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Displaying: 81-90 of 2376 documents


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81. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 86 > Issue: 3
John Bengson Experimental Attacks on Intuitions and Answers
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82. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 86 > Issue: 3
Matthew McGrath Dogmatism, Underminers and Skepticism
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83. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 86 > Issue: 3
Aaron J. Cotnoir Validity for Strong Pluralists
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84. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 86 > Issue: 3
Andrew Sepielli Moral Uncertainty and the Principle of Equity among Moral Theories
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85. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 86 > Issue: 3
Liam P. Dempsey, Itay Shani Stressing the Flesh: In Defense of Strong Embodied Cognition
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In a recent paper, Andy Clark (2008) has argued that the literature on embodied cognition reveals a tension between two prominent strands within this movement. On the one hand, there are those who endorse what Clark refers to as body-centrism, a view which emphasizes the special contribution made by the body to a creature's mental life. Among other things, body centrism implies that significant differences in embodiment translate into significant differences in cognition and consciousness. On the other hand, there are those who endorse what Clark calls extended functionalism, a view which sees the mind as the joint product of the computational resources presented by (i) intracranial processing, (ii) bodily input, and (iii) environmental scaffolding. As such, extended functionalism allows for the possibility that any contribution of the body to cognition and consciousness can be compensated for by the other two contributing factors. While Clark's sympathies lie with the latter approach, we argue in favour of the former. In particular, we focus on consciousness and argue that the unique contribution the body makes to a creature's manifold of phenomenal experience cannot be compensated for, in the manner, and on the scale, that Clark envisages.
86. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 86 > Issue: 3
Edouard Machery, Ron Mallon, Shaun Nichols, Stephen P. Stich If Folk Intuitions Vary, Then What?
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We have recently presented evidence for cross-cultural variation in semantic intuitions and explored the implications of such variation for philosophical arguments that appeal to some theory of reference as a premise. Devitt (2011) and Ichikawa and colleagues (forthcoming) offer critical discussions of the experiment and the conclusions that can be drawn from it. In this response, we reiterate and clarify what we are really arguing for, and we show that most of Devitt's and Ichikawa and colleagues' criticisms fail to address our concerns.
87. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 86 > Issue: 3
Yitzhak Y. Melamed Spinoza's Metaphysics of Thought: Parallelisms and the Multifaceted Structure of Ideas
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special symposium
88. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 86 > Issue: 3
Kirk Ludwig The Argument for Subject-Body Dualism from Transtemporal Identity
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89. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 86 > Issue: 3
Martine Nida-Rümelin The Argument for Subject Body Dualism from Transtemporal Identity Defended
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In my argument for subject body dualism criticized by Ludwig I use the locution of a genuine and factual difference between two possibilities. Ludwig distinguishes three interpretations of this locution. According to his analysis the argument does not go through on any of these interpretations. In my response I agree that the argument is unsuccessful if 'factual difference' is understood in the first way. The second reading—according to a plausible understanding—cannotbe used for the argument either. The discussion of this reading raises fundamental issues about different notions of propositional content. I disagree with Ludwig's diagnosis with respect to the third reading. Contrary to Ludwig's claim, there is no modal error involved if 'factual difference' is understood in the third way. Ludwig's objection to the argument according to its third reading can be answered by pointing out that every individual has its identity conditions necessarily.At this point fundamental and general metaphysical issues (concerning the link between identity conditions and the nature of ontological categories and between transworld and transtemporal identity) prove relevant. Finally, I make more explicit how Tactual difference' should be understood in the context of the argument (this is a fourth reading not considered by Ludwig) and explain how this reading strengthens the argument (compared to the third reading) by weakening its central premise. I conclude that Ludwig's attempt at undermining the argument from transtemporal identity for subject body dualism is unsuccessful.
book symposium
90. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 86 > Issue: 3
Derk Pereboom Précis of Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism
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