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Displaying: 61-80 of 808 documents


part vi: nassp book award
61. Social Philosophy Today: Volume > 32
Jeffrey Gauthier Equal Opportunity and Its Discontents: Comments on Joseph Fishkin’s Bottlenecks
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62. Social Philosophy Today: Volume > 32
Jeffrey M. Brown Equality of Opportunity, Disability, and Stigma: Commentary on Joseph Fishkin’s Bottlenecks: A New Theory of Equal Opportunity
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63. Social Philosophy Today: Volume > 32
Barry DeCoster Fishkin’s Bottlenecks: DeCoster’s Reply
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64. Social Philosophy Today: Volume > 32
Joseph Fishkin Bottlenecks, Disability, and Preference-Formation: A Reply
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65. Social Philosophy Today: Volume > 32
Notes on Contributors
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66. Social Philosophy Today: Volume > 31
Jeff Gauthier Introduction
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part i: protest and the duty to resist
67. Social Philosophy Today: Volume > 31
David A. Borman Protest, Parasitism, and Community: Reflections on the Boycott
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T. M. Scanlon defines intolerance as the “enforcement of morals,” particularly of controversial moral norms, and especially (though not exclusively) through the law. If this is correct, then the “boycott” is a form of “intolerant” protest: indeed, it is part of a long social tradition of intolerant protest practices, often aiming at the exclusion of norm-violators from the community, which developed in the course of the still unresolved historical struggle over the boundaries of the moral domain. Drawing on Marcuse’s account of “repressive tolerance,” I argue that the fact that the boycott is indeed intolerant in this sense is in no way a reason for condemning it, and that such condemnation in fact reflects an implausibly ideal view of politics and the law in our actually existing societies. On the contrary, such “intolerant” tactics should be seen by progressive movements today as attractive tools, especially for those which, like Occupy, the environmental and anti-globalization movements, attempt to exert pressure on purportedly norm-free or norm-excluding economic practices.
68. Social Philosophy Today: Volume > 31
Karin R. Howe Is There a Rawlsian Duty to Engage in Civil Disobedience?
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Debates concerning Rawls’s definition of civil disobedience have been the focus of much of the discussion on civil disobedience since the publication of A Theory of Justice. However, in this paper I will be focusing on a question about Rawls’s view of civil disobedience that has been largely ignored in the literature. Throughout the section on the justification of civil disobedience, Rawls clearly and explicitly says that people have a right to engage in civil disobedience, provided that all of the conditions for civil disobedience are met. My question is: Can we say something stronger than people have a right to engage in civil disobedience? In other words, is it possible that people have either a duty or an obligation to engage in civil disobedience under certain circumstances? If so, who has these duties or obligations—would everyone in the state have these duties and/or obligations, or just some people? In this paper I propose to carefully examine what Rawls has to say about political obligations and the natural duty of justice, and see what light I can shed on the question of an obligation or duty to engage in civil disobedience from a Rawlsian perspective.
69. Social Philosophy Today: Volume > 31
Colena Sesanker De-Trivializing the Kantian Duty to Resist Oppression
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An argument can be constructed from Kantian resources to the effect that we not only can, but must resist our own oppression according to the second formulation of the categorical imperative. This derivation of the duty from the Humanity formulation presents it as a fully moral categorical duty. Such a portrayal of our obligations in even the harshest of circumstances suggests that no circumstances can take our humanity away. On this Kantian view, it is possible to maintain a self worthy of respect no matter what. Such a view is saddled with difficulties, however. This paper addresses the ways that these difficulties can be successfully addressed and discusses the limitations of a more modest version of a Kantian account of the duty to resist oppression, advanced by Carol Hay. This paper will conclude that the more modest account cannot provide the hope for retaining our worth and the explanation of the injustice of oppression the way that a more straightforward reading of a fully moral obligation can and that the apparent difficulties of the more extreme view are surmountable.
part ii: hannah arendt on responsibility and revolution
70. Social Philosophy Today: Volume > 31
Larry Busk Sleepwalker: Arendt, Thoughtlessness, and the Question of Little Eichmanns
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Academia is still feeling the echoes of a controversy that emerged in 2005 over an essay by Ward Churchill, former professor at the University of Colorado, in which he refers to (certain) victims of the 9/11 terrorist attacks as “little Eichmanns.” While there have been many (violent) condemnations and (limited) defenses of the piece, there has been little discussion of what the term “little Eichmann” actually means. This paper analyzes the incendiary remark in the context of its reference, the work of Hannah Arendt. Read in this light, it ceases to be a simple defamation and becomes a momentous intellectual challenge.
