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Displaying: 81-100 of 284 documents


statě & diskuse
81. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 10 > Issue: 3
Stanislav Sousedík K pozitivnímu významu Kantovy kritiky metafyziky Poznámka ke stejnojmennému příspěvku Ondřeje Sikory
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82. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 10 > Issue: 3
Ondřej Sikora Kant a metafyzika K reakci Stanislava Sousedíka na článek „K pozitivnímu významu Kantovy kritiky metafyziky“
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83. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 10 > Issue: 3
Prokop Sousedík Úvahy o filosofii a vědě
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The author divides his reflections on the nature of philosophy or science into three parts. In the first part, he strives to determine the issues in question systematically. By dividing the concept of human activity he uncovers the features common to philosophy and science as well as the features by which these two disciplines are distinguished. The inspiration is found especially in Aristotle’s Metaphysics. In the second part, the same problem is dealt from the historical perspective. By way of a reconstruction of the origins of philosophy and science, the author shows the features by which these disciplines got mutually separated and secluded from the previous trends. In the third part, the author contrasts the presented approaches and highlights why it is reasonable to investigate the nature of philosophy and science from both, systematical and historical point of view.
articles
84. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 10 > Issue: 2
Nicholas Rescher Aristotle’s Precept on Precision
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As Aristotle saw it, the modus operandi of nature is frequently irregular and unruly. And this accords with the structure of the universe, with regularity predominant in the trans-lunar realm and regularity prominent in the cis-lunar. This circumstance opens the way to the different sorts of natural laws: those which are strictly universal and those which function only normally and “for the most part.” And knowing to what extent exactness, regularity, and universality can be expected in different areas of inquiry was, for Aristotle, the very touchstone of scientific wisdom and sophistication.
85. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 10 > Issue: 2
Stefan Heßbrüggen-Walter Scientific Knowledge and the Metaphysics of Experience The Debate in Early Modern Aristotelianism
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Early modern commentaries on Aristotle’s Metaphysics contain a lively debate on whether experience is ‘rational’, so that it may count as ‘proto-knowledge’, or whether experience is ‘non-rational’, so that experience must be regarded as a primarily perceptual process. If experience is just a repetitive apprehension of sensory contents, the connection of terms in a scientific proposition can be known without any experiential input, as the ‘non-rational’ Scotists state. ‘Rational’ Thomists believe that all principles of scientific knowledge must rely on experiential data, because experience consists in an apprehension of facts rather than objects. And it is only apprehension of facts that can justify knowledge of principles. In this context, the role of mathematical knowledge is special, because it is self-evident. So Thomists must either show that mathematical principles do rely on experience, or that they do not express knowledge claims.
86. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 10 > Issue: 2
Mark K. Spencer Transcendental Order in Suárez
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Francisco Suárez’s account of the transcendentals in Disputationes Metaphysicae 3 has been noted by Aertsen, Courtine, Darge, and Sanz for its reductionism; Suárez argues that all proposed transcendentals reduce to unum, verum, and bonum. This scholarship overlooks a key feature of Suárez’s account. In addition to providing his own theory, Suárez also works out a meta-metaphysical framework with which it can be shown how any proposed metaphysical item, including those that do not fit into Suárez’s own theory, relates to Being; he also works out rules for ordering these items. The way in which Suárez orders and reduces items related to Being involves several different kinds of reduction, and is more complex than current interpretations allow. Suárez’s framework and rules providea neutral standard for assessing the truth of any theory of transcendentals; this is shown through examining four accounts of the proposed transcendental aliquid using Suárez’s framework and rules.
87. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 10 > Issue: 2
Vlastimil Vohánka Why Peter van Inwagen Does Not Help in Showing the Logical Possibility of the Trinity
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I conceive the Trinity doctrine as the proposition that there are three persons each of whom is God but just one being (substance) which is God. In two papers by Peter van Inwagen I distinguish three potential candidates for a reason that the Trinity doctrine is logically possible. First, a particular conjunction entailing the Trinity doctrine is formally consistent in relative identity logic. Second, the conjunction is formally consistent in the standard logic. Third, the conjunction shares a form in relative identity logic with another logically possible conjunction. I explain how all these three reasons fail because of the distinction between logical possibility and formal consistency. In contrast to previous critiques, I dispense with epistemological and metaphysical assumptions about absolute and relative identity. Instead, I employ modal distinctions endorsed even by the inspirer of van Inwagen’s relative identity of the Trinity — the pioneering analytic scholastic Peter Geach.
88. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 10 > Issue: 2
Miroslav Hanke Insolubilia Novissima: Analysis of an Anonymous Insolubilia-Treatise with a Working Edition
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Insolubilia novissima is a short anonymous fifteenth-century treatise on semantic paradoxes printed in the Cambridge compendium Libellus sophistarum. Along with a working edition of this treatise, basic information about its content and historical and systematic context is offered. Insolubilia novissima endorses the Swyneshedian contextualist solution to paradoxes based on distinguishing between compositional and contextual meaning of sentences.
reviews
89. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 10 > Issue: 2
Paul Richard Blum Marco Sgarbi: The Aristotelian Tradition and the Rise of British Empiricism. Logic and Epistemology in the British Isles (1570–1689)
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interview
90. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 10 > Issue: 1
Lukáš Novák, Daniel D. Novotný “Let Us Think the Tradition Through Anew!” A Philosophical Interview with Prof. Stanislav Sousedík
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articles
91. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 10 > Issue: 1
Richard Swinburne A Posteriori Arguments for the Trinity
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There is a good a priori argument for the doctrine of the Trinity, from the need for any divine being to have another divine being to love suffi ciently to provide for him a third divine being whom to love and by whom to be loved. But most people who have believed the doctrine of the Trinity have believed it on the basis of the teaching of Jesus as interpreted by the church. The only reason for believing this teaching would be if Jesus led the kind of life which a priori we would expect an incarnate God to live in order to identify with our suffering, make atonement for our sins, and to reveal truth to us; culminated by a miracle which God alone could do and which would also authenticate the teaching. Given good a posteriori evidence for the existence of God, there is enough historical evidence to make it probable that Jesus did live that sort of life, and so to believe the doctrine of the Trinity.
92. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 10 > Issue: 1
Theodore Scaltsas Relations as Plural-Predications in Plato
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Plato was the first philosopher to discover the metaphysical phenomenon of plural-subjects and plural-predication; e.g. you and I are two, but neither you, nor I are two. I argue that Plato devised an ontology for plural-predication through his Theory of Forms, namely, plural-partaking in a Form. Furthermore, I argue that Plato used plural-partaking to offer an ontology of related individuals without reifying relations. My contention is that Plato’s theory of plural-relatives has evaded detection in the exegetical literature because his account of plural-subjects through the Theory of Forms had not been recognised for what it is. I further submit that Plato’s handling of related individuals through plural-predication is not only a “first” in philosophy, but also an “only”, having remained a unique account in the metaphysics of relations. I hope that Plato’s account will introduce a fresh approach to contemporary debates on the subject.
93. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 10 > Issue: 1
Miroslav Hanke John Mair on Semantic Paradoxes: Alethic Modalities and Validity in Paradoxical Contexts
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Conceptual analysis of logical consequence can be regarded as a crucial part of any logical theory. The present paper focuses on John Mair’s approach to this issue from both historical and systematic point of view. Mair’s task is to analyse the concepts of modality and validity in universal token-based languages with non-compositional semantics based on network evaluation. To fulfil it, Mair addresses modal paradoxes, validity paradoxes and inferences with paradoxical components. Both truth and modality and truth and validity, when conceived as semantic properties, turn out to be mutually independent as a result of Mair’s semantics: there are true impossible propositions and possible propositions which cannot be true and truth-preservation turns out to be neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for validity.
