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Displaying: 81-100 of 899 documents


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81. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 41 > Issue: Supplement
Daniel Howard-Snyder Two Peas in a Single Polytheistic Pod: John Hick and Richard Swinburne
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A descriptive polytheist thinks there are at least two gods. John Hick and Richard Swinburne are descriptive polytheists. In this respect, they are like Thomas Aquinas and many other theists. What sets Swinburne and Hick apart from Aquinas, however, is that unlike him they are normative polytheists. That is, Swinburne and Hick think that it is right that we, or at least some of us, worship more than one god. However, the evidence available to me shows that only Swinburne, and not Hick, is a cultic polytheist: he actually worships more than one god. I conclude that only Swinburne is a polytheist par excellence.
82. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 41 > Issue: Supplement
Michael P. Lynch, Paul Silva, Jr. Why Worry about Epistemic Circularity?
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Although Alston believed epistemically circular arguments were able to justify their conclusions, he was also disquieted by them. We will argue that Alston was right to be disquieted. We explain Alston’s view of epistemic circularity, the considerations that led him to accept it, and the purposes he thought epistemically circular arguments could serve. We then build on some of Alston’s remarks and introduce further limits to the usefulness of such arguments and introduce a new problem that stems from those limits. The upshot is that adopting Alston’s view that epistemically circular arguments can be used to justify their conclusions is more costly than even he thought.
83. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 41
Asha Bhandary Liberal Dependency Care
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Dependency care is an asymmetric good; everyone needs to receive it, but it is not the case that we all have to provide it. Despite ethicists’ of care’s theorizing about the importance of dependency care, it has yet to be theorized within a form of liberalism. This paper theorizes two components of a liberal theory of dependency care. First, it advances a liberal justification to include the receipt of dependency care among the benefits of social cooperation. Then, it advances an autonomy-based principle to guide how care should be provided (“strong proceduralism”). Strong proceduralism is based on an account of autonomy that incorporates the significance of a person’s skills when he parses options. Strong proceduralism consequently requires educational efforts to teach care-giving skills to groups who have not previously possessed them. I hypothesize that strong proceduralism will secure adequate care provision as the outcome of autonomous choice, but if an inadequate number of people choose to provide care, then a secondary stage of deliberations will be necessary. If the outcome of those secondary deliberations is that people want to have their care needs met, then a fair process for distributing infringements on autonomy must be devised.
articles
84. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 41 > Issue: Supplement
Matthew McGrath Alston on the Epistemic Advantages of the Theory of Appearing
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William Alston claimed that epistemic considerations are relevant to theorizing about the metaphysics of perceptual experience. There must be something about the intrinsic nature of a perceptual experience that explains why it is that it justifies one in believing what it does, rather than other propositions. A metaphysical theory of experience that provides the resources for such an explanation is to be preferred over ones that do not. Alston argued that the theory of appearing gains a leg up on its rivals, particularly sense-datum theory and adverbialism, precisely on this score. This paper examines these claims, along with the further question of whether the theory of appearing fares better epistemologically than the currently popular theory of intentionalism about perceptual experience. I conclude that while Alston is correct that the theory of appearing fares better than its traditional rivals (the sense datum theory and adverbialism), it does not clearly fare better than intentionalism. I further argue that Alston ignores a number of complexities in his account of how perceptual experience, construed as states of objects appearing certain ways to subjects, justifies perceptual beliefs.
exchange: framing a decision problem
85. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 41
Thomas A. Blackson Against Weatherson on How to Frame a Decision Problem
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In “Knowledge, Bets, and Interests,” Brian Weatherson makes a suggestion for how to frame a decision problem. He argues that “the states we can ‘leave off’ a decision table are the states that the agent knows not to obtain.” I present and defend an example that shows that Weatherson’s principle is false. Weatherson is correct to think that some intuitively rational decisions wouldn’t be rational if states the agent knows not to obtain were not omitted from the outcomes in the decision problem. This, however, is not true of every rational decision. Weatherson’s principle for how to frame a decision problem is open to counterexample.
articles
86. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 41 > Issue: Supplement
Daniel J. McKaughan Action-Centered Faith, Doubt, and Rationality
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Popular discussions of faith often assume that having faith is a form of believing on insufficient evidence and that having faith is therefore in some way rationally defective. Here I offer a characterization of action-centered faith and show that action-centered faith can be both epistemically and practically rational even under a wide variety of subpar evidential circumstances.
exchange: framing a decision problem
87. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 41
Brian Weatherson Reply to Blackson
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Thomas Blackson argues that interest-relative epistemologies cannot explain the irrationality of certain choices when the agent has three possible options. I argue that his examples only refute a subclass of interest-relative theories. In particular, they are good objections to theories that say that what an agent knows depends on the stakes involved in the gambles that she faces. But they are not good objections to theories that say that what an agent knows depends on the odds involved in the gambles that she faces. Indeed, the latter class of theories does a better job than interest-invariant epistemologies of explaining the phenomena he describes.
88. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 41
Cristina Ionescu Due Measure and the Dialectical Method in Plato’s Statesman
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In this paper I explore the relevance of due measure for the dialectical method of division in Plato’s Statesman, and I argue that due measure is the unifying thread of the dialogue insofar as it guides the application of the dialectical method throughout the conversation. I defend this view by showing (a) that due measure accounts for the Stranger’s shift from bisective and value-neutral divisions to non-bisective divisions that identify the essence of statesmanship and situate this art hierarchically in relation to other arts needed in the polis; (b) that due measure accounts for the transition from the paradigm of the shepherd to the paradigm of the weaver, and finally (c) that due measure is also intimately related to the myth, insofar as the myth provides the metaphysical horizon in which natural joints of division and due measure itself are to be discerned.
articles
89. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 41 > Issue: Supplement
Thomas D. Senor The Knowledge-As-Perception Account of Knowledge: A Prolegomenon
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William Alston once argued that justification is not necessary for knowledge. He was convinced of this because he thought that, in cases of clear perception, one could come to know that P even if one’s justification for believing P was defeated. The idea is that the epistemic strength of clear perception is sufficient to provide knowledge even where justification is lacking; perceiving (and believing) that P is sufficient for knowing that P. In this paper, I explore a claim about knowledge that is the opposite side of the coin from Alston’s position: clear perception (with belief) that P is necessary for knowledge. Taking my cue from John Locke, I examine the plausibility of a theory of knowledge that distinguishes justified true unGettiered belief that P from knowing that P. Although I don’t fully advocate this position, I argue that it has significant plausibility, and that the initially troubling consequences of the account are not as problematic as one might have suspected.
90. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 41
Dionysis Christias Sellars, Meillassoux, and the Myth of the Categorial Given: A Sellarian Critique of “Correlationism” and Meilassoux’s “Speculative Realism”
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The aim of this paper is threefold. First, we examine the Sellarsian concept of the (myth of the) categorial Given, focus on its wide application and suggest that it can be applied to those post-Kantian philosophical views, currently fashionable in Continental philosophical circles, for which Quentin Meillassoux coins the term “correlationism”: the view that mind and world are “always already” given to us as essentially related to one another, and only subsequently can they be thought of as being independently existing and meaningful “entities.” Second, it is pointed out that Sellars uses an argument against the explanatory adequacy of the manifest image (an image with essential “Givenist” elements in its descriptive and explanatory dimension) that is exactly of the same form as Meillassoux’s argument against correlationism, but, which, when combined with other crucial Sellarsian views concerning the transcendental/empirical distinction, can avoid a problematic feature of Meillassoux’s argument, and, in this way, constitute a better philosophical weapon against correlationism. Finally, it is suggested that by not drawing the transcendental/empirical distinction in the right (i.e., Sellarsian) way, Meillassoux himself is exposed and, in the constructive (“speculative realist”) part of his work, indeed succumbs to a version of the myth of the categorial Given.
articles
91. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 41 > Issue: Supplement
Eleonore Stump The Atonement and the Problem of Shame
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The atonement has been traditionally understood to be a solution to the problem created by the human proneness to moral wrongdoing. This problem includes both guilt and shame. Although the problem of human guilt is theologically more central to the doctrine of the atonement, the problem of shame is something that the atonement might be supposed to remedy as well if it is to be a complete antidote to the problems generated by human wrongdoing. In this paper, I discuss the difference between guilt and shame; I explore the different varieties of shame, and I suggest ways to connect the atonement to a remedy for all the kinds of shame.
92. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 41
Reiner Schaefer Brandom’s Account of Reasoning: Nonmonotonic, But Does Not Allow Entitlement Recovery
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In most everyday instances of reasoning, reasoners can gain, lose, and reacquire entitlement to (or justification for) a possible commitment (or belief) as a result of their consecutively acquiring new commitments. For example, we might initially conclude that ‘Tweety can fly’ from ‘Tweety is a bird,’ but later have to reject this conclusion as a result of our coming to learn that Tweety is a penguin. We could, even later, reacquire entitlement to ‘Tweety can fly’ if we became committed (and presumably entitled) to the claim ‘Tweety has a jetpack.’ I will call this very common feature of reasoning entitlement recovery. In this paper I will argue that the types of inferential relations that are central to Brandom’s entire account of language and reasoning make entitlement recovery impossible. I will then briefly attempt to diagnose why this problem arises for Brandom and suggest how his account should be modified so that it will successfully allow entitlement recovery.
93. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 41
Carl Hammer The Structure of Accountability: An Analysis Applied to Animals
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There is a growing trend toward recognizing that moral obligation is centrally grounded in accountability. This, however, may seem to offer another argument, perhaps in the footsteps of Kant, that other animals have no moral standing. Accountability seems to be grounded in some kind of authoritative demands and, as Stephen Darwall puts it, “second-personal address.” Other animals are not competent in such practices, so they may seem to be left out of the domain of obligation. I argue that demand-accountability-based obligation is consistent with robust moral standing for other animals. Our accountability could be based on demands made by the moral community at large, which would put other animals on equal footing with moral agents in terms of how obligations might apply to them. Further, I argue that the most plausible model of demand-accountability-based obligation would have such a community-centered structure and would support other animals having moral standing.
book exchange: epistemological disjunctivism
94. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 41
Duncan Pritchard Précis of Epistemological Disjunctivism
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An articulation is offered of the main themes of my book, Epistemological Disjunctivism (2012).
95. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 41
Sanford Goldberg Comments on Pritchard’s Epistemological Disjunctivism
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Among the many virtues Duncan Pritchard ascribes to his disjunctivist position in Epistemic Disjunctivism, he claims it defeats the skeptic in an attractive fashion. In this paper I argue that his engagement with the skeptic is not entirely successful.
96. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 41
Ram Neta How Holy is the Disjunctivist Grail?
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In his book Epistemological Disjunctivism, Duncan Pritchard describes disjunctivism as the “holy grail” of epistemology. This is because, according to him, disjunctivism enjoys the advantages of both internalism and externalism without suffering from their disadvantages. In this paper, I argue that Pritchard fails to make his case for this claim.
97. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 41
Clayton Littlejohn Pritchard’s Reasons
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Pritchard’s epistemological disjunctivist thinks that when we come to know things through vision our perceptual beliefs are based on reasons that provide factive support. The reasons that constitute the rational basis for your belief that the page before you is white and covered in black marks entails that it is and includes things that could not have provided rational support for your beliefs if you had been hallucinating. There are some issues that I would like to raise. First, what motivation is there for thinking that this sort of view is preferable to a more traditional internalist view that insists that the rational support for our beliefs is always limited to things that are common to the cases of knowledge and subjectively indistinguishable cases of non-knowledge? I suspect that an important part of the motivation for the view comes from worries about skepticism. Second, if we’re worried about skepticism, can we resist these skeptical pressures without an appeal to metaphysical disjunctivism? Pritchard’s epistemological disjunctivist differs from McDowell’s in that Pritchard’s epistemological disjunctivist doesn’t take up controversial positions in the philosophy of perception. Is this kind of neutrality tenable? Third, should we follow Pritchard in thinking that the rational basis for our perceptual beliefs involves reasons? What specifically is the relationship between cases in which there is something the subject knows and cases in which there is something that is the subject’s reason for believing what she does?
98. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 41
Duncan Pritchard Epistemological Disjunctivism: Responses to My Critics
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A response to commentaries on my book, Epistemological Disjunctivism (Oxford University Press, 2012), by Sanford Goldberg, Clayton Littlejohn, and Ram Neta. The themes covered include: the viability of the epistemological disjunctivist response to radical skepticism (Goldberg); the extent to which epistemological disjunctivism has dialectical advantages over classical epistemic internalism from an anti-sceptical point of view (Neta); and whether epistemological disjunctivism incorporates the right view of the nature of reasons (Littlejohn).
99. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 41
Ryan W. Davis Can Consequentialism Require Selfishness?
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A moral theory that is consequentialist, welfarist, and impartialist can sometimes require providing a benefit to oneself, rather than to others. However, it seems intuitively wrong that selfish actions could be morally required. This essay develops a version of what has been called the selfishness objection, and considers how consequentialist views might respond to it. I argue that some proposed modifications to consequentialist theories to avoid the problem are objectionably ad hoc. That is, they risk discharging important motivating assumptions of the theory. Nor can the problem be dissolved by claiming the selfishness problem is empirically unlikely. Instead, I suggest that that the problem raises persistent doubts about whether we can be morally required to promote impartial welfare. Such doubts may indicate that well-being lacks the normative significance sometimes attributed to it.
100. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 41
Neil Levy Culpable Ignorance: A Reply to Robichaud
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In earlier work, I argued that agents are blameworthy for their ignorance only when they have akratically failed to take advantage of an opportunity to improve their epistemic situation, because it is only when agents judge that they ought to take such an opportunity that they can reasonably be expected to do so. In response, Philip Robichaud argues that the conditions under which agents may reasonably be expected to improve their epistemic situation are broader than I recognize, and that culpable ignorance is more common that I believe. He also claims to show that my account of internalist reasons cannot do the work I demand of it. In response, I elaborate the conception of ‘capacity’ my account requires. If we pay attention to the conditions under which it is reasonable to expect an agent to exercise a capacity, I maintain, we can identify a sense of the term that plays the role I want: showing that agents can reasonably be expected to take advantage of an opportunity to improve their epistemic situation only when they would be akratic in not doing so.