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book reviews
61. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 58 > Issue: 4
Peter N. Bwanali, S.J. Political Illiberalism: A Defense of Freedom. By Peter L. P. Simpson
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62. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 58 > Issue: 4
Books Received
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63. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 58 > Issue: 4
Index for Volume 58
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64. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 58 > Issue: 3
About Our Contributors
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articles
65. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 58 > Issue: 3
Gene Fendt Socrates as the Mimesis of Piety in Republic
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The absence of any discussion of the virtue of piety in Plato’s Republic has been much remarked, but there are textual clues by which to recognize its importance for Plato’s construction and for the book’s intended effect. This dialogue is Socrates’s repetition, on the day after the first festival of Bendis, of a liturgical action that he undertook—at his own expense, at the “vote” of his “city”—on the previous day. Socrates’s activity in repeating it the next day is an “ethological” mimesis of properly pious liturgy. In the course of that liturgy we find that piety is specifically discussed, but in a (mimetic) mirror, and darkly (in its absence). The mirror of piety is the laws about stories of the gods. The absence is in the (missing) discussion of the best city, that is, one above aristocracy.
66. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 58 > Issue: 3
Weijia Wang Three Necessities in Kant’s Theory of Taste: Necessary Universality, Necessary Judgment, and Necessary Free Harmony
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This paper argues that the structural obscurity in Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment reflects his tacit employment of three correlated but distinct notions: necessity considered as the universal validity of the judgment of taste; necessity considered as a feature of the judgment itself; and necessity considered as a feature of the mental free harmony that obtains in judging certain forms with taste. These distinctions have not been sufficiently recognized by commentators so far. Clarification of these three notions can shed new light on the structure of the first part of Kant’s third Critique as well as on debates over the plausibility of his claims regarding taste.
67. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 58 > Issue: 3
Vlastimil Vohánka Material Value-Ethics: Evaluating the Thought of Josef Seifert and John F. Crosby
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Josef Seifert and John F. Crosby are the two main proponents of applied material value-ethics. Both reject all forms of suicide and abortion. Seifert also explicitly rejects euthanasia, torture, destructive stem-cell research, genetic enhancement, in vitro fertilization, and contraception. Crosby explicitly rejects spousal in vitro fertilization and spousal contraception. In this essay I examine whether their case should be regarded as convincing. Against Seifert, and possibly also against Crosby, I show why it definitely should not.
68. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 58 > Issue: 3
Tim Black Action and Luck in the Kierkegaardian Ethical Project
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To see the ethical as a space that is immune to luck, it seems that we must see it as a space that is utterly inner, locked away inside the cabinet of consciousness. If, on the other hand, we wish to see the space of the ethical as extending into the world, it seems that we must see it as being vulnerable to luck. Kierkegaard and his pseudonyms steer us through this dilemma by extending the space of the ethical into the world while also inoculating it against luck. For Kierkegaard, an action is a single thing with two aspects, one under which it is seen in terms of movements of the will, and another under which it is seen in terms of movements in the world. Given the structure of the Kierkegaardian ethical project, these movements are immune to luck since they can always achieve their ethical aims: they can always count as doing what one’s ideal self would do.
69. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 58 > Issue: 3
Andrew Israelsen Imperatives of Right: The Essential Ambiguity in Kant’s Rechtslehre
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The relationship between Kant’s “Doctrine of Right” and his broader moral philosophy is a fraught one, with some readers insisting that the two domains are mutually supporting parts of a cohesive practical philosophy and others arguing for their conceptual and legislative independence. In this paper I investigate the reasons for this disparity and argue that both main interpretive camps are mistaken, for Kant’s Rechtslehre can neither be reconciled to his moral philosophy nor stand on its own. I argue that this failure results from Kant’s confused attempt to define the sphere of right as one that functions independently of (yet analogously to) the moral domain through the construction of non-moral yet categorical imperatives. The result is a fundamental tension in Kant’s text that can only be solved through either collapsing juridical duties into broad moral duties or denying any categorical status to duties of right.
70. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 58 > Issue: 3
Christopher James Wolfe, Jonathan Polce, S.J. A Response to John Rawls’s Critique of Loyola on the Human Good
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In this paper we shall consider whether John Rawls’s treatment of Ignatius of Loyola is a fair one. Rawls claims in A Theory of Justice that Catholic theology (and Ignatius’s theology in particular) aims at a “dominant end” of serving God that overrides other moral considerations. Rawls argues that dominant end views lead to a disfigured self and a disregard for justice. We do not question Rawls on the normative issue of whether dominant end conceptions are untenable, but rather on his factual claim that Ignatian spirituality and Catholic theology in general presupposes a dominant end view as he defines it. The Loyola whom Rawls attacks in Theory of Justice is a straw-man. Ignatian spirituality and Catholic theology in general embraces something closer to an inclusive end view, since it argues that several different ways of virtuous living can lead to happiness.
book reviews
71. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 58 > Issue: 3
Sophie Berman The A Priori in the Thought of Descartes: Cognition, Method and Science. By Jan Palkoska
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72. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 58 > Issue: 3
Justin M. Anderson Aquinas on Virtue: A Causal Reading. By Nicholas Austin, S.J.
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73. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 58 > Issue: 3
Aaron Segal David Shatz: Torah, Philosophy, and Culture. Edited by Hava Tirosh-Samuelson and Aaron W. Hughes
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74. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 58 > Issue: 3
Joseph W. Koterski, S.J. Plato’s Persona: Marsilio Ficio, Renaissance Humanism, and Platonic Traditions. By Denis J.-J. Robichaud
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75. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 58 > Issue: 3
Books Received
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76. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 58 > Issue: 2
About Our Contributors
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articles
77. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 58 > Issue: 2
Lorraine Yeung The Nature of Horror Reconsidered
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There is a growing interest in the role of non-cognitive affective responses in the philosophical literature on fiction and emotion. This flurry of scholarly interest is partly a reaction to cognitivist accounts of fiction and emotion that have been found to be inadequate. The inadequacy is particularly salient when this approach is employed to account for narrative horror. Cognitivist conceptions of the emotion engendered by narrative horror prove to be too restrictive. Cognitivist accounts also fail to give the formal devices and stylistic elements deployed in narrative horror a proper place within the spectator’s emotional engagement with it. In this paper I propose an alternative conception of the emotion “horror” that incorporates non-cognitive affective responses. I argue that this conception of “horror” is more fine-grained than the one characterized as a cognitivist approach. It captures more literary examples of the horror experience and it accommodates better the fear of the unknown. It also makes possible an aesthetics of horror in which formal devices and stylistic elements are given their proper place.
78. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 58 > Issue: 2
Michael Barker The Argumentative Significance of Relative Purposiveness
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In the Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment Kant argues that organisms have inner purposiveness. He introduces inner purposiveness in contrast to relative purposiveness. I examine Kant’s discussion of relative purposiveness in §63. I then argue that Kant establishes three theses in §63 that he subsequently modifies in §64 and further refines in §65. In my view, his discussion of relative purposiveness serves a broader purpose than just to present a contrast from which to consider inner purposiveness. The discussion of relative purposiveness establishes a framework for a sustained thread of argument from §63 through §65, culminating in Kant’s often discussed claim that we must judge organisms to be natural ends. My interpretation exposes a more significant argumentative role for relative purposiveness than is typically recognized.
79. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 58 > Issue: 2
Joseph Gamache Aquinas and Contemporary Epistemology: The Case of the Truth-Norm
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Whether and how truth is a norm of belief is a contentious issue in contemporary epistemology. In this paper I retrieve Aquinas’s conception of truth in order to advance a new answer to the question of what grounds the truth-norm. I begin by contrasting the two dominant contemporary accounts of this grounding, showing ways in which each succeeds and fails. Unlike the currently dominant accounts, my account seeks to ground the truth-norm in the nature of truth, as opposed to the nature of belief. Ultimately I argue that Aquinas’s conception of truth furnishes us with an account of the grounding of the truth-norm that satisfies three conditions of adequacy. Such an account (1) grounds the truth-norm in the nature of truth, (2) captures the breadth of epistemic evaluation, and (3) makes sense of the fact that truth is a norm specifically for the human person.
80. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 58 > Issue: 2
Gaven Kerr The Immediate Realism of Léon Noël
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After the emergence of the neo-Thomist movement in the early twentieth century, the question of how best to present Aquinas’s latent epistemological realism came to the fore. Léon Noël was an important contributor to this area of neo-Thomism, but his work has unfortunately been eclipsed by that of other more recognizable authors such as Etienne Gilson and Jacques Maritain. Noël argued that Aquinas’s realism is a form of immediate realism that recognizes the challenge of modern representationalist epistemologies but does not succumb to non-realist ways of thinking. Hence Noël presented immediate realism as an epistemological position that is inspired by Aquinas but also capable of addressing philosophical concerns that emerged after his death. In this article I present Noël’s view as interesting in its own right and capable of engaging with contemporary non-Thomist trends in epistemology.