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Displaying: 81-100 of 1692 documents


articles
81. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 34 > Issue: 4
Claire Brown Peterson Humility in the Deficient
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Contemporary treatments of humility typically treat humility as a virtue that is reserved for the accomplished. I argue that paradigmatic humility can also be possessed by the deficient, and I provide an extended example of such humility. I further argue that attending to such a case helps us to appreciate the way in which the humble have released both the desire for superiority and the aversion to inferiority. Accordingly, when necessary, the humble will exhibit an extremely low concern with their own status relative to that of others.
82. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 34 > Issue: 4
John Ross Churchill Determinism and Divine Blame
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Theological determinism is, at first glance, difficult to square with the typical Christian commitment to the appropriateness of divine blame. How, we may wonder, can it be appropriate for God to blame someone for something that was determined to occur by God in the first place? In this paper, I try to clarify this challenge to Christian theological determinism, arguing that its most cogent version includes specific commitments about what is involved when God blames wrongdoers. I then argue that these commitments are not essential to divine blame, and that there are plausible alternative accounts of such blame that would not court similar challenges. I end with a case for the intelligibility of divine blame within theological determinism, in light of its possible similarity in relevant respects to certain instances of intelligible human blame.
83. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 34 > Issue: 4
Andrew Moon Plantinga’s Religious Epistemology, Skeptical Theism, and Debunking Arguments
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Alvin Plantinga’s religious epistemology has been used to respond to many debunking arguments against theistic belief. However, critics have claimed that Plantinga’s religious epistemology conflicts with skeptical theism, a view often used in response to the problem of evil. If they are correct, then a common way of responding to debunking arguments conflicts with a common way of responding to the problem of evil. In this paper, I examine the critics’ claims and argue that they are right. I then present two revised versions of Plantinga’s argument for his religious epistemology. I call the first a religion-based argument and the second an intention-based argument. Both are compatible with skeptical theism, and both can be used to respond to debunking arguments. They apply only to theistic beliefs of actual persons who have what I call doxastically valuable relationships with God—valuable relationships the goods of which entail the belief that God exists.
84. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 34 > Issue: 4
Eleanor Helms On Climacus’s “Against Reason” Thesis: A Challenge to Westphal
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I object to Merold Westphal’s characterization in Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith (2014) of faith as “against reason.” I argue that Kierkegaard scholars emphasize the tension between faith and reason more than Kierkegaard does, affirming and perpetuating a broader antagonism in our own cultural climate. I suggest that the view of faith as “transforming vision” developed by M. Jamie Ferreira and others makes better sense of the different facets of faith pointed out by Westphal and the strengths of his account (especially faith as a passion) while avoiding conceptual and practical problems with the account Westphal has recently offered.
book reviews
85. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 34 > Issue: 4
Michael Pace Evidentialism and the Will to Believe, by Scott F. Aikin
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86. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 34 > Issue: 4
Mary Leng God Over All: Divine Aseity and the Challenge of Platonism, by William Lane Craig
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87. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 34 > Issue: 4
Emily Kelahan The Will to Reason: Theodicy and Freedom in Descartes, by C. P. Ragland
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articles
88. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 34 > Issue: 3
Pavel Butakov The Eucharistic Conquest of Time
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Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox theologians claim that the unique event of Christ’s sacrifice on Calvary is present in Eucharistic liturgies. A popular explanatory strategy for this miraculous presence suggests that due to its supernatural character the Eucharist “conquers time,” transcends its boundaries, and allows for temporal coincidence of two chronologically distant events. I discuss the four main approaches within this strategy that can be discovered in contemporary theological writings. The first approach implies a time travel of the Calvary event. The second suggests the time travel of Eucharistic participants. The third eliminates the chronological distance by relocating one of the events into a timeless reality. The fourth assumes multilocation of the event across time. I argue that each of these approaches is untenable on philosophical or theological grounds.
89. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 34 > Issue: 3
Jada Twedt Strabbing Divine Forgiveness and Reconciliation
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I argue that divine forgiveness is God’s openness to reconciliation with us, the wrongdoers, with respect to our wrongdoing. The main advantage of this view is that it explains the power of divine forgiveness to reconcile us to God when we repent. As I show, this view also fits well with the parable of the prodigal son, which is commonly taken to illustrate divine forgiveness, and it accounts for the close connection between divine forgiveness and Christ’s atonement. Finally, I demonstrate that this view is particularly well-suited, although not committed, to the idea that God forgives us without our repentance.
90. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 34 > Issue: 3
Rico Vitz “What is a Merciful Heart?”: Affective-Motivational Aspects of the Second Love Command
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In this paper, I argue that Christ’s second love command implies not only that people’s volitions and actions be Christ-like, but also that their affective-motivational dispositions be Christ-like. More specifically, I argue that the command implies that people have aretaic obligations to strive to cultivate a merciful heart with the kind of affective depth described by St. Isaac of Syria in his 71st ascetical homily—i.e., one that is disposed to becoming inflamed, such that it is gripped by “strong and vehement mercy.”
91. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 34 > Issue: 3
Scott M. Williams Unity of Action in a Latin Social Model of the Trinity
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I develop a Latin Social model of the Trinity that is an extension of my previous work on indexicals and the Trinity. I focus on the theological desideratum of the necessity of the divine persons’ unity of action. After giving my account of this unity, I compare my account with Swinburne’s and Hasker’s social models and Leftow’s non-social model. I argue that their accounts of the divine persons’ unity of action are theologically unsatisfactory and that this unsatisfactoriness derives from a modern conception of personhood according to which distinct and incommunicable intellectual acts and volitional acts are necessary conditions for one’s being a person. I argue that the Latin Social model is preferable to the modern-personhood models because it is simpler in explanatory economy with regard to securing the necessity of the divine persons’ unity of action.
92. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 34 > Issue: 3
Benedikt Paul Göcke Christian Cyborgs: A Plea For a Moderate Transhumanism
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Should or shouldn’t Christians endorse the transhumanist agenda of changing human nature in ways fitting to one’s needs? To answer this question, we first have to be clear on what precisely the thesis of transhumanism entails that we are going to evaluate. Once this point is clarified, I argue that Christians can in principle fully endorse the transhumanist agenda because there is nothing in Christian faith that is in contradiction to it. In fact, given certain plausible moral assumptions, Christians should endorse a moderate enhancement of human nature. I end with a brief case study that analyses the theological implications of the idea of immortal Christian cyborgs. I argue that the existence of Christian cyborgs who know no natural death has no impact on the Christian hope of immortality in the presence of God.
book reviews
93. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 34 > Issue: 3
Kenneth L. Pearce Idealism and Christian Theology, edited by Joshua R. Farris and S. Mark Hamilton
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94. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 34 > Issue: 3
Edward Wierenga The Fall and Hypertime, by Hud Hudson
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articles
95. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 34 > Issue: 2
A. J. Cotnoir Mutual Indwelling
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Perichoresis, or “mutual indwelling,” is a crucial concept in Trinitarian theology. But the philosophical underpinnings of the concept are puzzling. According to ordinary conceptions of “indwelling” or “being in,” it is incoherent to think that two entities could be in each other. In this paper, I propose a mereological way of understanding “being in,” by analogy with standard examples in contemporary metaphysics. I argue that this proposal does not conflict with the doctrine of divine simplicity, but instead affirms it. I conclude by discussing how mutual indwelling relates to the concepts of unity (modal inseparability) and identity (qualitative indiscernibility).
96. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 34 > Issue: 2
Shieva Kleinschmidt Atheistic Prayer
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In this paper I will argue, contrary to common assumptions, that rational atheistic prayer is possible. I will formulate and respond to two powerful arguments against the possibility of atheistic prayer: first, an argument that the act of prayer involves an intention to communicate to God, precluding disbelief in God’s existence; second, an argument claiming that reaching out to God through prayer requires believing God might exist, precluding rational disbelief in God. In showing options for response to these arguments, I will describe a model on which atheistic prayer is not only possible, but is on a par with theistic prayer in many more ways than one might expect.
97. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 34 > Issue: 2
Tomas Bogardus, Mallorie Urban How to Tell Whether Christians and Muslims Worship the Same God
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Do Muslims and Christians worship the same God? We answer: it depends. To begin, we clear away some specious arguments surrounding this issue, to make room for the central question: What determines the reference of a name, and under what conditions do names shift reference? We’ll introduce Gareth Evans’s theory of reference, on which a name refers to the dominant source of information in that name’s “dossier,” and we then develop the theory’s notion of dominance. We conclude that whether Muslims’ use of “Allah” co-refers with Christians’ use of “God” depends on how much weight is given to what type of information in the dossiers of these two names, and we offer a two-part test by which the reader can determine whether Muslim and Christian uses of the divine names co-refer: If Christianity were true and Islam false, might “Allah” still refer to God? And: If Islam were true and Christianity false, might “God” still refer to Allah? We explain the implications of your answers to those questions, and we close with a few reflections about what, in addition to reference, might be required for worship, and whether, from a Christian perspective, salvation turns on this issue.
98. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 34 > Issue: 2
Dennis Vanden Auweele Reconciliation, Incarnation, and Headless Hegelianism
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A number of contemporary authors (e.g., Catherine Malabou, Slavoj Žižek, and John Caputo) claim that Hegel’s Religionsphilosophie provides important insights for contemporary philosophy of religion. John Caputo argues that Hegel’s notion of incarnation as radical kenosis is a powerful tool for postmodern Radical Theology. In this essay, I scrutinize this claim by balancing Hegel’s notion of incarnation with his notion of recognition—the latter of which Caputo removes from a “headless Hegelianism.” I argue that a non-Hegelian, non-dialectic sense of recognition ought to be introduced in contemporary philosophy of religion to remove the confrontation with the Other from the realm of radical trauma.
99. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 34 > Issue: 2
Thomas Williams Anselm on Free Choice and Character Formation
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Character formation is a central theme in Katherin Rogers’s Freedom and Self-Creation: Anselmian Libertarianism. According to Rogers, Anselm holds that the purpose of free choice is to afford creatures the possibility of creating their own characters through their free choices. I argue that Anselm has no doctrine of character formation. Accordingly, he does not hold the view of the purpose of free choice that Rogers attributes to him. Creatures cannot bring about justice in themselves, let alone increase it by their own efforts; any moral progress is divine gift, not creaturely achievement. I offer an alternative account of the purpose of free choice.
book reviews
100. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 34 > Issue: 2
Jeff Snapper Skeptical Theism: New Essays, ed. Trent Dougherty and Justin P. McBrayer
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