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Displaying: 71-80 of 1630 documents


articles
71. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 33 > Issue: 2
Arthur J. Cunningham Where Hasker’s Anti-Molinist Argument Goes Wrong
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This paper is a response to William Hasker’s “bring about” argument (1999, reiterated in 2011) against the Molinist theory of divine providence. Hasker’s argument rests on his claim that God’s middle knowledge must be regarded as part of the world’s past history; the primary Molinist response has been to resist this claim. This paper argues that even if this claim about middle knowledge is granted, the intended reductio does not go through. In particular, Hasker’s claim about middle knowledge is shown to undermine his proof of the “power entailment principle.” The paper closes with a critical examination of ideas about free will and the past history of the world that might be supposed to support Hasker’s conviction that Molinism is incompatible with a libertarian view of free will.
72. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 33 > Issue: 2
W. Matthews Grant The Privation Solution: A Reply to Furlong
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Peter Furlong has recently raised an objection to my defense of Aquinas’s approach to explaining how God could cause all creaturely actions without causing sin. In this short paper, I argue that the objection fails.
book reviews
73. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 33 > Issue: 2
Simon Kittle Deep Control: Essays on Free Will and Value, by John Martin Fischer
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74. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 33 > Issue: 2
Allison Krile Thornton Libertarian Free Will: Contemporary Debates, ed. David Palmer
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75. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 33 > Issue: 2
Josef Quitterer Free Will in Philosophical Theology, by Kevin Timpe
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76. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 33 > Issue: 2
Angus Menuge Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism, by Erik J. Wielenberg
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articles
77. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 33 > Issue: 1
Mark C. Murphy From the Editor
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78. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 33 > Issue: 1
Timothy G. McCarthy Essence and Realization in the Ontological Argument
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A persistent complaint about modal forms of the ontological argument is that the characteristic modalized existence assumptions of these arguments are simply too close to the conclusion to be of much probative value in establish­ing it. I present an abstract form of the ontological argument in which the properties imputed to the divine nature by these assumptions are replaced by any of a wide class of properties of a sort I call “actualizing.” These include basic theistic attributes such as authorship, sovereignty and omniscience. The import of these arguments is to show that the metaphysical coherence of some of the most familiar conceptions of the divine nature ensures their actual realization.
79. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 33 > Issue: 1
Daniel S. Murphy Divine Knowledge and Qualitative Indiscernibility
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This paper is about the nature of God’s pre-creation knowledge of possible creatures. I distinguish three theories: non-qualitative singularism, qualitative singularism, and qualitative generalism, which differ in terms of whether the relevant knowledge is qualitative or non-qualitative, and whether God has singular or merely general knowledge of creatures. My main aim is to argue that qualitative singularism does not depend on a version of the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles to the effect that, necessarily, qualitatively indiscernible individuals are identical. It follows that qualitative singularism does not depend on the view that possible creatures categorically have qualitative individual essences.
80. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 33 > Issue: 1
Christian B. Miller Should Christians be Worried about Situationist Claims in Psychology and Philosophy?
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The situationist movement in psychology and, more recently, in philosophy has been associated with a number of striking claims, including that most people do not have the moral virtues and vices, that any ethical theory that is wedded to such character traits is empirically inadequate, and that much of our behavior is causally influenced to significant degrees by psychological influences about which we are often unaware. Yet Christian philosophers have had virtually nothing to say about situationist claims. The goal of this paper is to consider whether Christians should start to be worried about them.