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Displaying: 71-80 of 1592 documents


book reviews
71. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 32 > Issue: 3
Veronika Weidner, Evolutionary Religion, by J. L. Schellenberg
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72. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 32 > Issue: 3
James D. Madden, The Knower and the Known: Physicalism, Dualism, and the Nature of Intelligibility, by Stephen Parrish
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73. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 32 > Issue: 3
Kyle David Bennett, Moral Emotions: Reclaiming the Evidence of the Heart, by Anthony J. Steinbock
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74. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 32 > Issue: 3
Joshua R. Farris, God, Mind and Knowledge, ed. Andrew Moore
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articles
75. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 32 > Issue: 2
Joseph Jedwab, Against the Geachian Theory of the Trinity and Incarnation
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Relative-identity theories of the Trinity and Incarnation are worth another look. But not all such theories are the same. One important difference among them concerns restricted quantification. Peter Geach proposes two theses: the sortal relativity of identity and the irreducibility of restricted quantification. Every relative-identity theory of the Trinity and Incarnation applies Geach’s first thesis. But only what I call “the Geachian theory” applies both theses. I argue that any such Geachian theory faces significant theoretical disadvantages. Towards the end, I propose a closely related but non-Geachian relative-identity theory that doesn’t share those theoretical disadvantages.
76. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 32 > Issue: 2
Adam Green, The Jet Lag Theory of Purgatory
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Models of purgatory tend to come paired with an operative conception of what perfection consists in. In the recent philosophical literature, two models, the satisfaction model and the sanctification model, have been pitted against one another. The former focuses on innocence before the law and makes purgatory out to be a place where a debt of punishment is paid. The latter focuses on moral character and describes purgatory in terms of character formation. If perfection consists in a certain way of being related to God, however, then there is a third model (or perhaps a particular way of developing the second model) that merits our attention that focuses on relational dynamics.
77. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 32 > Issue: 2
H. E. Baber, The Trinity: Relative Identity Redux
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Prima facie, relative identity looks like a perfect fit for the doctrine of the Trinity since it allows us to say that the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, each of which is a Trinitarian Person, are the same God (or Being) but not the same Person. Nevertheless, relative identity solutions to logic puzzles concerning the doctrine of the Trinity have not, in recent years, been much pursued. Critics worry that relative identity accounts are unintuitive, uninformative or unintelligible. I suggest that the relative identity account is worth a second look and argue that it provides a coherent account of the doctrine of the Trinity.
78. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 32 > Issue: 2
William Hasker, Getting That Model T Back On the Road: Thomas Flint On Incarnation and Mereology
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Thomas Flint claims that an argument of his seriously damages “Model T,” a mereological model of the incarnation. I contend that the argument fails, and that Model T remains viable.
79. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 32 > Issue: 2
Thomas P. Flint, Is Model T Rattle-Free?: A Reply to Hasker
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In “Getting that Model T Back on the Road: Thomas Flint on Incarnation and Mereology,” William Hasker contends that the reasons I offered for being dissatisfied with Model T, a mereological model of the incarnation, are insufficient. I argue, though, that Hasker’s defense of Model T is inadequate; though Christians may not want to consign it to the junkyard, they should at least be open to trading it in for a better model.
80. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 32 > Issue: 2
Jeff Jordan, The Topography of Divine Love: A Reply to Thomas Talbott
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Does God love every human equally and to the deepest degree possible? In an earlier article I argued that no one could, in principle, love every human equally and to the deepest degree possible. Thomas Talbott has objected and argues that a model of the divine love extended equally to all best captures the idea of God as loving parent. I contend that Talbott’s argument fails, in part, as it implies that the divine love treats the interests of humans as fungible.