejects natural theology because it attempts to ground knowledge of God in human reason, and he claims that my treatment of Acts 17:16–34 is fatal to my argument. However, Penner does not engage my explication of the doctrine of general revelation. The catastrophic effects that Penner perceives turn out to be only against a straw man of the version of natural theology that I defend.
book reviews
95. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 21 > Issue: 1
Paul M. Gould Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives on Contemporary Science
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96. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 21 > Issue: 1
Eric Yang The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism
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97. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 21 > Issue: 1
Michael N. Keas Scientism and Secularism: Learning to Respond to a Dangerous Ideology
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98. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 21 > Issue: 1
Logan Paul Gage Five Proofs of the Existence of God
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99. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 21 > Issue: 1
News and Announcements
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100. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 20 > Issue: 2
Craig J. Hazen Editor’s Introduction
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