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Displaying: 81-90 of 431 documents


possibilities of embodiment
81. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 12
Elizabeth A. Behnke, Cristian Ciocan, Introduction: Possibilities of Embodiment
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82. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 12
Chris Nagel, Phenomenology without “the body”?
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French phenomenology focused on “the body” to avoid the supposed transcendental idealism of Husserl’s phenomenology, and to provide an “existential” or “empirical” account of the origin of meaning, as Ricoeur put it. In practice, however, this has implicitly presupposed a Cartesian problematic of the relation between body and mind or “subject.” This is the source of the ultimate frustration of this effort, as well as the persistence of a “mystery” of meaning (to cite Merleau-Ponty and Henry). This essay offers an alternative, considering the embodiment of any meaningful experience, suggesting finally that embodiment must be accounted for in terms of subjection.
83. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 12
Gunnar Declerck, Incarnation, motricité et rapport au possible
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For Husserl, kinaesthetic capability is a key piece of the process of perception. By ensuring the junction between the actual and the potential, it allows the exhibition of an object that is always more than what appears. Kinaesthetic capability preserves the transcendence of the object by preventing the phenomenon from being confined to pure actuality. This idea, however, poses significant challenges when one questions the nature of the possibilities that are at stake here. Especially, the perceived seems to enjoy a kind of emancipation from these capabilities as they actually are. How can one justify that the structures of the perceived world are the intentional correlate of the kinaesthetic skills of the subject if such structures continue to regulate the sense of the appearing objects when those skills are neutralized? We will see that only a genetic perspective, assuming the intrinsically historical character of the subject, provides a satisfactory answer to this question, and that this perspective leads to placing into question the actualist position that Husserl sometimes tends to adopt.
84. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 12
Diego D’Angelo, Die Schwelle des Lebe-Wesens: Überlegungen zur Leibinterpretation Heideggers in der Nietzsche-Abhandlung
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One of Heidegger’s most important descriptions of bodily existence can be found in his Nietzsche lectures. This paper aims to elucidate this “metaphysics of the body” both in relation to Heidegger’s Leibniz-interpretation in the later Marburg lectures as well as in the context of his later thought. Leibniz and Nietzsche are Heidegger’s points of departure in the attempt to think the difference between θεωρία and πραξις beyond Being and Time: It is only by understanding their relationship, through a radical re-thinking of the problem of corporeality, no longer as a noun (der Leib) but as a verb (leiben), that one can possibly move beyond every traditional dualism, between theory and praxis but also and most notably between being and becoming.
85. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 12
Jan Bierhanzl, Signifiance éthique et corporéité dans Autrement qu’être ou au-delà de l’essence
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The paper here presented deals with ethical signifying as happening in corporeity. The starting point is a provisional definition of ethical signifying as a process and a relation to the other. In the first part I attempt to describe precisely this process and distinguish two aspects: concretization and hyperbole. In the second and main part I try to outline concretization and hyperbole in the corporeal relation to the other. The modalities of ethical signifying are caress, vulnerability, maternity and last but not least the voice of the self.
86. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 12
Anne Gléonec, Corps animal et corps humain: l’« eff acement » de la propriété. À la naissance de l’institution chez Merleau-Ponty
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The purpose of this article is to show that in Merleau-Ponty’s lesser known works, one can find a path leading toward a phenomenology of the body that would not risk the “ambiguity of the flesh,” as The Visible and the Invisible is often charged with, but instead would sustain the ontology of nature that one finds in the “Working Notes” added to Merleau-Ponty’s last writings. Analyzing first his concept of nature, as it was developed in his courses at the Collège de France, the proposed aim of this text is to question anthropological difference by focusing on Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation of the contemporary sciences, whereby the Ineinander between the physical, living, and human orders is re-founded by a new, negative concept of nature. By deconstructing classical ontology and its understanding of space, time, and objectivity, and by returning to the domain of perception, this new concept offers a novel way to reveal the advent of life in nature, its institution, and the emergence of a new corporeity in life itself. The model of Merleau-Ponty’s essential concept of institution becomes birth, and therefore the human body will no longer be interpreted as “one’s own body,” but rather will be understood, in a radically a-subjective way, as from, and based on, the participation of our perception with animality. Thereby, the concept of “ownness” becomes secondary; however, the notion of institution, established against the lexicon of consciousness and subjectivity, opens another sense of anthropological difference, one that is based only on the experiences of corporeity.
87. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 12
Emre Şan, Corporéité et existence: Patočka, Merleau-Ponty, Maine de Biran
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We propose here to analyze Patočka’s dialogue with Merleau-Ponty and Maine de Biran with regard to the reciprocal implication of the body and existence. Patočka’s gesture seeks to discover the condition of existence and its effectiveness, named by the concept of flesh for Merleau-Ponty. What is the meaning of existence as constitutive flesh? The analysis will consist of three parts. The first part of the article presents the meaning of embodiment characterized by Merleau-Ponty in the analysis of the experience of the body as a sexed being. In the second part, we will analyze the corporeal movement that shows existence in its specificity. In the third and final part, we will analyze the original relationship of subjectivity to corporeal movement through Patočka’s reading of Maine de Biran.
88. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 12
Luka Nakhutsrishvili, Corps propre et corps technique(s): Jean-Luc Nancy et la phénoménologie
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This essay deals with Jean-Luc Nancy’s ambivalent philosophical relationship to the phenomenological perspective on the problem of corporeity. The present analysis aims to point out how within the framework of a critical rejection of some of the fundamental elements of the phenomenological tradition, Nancy adopts some of its other elements in order to forge his own approach to corporeity. While traversing Nancy’s thinking from his critique of the Leib to his concept of technique and ecotechnics, the essay engages in a critical discussion of diverse phenomenological motifs from Husserl’s, Merleau-Ponty’s and Heidegger’s oeuvre.
89. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 12
Corry Shores, Body and World in Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze
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To compare Merleau-Ponty’s and Deleuze’s phenomenal bodies, I first examine how for Merleau-Ponty phenomena appear on the basis of three levels of integration: 1) between the parts of the world, 2) between the parts of the body, and 3) between the body and its world. I contest that Deleuze’s attacks on phenomenology can be seen as constructive critiques rather than as being expressions of an anti-phenomenological position. By building from Deleuze’s definition of the phenomenon and from his more phenomenologically relevant writings, we find that phenomena for him are given to the body under exactly the opposite conditions as for Merleau-Ponty, namely that 1) the world’s differences 2) appear to a disordered body that 3) comes into shocking affective contact with its surroundings. I argue that a Deleuzian theory of bodily-given phenomena is better suited than Merleau-Ponty’s model in the task of accounting for the intensity of phenomenal appearings.
90. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 12
James Mensch, Public Space and Embodiment
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Hannah Arendt’s notion of public space is one of her most fruitful, yet frustrating concepts. Having employed it to analyze political freedom, she claims that such space has largely disappeared in the modern world. In what follows, I am going to argue that this pessimistic assessment follows from Arendt’s exclusion of labor and work from the public realm. Against Arendt’s claim that such activities are essentially private, I shall argue that they, like action, manifest our embodied being-in-the-world. When we think of public space in terms of our embodied presence, it becomes a concept applicable to modern democratic politics.