71. Social Philosophy Today: Volume > 31
Florian Grosser In Search of the Good Revolution: Arendt on Violence and ‘the Social Question’
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The paper concerns Hannah Arendt’s attempt to identify both historical types and conceptual understandings of revolution that can be considered to be genuinely ‘political.’ Its aim is to first reconstruct Arendt’s distinction between ‘political’ and ‘anti-political’ processes and conceptions of profound, lasting transformation. In this section of the paper, it will be shown to what extent the critical distinction she proposes is informed by her understanding of (a) the role of ‘the social question’ and (b) the role of violence for the praxis as well as the theory of revolution. In a second step, the focus will be on the problematization of certain aspects of her critique of political revolution that lead, as will be argued, to the counter-intuitive exclusion of a variety phenomena and theories as properly revolutionary. The final part of the paper will hint at the possibility of a productive re-appropriation of Arendt’s critique of political revolution.
part iii: issues in social philosophy
72. Social Philosophy Today: Volume > 31
Crista Lebens “Sacredly Cultivated Ignorance”: Attacks on Anti-Racist Instructors as a Form of Academic Repression
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A pattern of attacks against instructors of color, often untenured and female, has emerged in recent years. A democratic society depends, for healthy functioning, on an educated citizenry. The attacks on education, especially on race and ethnic studies programs, are a part of a systemic movement to suppress radical thought within the university. I argue that this pattern of repression is a form of white ignorance and fits into Charles Mills’s analysis of the epistemology of ignorance. Moreover, this ignorance of systemic racism on the part of white people is as James Baldwin called it, ‘sacred and sacredly cultivated.’ To counter this pattern of repression, those of us with a measure of protection under the principles of academic freedom must be attentive to the ways in which efforts to address racial injustice in the university, such as work on diversity committees, can be turned to support institutional goals that conflict with the goal of racial and other forms of social justice.
73. Social Philosophy Today: Volume > 31
Duncan Purves GMOs, Future Generations, and the Limits of the Precautionary Principle
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The Precautionary Principle is frequently invoked as a guiding principle in environmental policy. In this article, I raise a couple of problems for the application of the Precautionary Principle when it comes to policies concerning Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs). First, I argue that if we accept Stephen Gardiner’s sensible conditions under which it is appropriate to employ the Precautionary Principle for emerging technologies, it is unclear that GMOs meet those conditions. In particular, I contend that GM crops hold the potential to provide more than a mere bonus; they hold the (admittedly uncertain) potential to prevent serious harm to millions of people. This means that, if proponents of the Precautionary Principle take prevention of harm as seriously as avoidance of harm, then precaution may tell in favor of GMOs rather than against them. Second, I observe that the use of GM technology in the developing world is likely to be identity-affecting; it will cause people to exist who otherwise would not have. I argue that this undermines Precautionary Principle-based objections to GM technology that appeal to the potentially harmful effects of GMOs on future generations.
74. Social Philosophy Today: Volume > 31
Kacey Warren Does Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach Support Political Surrogacy?
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Martha Nussbaum offers a robust vision of justice in terms of capability that she contends is capable of handing the most difficult cases. In recent work, she suggests that her capabilities approach supports a range of accommodations to make voting accessible and feasible for citizens with cognitive disabilities, including surrogate voting in the instance of profound cognitive impairment. Although Nussbaum’s call for political surrogacy is noble, I argue that it conflicts with at least three of five commitments that together characterize her capabilities approach to justice. The commitments that characterize her capabilities approach to justice include the commitment to justice in terms of capability, the commitment to an Aristotelian conception of human dignity, the commitment to a universal standard of justice, and the commitment to liberal individualism. In addition, Nussbaum’s approach is a “social minimum” approach to justice. Thus my critique is methodological. I do not contend that political surrogacy is either undesirable or unjustifiable, only that it is incompatible with Nussbaum’s capabilities approach.
