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Displaying: 61-80 of 216 documents


book reviews & notes on books
61. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 6 > Issue: 2
Krzysztof Posłajko Odsłonić tajemnicę znaczenia, [To Reveal the Secret of Meaning] by Aleksandra Derra
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62. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 6 > Issue: 2
Jan Woleński Rudolf Carnap and the Legacy of Logical Empiricism, Richard Creath (Ed.)
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63. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 6 > Issue: 2
Maciej Zarych Spinoza o naturze ludzkiej, [Spinoza on Human Nature] by Przemysław Gut
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articles
64. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 6 > Issue: 1
Karol Chrobak What Plurality of Realities? Some Critical Remarks on the Philosophy of Leon Chwistek
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This paper focuses on the theory of plurality of realities introduced by Leon Chwistek. A critical analysis of this theory and an extensional interpretation of Chwistek’s axiomatic descriptions of four realities lead to an epistemological interpretation of this theory. The word “plurality” in the title is a result of different waysof understanding the same original set of sense-data. This interpretation is contrasted with Kazimierz Pasenkiewicz’s ontological version of this theory. In the final parts of the paper the most important consequences of this theory are discussed. First, the ethical relativism postulated by Chwistek is criticized. Second, an attempt to illustrate the plurality of realities with an example of different styles of painting is discussed. Third, a critical rationalism in the form of a kind of practical attitude toward social reality, which results from the theory of plurality of realities, is outlined.
65. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 6 > Issue: 1
Robert S. Colter Thought, Perception, and Isomorphism in Aristotle’s De Anima
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Aristotle contends that in perception the sense organ is “made like” its object, but only “in a certain way.” Much controversy has surrounded these remarks, primarily about how to understand being “made like.” One camp has understood this to require literal exemplification, such that the sense organs manifest the sensible qualities of their objects. Others have understood likeness to require no physical alteration at all in the sense organs.I accept as a starting point in this paper that understanding perceptual likeness in terms of exemplification is a non-starter. By doing so, however, I also reject the easiest and most direct understanding of what it means for the sense organs to be “made like” their objects. Others who have shared this assumption have suggested that likeness consists in “isomorphism.” Unfortunately, they have not adequately explicated how this notion is to be understood, with the result that Aristotle’s theory of perception remains crucially underdeveloped. I argue that the key is to understand the form of isomorphism at work in Aristotle’s account of thinking.
66. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 6 > Issue: 1
M. Fletcher Maumus Proper Names: Attribution and Reference
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Principally under the influence of Saul Kripke (1972), philosophical semantics since the closing decades of 20th century has been dominated by thephenomenon Nathan Salmon (1986) aptly dubbed Direct Reference “mania.” Accordingly, it is now practically orthodox to hold that the meanings of proper names are entirely exhausted by their referents and devoid of any descriptive content. The return to a purely referential semantics of names has, nevertheless, coincided with a resurgence of some of the very puzzles that motivated description theories of names in the first place, to wit: the informativeness of true identity statements of the form ‘a=b’ and the failure of substitutivity salve veritate for co-referential names in propositional attitude ascriptions. I argue that a Metalinguistic Description Theory of proper names, which treats the meaning of an arbitrary proper name as roughly equivalent to the definite description ‘the bearer of NN,’ offers a novel, semantically innocent solution to these puzzles when synthesized with Keith Donnellan’s (1966) insight that descriptions are semantically ambiguous between attributive and referential meanings. The ensuing account is then defended against two well-known Kripkean objections to metalinguisticsemantics: the Circularity Objection and the Paderewski Puzzle.
67. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 6 > Issue: 1
Rafe McGregor Cinematic Realism Reconsidered
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The purpose of this paper is to re-examine the debate about cinematic motion in terms of the necessity for reception conditions in art. I shall argue that Gregory Currie’s rejection of weak illusionism—the view that cinematic motion is illusory—is sound, because cinematic images really move, albeit in a response-dependentrather than garden-variety manner. In §1 I present Andrew Kania’s rigorous and compelling critique of Currie’s realism. I assess Trevor Ponech’s response to Kania in §2, and show that his focus on the cinematic experience is indicative of the direction the debate should take. §3 demonstrates that the issue is underpinned by the question of the role of reception conditions in the experience of art. In §4 I apply my observations on reception conditions to the problem of cinematic motion and conclude that Kania’s objections are unsuccessful due to his failure to acknowledge the necessary conditions for cinematic experience.
68. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 6 > Issue: 1
Hartley Slater Logic is not Mathematical
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I first show in this paper how twentieth century Set Theory got into its greatest tangle by, amongst other things, regarding relational remarks like ‘Rxy’ asbinary functions. I then show how the lack of indexicality, and of ‘that’-clauses, in Modern Logic led that subject into its intractable difficulties with the Theory of Truth. Both errors arose not only through a contempt for ordinary language, but also through the related failure to recognise that being logical is not a matter of being brainy, but of being coherent. It is not a mathematical talent, but a literary one. Later in the paper I go on to demonstrate this same conclusion with respect to Modal Logic and General Intensional Logic, and in particular with respect to fictions, since these are the central items that have been misunderstood, as is witnessed in some recent writings of Graham Priest.
critical notices
69. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 6 > Issue: 1
Renata Ziemińska Sextan Skepticism and Self-Refutation
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book reviews
70. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 6 > Issue: 1
Philippe-André Rodriguez Dignity: Its History and Meaning
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71. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 6 > Issue: 1
Jan Woleński August W. Sladek, Aus Sand bauen. Troppentheorie auf schmaler relatiomaler Basis. Ontologische, epistemologische, darstellungstechniszheMöglichkeiten und Troppenanalyse
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72. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 6 > Issue: 1
Roman Murawski Jan Woleński, Essays on Logic and its Applications in Philosophy
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articles
73. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
J. M. Fritzman Hegel’s Philosophy—in Putnam’s Vat?
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Using Putnam’s brain-in-a-vat thought experiment, this article argues that interpretations which assert that Hegel’s philosophy, or some portion of it, develops inan entirely a priori manner are incoherent. An alternative reading is then articulated.
74. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Jerzy Gołosz Science, Metaphysics, and Scientific Realism
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The paper can be logically divided into two parts. In the first part I distinguish two kinds of metaphysics: basic metaphysics, which affects scientific theories, and a second kind, which is an effect of interpretations of these theories. I try to show the strong mutual relations between metaphysics and science and to point out that the basic metaphysics of science is based on realistic assumptions. In the second part of my paper I suggest that we should consider the basic metaphysics of science and its realistic foundations in order to better understand scientific realism and to properly resolve the debate around it. The methodology of Imre Lakatos is applied in the paper.
75. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Elżbieta Łukasiewicz Primary-Secondary Quality Distinction: Locke’s, Reid’s, or None?
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In the present paper we shall first focus on Locke’s and Reid’s understanding of primary and secondary qualities, as these two approaches mark the main dividing line in interpreting this distinction. Next, we will consider some modern approaches to the distinction and try to answer the question of whether, from theperspective of what we know about perception of sensory qualities, Locke’s ontological interpretation or Reid’s epistemological approach to the distinction are tenable ideas. Finally, we will concentrate on the relation between language and qualities of objects and, on the basis of some adjectival systems in the world’s languages, see how languages render, or code, certain distinctions and qualities apparently obvious to our cognition.
76. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Niklas Möller Thick Concepts and Practice
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Thick concepts provide a focal point for several important issues in ethical theory. Separatists argue that the descriptive and evaluative elements of a thick concept can be separated out. Non-separatists deny this and claim that there are no descriptive boundaries delimiting a thick concept. A common strategy for both camps in the debate has been an appeal to armchair intuitions of various everyday thick concepts. My alternative strategy consists in a closer study of the professional practice of risk analysis. As a well-developed practice, it provides substantial material for analysis. Moreover, its central concepts of risk and safety are typically seen as scientific concepts fitting the separatist analysis. Still, I argue that there are several evaluative aspects in risk and safety ascription that are hard to account for on a separatist analysis. I consider three separatist strategies, and conclude that they all fail. The result is a corroboration of the general non-separatist thesis put forward by theorists such as John McDowell and Bernard Williams.
77. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Jörgen Sjögren Indispensability, the Testing of Mathematical Theories, and Provisional Realism
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Mathematical concepts are explications, in Carnap’s sense, of vague or otherwise unclear concepts; mathematical theories have an empirical and a deductivecomponent. From this perspective, I argue that the empirical component of a mathematical theory may be tested together with the fruitfulness of its explications.Using these ideas, I furthermore give an argument for mathematical realism, based on the indispensability argument combined with a weakened version of confirmational holism
critical notices
78. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Justyna Miklaszewska Contemporary Theories of Justice: Between Utopia and Political Practice
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book reviews
79. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Paweł Armada Historia filozofii politycznej od Tukidydesa do Locke’a: tradycja klasyczna i jej krytycy, [A History of Political Philosophy from Thucidydes to Locke]
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80. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Jakub Gomułka Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Wittgenstein and the Tractatus
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