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Displaying: 71-80 of 1573 documents


articles
71. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 32 > Issue: 1
Nikk Effingham, Multiple Location and Christian Philosophical Theology
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This paper discusses how the possibility of multi-located entities can resolve problems both with the Trinity (i.e., there being one God and three divine people, or the Father knowing things that the numerically identical Son does not) and with the existence of souls.
72. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 32 > Issue: 1
Dustin Crummett, “We Are Here to Help Each Other”: Religious Community, Divine Hiddenness, and the Responsibility Argument
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Richard Swinburne and Travis Dumsday have defended what J. L. Schellenberg calls “the responsibility argument” as a response to the problem of divine hiddenness. Schellenberg, meanwhile, has levied various objections against the responsibility argument. In this paper, I develop a version of the responsibility argument and discuss some advantages it has over those defended by either Swinburne or Dumsday. I then show how my version can withstand Schellenberg’s criticisms.
73. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 32 > Issue: 1
Christopher M. Brown, Making the Best Even Better: Modifying Pawl and Timpe’s Solution to the Problem of Heavenly Freedom
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In a recent paper, “Incompatiblism, Sin, and Free Will in Heaven,” Timothy Pawl and Kevin Timpe discuss and propose a novel solution to a problem posed for traditional Christian theism that they call the Problem of Heavenly Freedom. In short, Christian tradition contains what seems to be a contradiction, namely, the redeemed in heaven are free but nonetheless can’t sin. Pawl and Timpe’s solution to the Problem of Heavenly Freedom is particularly attractive for two reasons: it shows great respect for the Christian tradition’s teaching on heaven, and it entails that the redeemed in heaven act with morally weighty libertarian free will. Nonetheless, I think their solution can be improved upon. By drawing on some of the teachings of the Catholic tradition on heaven, particularly those of St. Thomas Aquinas, I raise three objections to Pawl and Timpe’s solution and introduce a modified version of their solution. In doing so, I have attempted to make their “best” solution to the Problem of Heavenly Freedom even better.
74. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 32 > Issue: 1
Michael Rota, Synchronic Contingency and the Problem of Freedom and Foreknowledge
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Does a free agent have the power to will otherwise even at the very moment she is making a particular free choice? That is, when one is freely making some choice at a time T, does one also have the power to refrain from so choosing at T? The diachronic account of contingency and freedom says “no,” while the synchronic account says “yes.” In this paper I first address William Hasker’s criticisms of my earlier presentation of the synchronic account, and then present an argument against the diachronic account. If successful, my arguments offer support for the compatibility of human freedom and divine foreknowledge.
reviews
75. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 32 > Issue: 1
Aaron Segal, Reason, Metaphysics, and Mind: Essays on the Philosophy of Alvin Plantinga, edited by Kelly James Clark and Michael Rea
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76. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 32 > Issue: 1
Daniel Howard-Snyder, Metaphysics and the Tri-Personal God, by William Hasker
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77. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 32 > Issue: 1
R. T. Mullins, Beyond the Control of God? Six Views on the Problem of God and Abstract Objects, ed. Paul M. Gould
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articles
78. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 31 > Issue: 4
Terence Cuneo, Ritual Knowledge
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Most work in religious epistemology has concerned itself with propositional knowledge of God. In this essay, I explore the role of knowing how to engage God in the religious life. Specifically, I explore the role of knowing how to engage God in the context of ritualized liturgical activity, exploring the contribution that knowing how to perform liturgical rites of various sorts can make to knowing God. The thesis I defend is that the liturgy provides both activities of certain kinds and conceptions of God such that knowing how to perform those activities under those conceptions is a species of what I call ritual knowledge.
79. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 31 > Issue: 4
Emanuel Rutten, A Modal-Epistemic Argument for the Existence of God
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I propose a new argument for the existence of God. God is defined as a conscious being that is the first cause of reality. In its simplified initial form, the argument has two premises: (1) all possible truths are knowable, and (2) it is impossible to know that the proposition that God does not exist is true. From (1) and (2) it follows that the proposition that God exists is necessarily true. After introducing the argument in its crude initial form and laying out the core intuitions behind its premises, I point to two difficulties that this simplified version faces. I then go on to show how the argument can be revised to handle these difficulties. I defend the revised argument from various objections.
80. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 31 > Issue: 4
Alexander Pruss, Joshua Rasmussen, Time without Creation?
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We introduce three arguments for the thesis that time cannot exist prior to an original creation event. In the first argument, we seek to show that if time doesn’t depend upon creation, then time is infinite in the backwards direction, which is incompatible with arguments for a finite past. In the second and third arguments, we allow for the possibility of backwards-infinite time but argue that God could not have a sufficiently good reason to refrain from creating for infinitely many moments—either in a world void of created things (argument two) or in the actual world prior to creation (argument three). Our end goal is to help clarify connections between time and divine action.