part iv: essays in honor of jean harvey 1947–2014
75. Social Philosophy Today: Volume > 31
Barrett Emerick Perceptual Failure and a Life of Moral Endeavor
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Over the course of her career, Jean Harvey argued that as agents engaged in a “life of moral endeavor,” we should understand ourselves and others to be moral works in progress, always possessing the potential to grow beyond and become more than the sum of our past wrongs.In this paper I will follow Harvey and argue that in order to live a life of moral endeavor, it is not enough merely to know about injustice. Instead, we must engage in the difficult and often painful task of overcoming deep-seated cognitive biases that cause us to fail to perceive the ubiquitous injustice that pervades our world. I will conclude by arguing that education, empathy, and love can each help us to increase our perceptual awareness of injustice and so should be recognized to be crucial parts of a life of moral endeavor.
76. Social Philosophy Today: Volume > 31
Maurice Hamington Jean Harvey: Care, Moral Solidarity, and Civilized Oppression
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On April 20, 2014, Jean Harvey passed much too soon. Professor of Philosophy at University of Guelph, Harvey was an active member of the North American Society for Social Philosophy and the Canadian Society for Women in Philosophy. Her passing has left many people with a profound loss of both an accomplished social and political philosopher who fought for the voiceless and oppressed, as well as a kind professional colleague who helped so many younger scholars thrive. I cannot claim to be anything more than an acquaintance of Jean, who conversed with her by e-mail and met her occasionally at conferences. Academically, Harvey was best known for her book, Civilized Oppression, however she wrote and presented widely on a variety of social justice issues including humor, consumerism, education, and animal-welfare. One of the byproducts of the scholarly life is that one’s insights can continue to contribute to intellectual discussions long after death. As a care ethicist, I would like pay tribute to Jean Harvey’s scholarly career by suggesting paths of intellectual exploration between care theory and Harvey’s work on confronting oppression. Specifically, Harvey’s work can contribute to a political ethic of care through elaborating the role of moral solidarity for those possessing differentiated social power.
77. Social Philosophy Today: Volume > 31
Sally J. Scholz Engaged Respect: A Tribute to Jean Harvey
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In this tribute to Jean Harvey, I take up a project that she left unfinished: the articulation of an account of engaged respect. Building on her discussion of facets of the moral community—namely self-respect, the irreducibly individual nature of civilized oppression and interactional justice, education and empathetic understanding, and moral solidarity—I suggest we can discern a Harveyian conception of engaged respect. Harvey acknowledges the fallibility of human beings, including well-meaning moral actors responding to their moral obligation to ameliorate relations of oppression. This, together with her accounts of “involvement and accountability” and gratitude, guides the development of a concept of engaged respect that captures the attentiveness and support she envisioned for the moral community.
part v: nassp book award
78. Social Philosophy Today: Volume > 31
Zachary Hoskins Education, Civic Empowerment, and Race: Commentary on Meira Levinson’s No Citizen Left Behind
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Meira Levinson’s No Citizen Left Behind is a thoughtful, accessible, philosophically rich look at civic education in U.S. schools. The book’s central claims are, on the whole, quite persuasive. In the interests of fostering further discussion, this essay raises some questions about the book’s accounts of racial microaggressions in schools, the extent of authenticity in student experiences, and the practice of code-switching.
79. Social Philosophy Today: Volume > 31
David J. Leichter The Politics of Civic Education: Commentary on Meira Levinson’s No Citizen Left Behind
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Meira Levinson’s No Citizen Left Behind addresses how the unequal distribution of economic, cultural, and political power along socioeconomic and racial lines affects civic engagement and democratic participation. In order to address this gap, Levinson develops a critical pedagogy that encourages teachers and students to recognize the ways that identity and ideology are intertwined. After briefly reviewing some of the considerations that frame her book, I suggest that her account of an engaged civic pedagogy could be further strengthened by considering how non-traditional forms of protest make possible new forms of solidarity.
80. Social Philosophy Today: Volume > 31
Krista K. Thomason Civic Education and the Ideal of Public Reason
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Meira Levinson argues for a robust civics education that models the practices of good citizenship. One of the elements of that civics education is teaching students how to take up the perspectives of others. The question arises: how do we teach students and citizens alike to take up the perspectives of others? Here I argue that we can make sense of perspective-taking by appealing to Rawls’s notion of public reason as an ideal. I conclude by arguing that a commitment to the ideal of public reason can help identify and resist oppression and marginalization.