notes & discussions
94. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 10 > Issue: 1
Derek von Barandy How to Save Aristotle from Modal Collapse
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On Jaakko Hintikka’s understanding of Aristotle’s modal thought, Aristotle is committed to a version of the Principle of Plenitude, which is the thesis that no genuine possibility will go unactualized in an infinity of time. If in fact Aristotle endorses the Principle of Plenitude, everything becomes necessary. Despite the strong evidence that Aristotle indeed accepts that Principle of Plenitude, there are key texts in which Aristotle seems to contradict it. On Hintikka’s final word on the matter, Aristotle either endorses the Principle of Plentitude or Aristotle is simply inconsistent. Without challenging Hintikka’s interpretation of the relevant texts, I show how Aristotle may accept a form of the Principle of Plenitude that allows for genuine unactualized possibilities in the world. What allows me to reconcile theseemingly inconsistent data is to show how Aristotle is only committed to a de re version of the Principle of Plenitude. After I lay out my proposal, I show how it opens up new ways in which we might understand Aristotle’s attempt to reject fatalism in his De interpretatione 9.
review articles
95. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 10 > Issue: 1
William F. Vallicella Constituent versus Relational Ontology (a review of Metaphysics: Aristotelian, Scholastic, Analytic)
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This review article explores in a critical spirit the differences between constituent and relational ontology as practiced by four contemporary Aristotelian philosophers, Michael J. Loux, E. J. Lowe, Lukáš Novák, and Stanislav Sousedík.
study
96. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 9 > Issue: 3
Ľuboš Rojka SJ Boh a vznik sveta z ničoho Náčrt obhajoby časového kozmologického argumentu pre Božie jestvovanie
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The kalām cosmological argument for the existence of God proposed by W. L. Craig (in 1970’s) has been subject to much debate on all sorts of issues related to the existence of God and the beginning of the universe. The goal of the paper is to briefly evaluate several complex questions embraced in the argument in order to show the depth and strength of the argument, and to avoid oversimplification, which one can find in some recent publications. The argument as such does not rely on a single thesis or a theory proposed by a single author. The argument has such a support from different fields that its opponents would need to elaborate a theory with much more explanatory power than the most recent cosmological theories.
97. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 9 > Issue: 3
Lukáš Lička Supozice mentálního termínu podle Viléma Ockhama
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This paper investigates Ockham’s claim that there is a diversity of suppositions of a mental term. First, it summarizes the hitherto research in Ockham’s theory of concepts (understood as natural signs) and the theory of mental language ascribed to him (Part 1–2). Secondly, it describes his theory of supposition, focusing on the interpretation of this theory which describes it as a device for interpretation of propositions (Part 3). Thirdly, the paper examines the problems which arise from combining Ockham’s theory concepts and his theory of supposition (Part 4–7) – namely, the problems concerning the nature of mental proposition, the questionof mental syncategoremata, and of equivocation in mental language. Part 8 then reveals the absurdity of understanding the supposition of a mental term as an instrument for interpretation of mental propositions. Finally, I propose a new interpretation of the whole issue, based on Ockham’s early commentary on the Sentences (Part 9). According to this interpretation, the diversity of supposition of a mental term is not triggered by the need of distinguishing various meanings of a mental propositions, but by Ockham’s nominalistic theory of science.
edition
98. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 9 > Issue: 3
Miroslav Hanke Opusculum insolubilium v kontextu scholastické logiky Analýza traktátu a pracovní edice
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Opusculum insolubilium is an anonymous sixteenth-century British logical treatise dealing with the so-called “insolubles”, i.e. self-reflexive paradoxical propositions. It summarises the fundamental principles of the approach proposed by Roger Swyneshed in the fourteenth century, which became popular in the British academic circles during the fifteenth century. The present paper has two basic aims: to contrive a modern edition of this treatise which could be used fora further research in post-mediaeval scholastic logic, and to provide elementary information about its content and historical context.
discussion
99. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 9 > Issue: 3
Jan Palkoska „Res illa quae cognoscitur“ v Suárezových Metafyzických disputacích Odpověď na kritickou poznámku Daniela Heidera „K objektivnímu bytí u Suáreze“
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review
100. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 9 > Issue: 3
Matej Drobňák Jaroslav Peregrin: Člověk a pravidla (Matej Drobňák)
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