Cover of International Journal of Applied Philosophy
Already a subscriber? - Login here
Not yet a subscriber? - Subscribe here

Browse by:



Displaying: 61-80 of 812 documents


articles
61. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 32 > Issue: 1
S. K. Wertz Little White Lies: A Pragmatic Defense
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Samuel Johnson has an interesting comment on consequences and the telling of “white lies.” For example “Sick People and Children are often to be deceived for their Good.” David Hume apparently endorses this concept in one of his letters. Both Johnson and Rousseau anticipate Kant’s argument about consequences in that one is to tell the truth under all circumstances. Hume, I argue, would take issue with this claim in that there are cases (like the two above) that warrant telling white lies. Elsewhere (second Enquiry) he speaks about “harmless liars” who indulge in “lying or fiction . . . in humorous stories.” And he says “Noble pride and spirit may openly display itself when one lies under calamity [defamation or slander] or opposition of any kind,” especially if the opposition puts one’s life in grave danger, so one’s self-preservation is threatened. Under situations like these, lying is justified. In regard to fiction, if lying is for the purpose of entertainment and where “truth is not of any importance,” it is permissible. These cases are discussed in some detail, and they offer, along with their analysis, a pragmatic defense of Hume’s position.
62. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 32 > Issue: 1
Robert Boyd Skipper Education and Bureaucracy
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
I argue that bureaucracies, as described by Max Weber, have essential characteristics that clash with basic educational values. On the one hand, bureaucracies, because of their divisions of labor, inevitably narrow all those who participate. Bureaucracies also, because of the need for impartiality, inevitably dehumanize all who participate. On the other hand, education aims to broaden and humanize those who participate in it. This tension between bureaucracy and education makes bureaucracy an unsuitable mechanism for delivering an education. Bureaucracies are often the best ways to accomplish large tasks involving many people; however, the task of educating all humanity is not one of those tasks. Problems in education can only be exacerbated by “fixing” the bureaucracy, because efficiency, the greatest bureaucratic virtue, is harmful to education. While I offer no solution, I share some thoughts about how a humanizing, broadening, and suitably inefficient education might look.
63. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 32 > Issue: 1
Joshua M. Hall Bodily-Social Copresence Androgyny: Rehabilitating a Progressive Strategy
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Historically, the concept of androgyny has been as problematic as it has been appealing to (especially white) Western progressives. The appeal clearly includes, inter alia, the opportunity to abandon or ameliorate certain identities (including essentialized femininity and toxic masculinity). As for the problematic dimension, the central problem seems to be the reduction of otherness (often unconscious and unwitting) to the norms of straight white middle/upper-class Western cismen, particularly because of the consequent worsening of actual others’ marginalization and exclusion from social institutions. Despite these problems, I wish to suggest that androgyny—as evidenced by the enthusiasm felt for it by many Westerners—bespeaks something larger and more important than the concept itself, and that modified conception of it might be helpful in pursuit of social justice.
64. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 32 > Issue: 1
Sigmund Loland Sport, Performance-enhancing Drugs, and the Art of Self-imposed Constraints
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Should the use of performance-enhancing drugs (PED) be banned in sport? A proper response to this question depends upon ideas of the meaning and value of sport. To a certain extent, sport is associated with ideal values such as equality of opportunity, fair play, performance and progress. PED use is considered contrary to these values. On the other hand, critics see sport as an expression of non-sustainable and competitive individualism that threatens human welfare and development. PED use is considered a logical consequence of these values. I challenge both views as simplistic and inadequate. I develop what I refer to as the normative structure of sport consisting of self-imposed constraints at three levels: in the formal rules, in norms for fair play, and in the interpretation of athletic excellence as a morally relevant instantiation of human excellence. I argue that the question of a ban on PED should be discussed at the third level and depends upon interpretations of athletic excellence as a form of human excellence. I conclude that, in the current situation of elite sport, proponents of a ban on PED seem to have the strongest arguments.
65. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 32 > Issue: 1
Jane Duran Avian Preservation: The Case of the Condor
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The case of the reintroduction efforts made on behalf of the California condor is examined, with a view toward discussing both the environmental difficulties and the overall cost. The work of Singer, Snyder, and others is cited, and it is concluded that the work was worthy, but that a full articulation of the problems has seldom been made.
66. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 32 > Issue: 1
Ben Almassi What’s Wrong With Ponzi Schemes? Trust and Its Exploitation in Financial Investment
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The role of trust in financial investment has been a matter of some contention, one often obscured by two misconceptions: (1) that financial relationships are fit only for wary predictive reliance where trust has no rational basis, and (2) that in those relationships where trust is operative it must be worth preserving. Following Baier’s contention that trust, like air, is more easily seen when polluted, here I consider Ponzi schemes as exemplars of corrupt and polluted trust. Without attending to the role of trust in financial relationships, I argue, we can not make sense of how Ponzi schemes work, why investors are fooled, what it is that makes Ponzi schemes distinctively wrong, and what differentiates them from structurally similar yet legitimate financial practices.
book review
67. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 32 > Issue: 1
Donald L. Turner Jon Mills, Inventing God: Psychology of Belief and the Rise of Secular Spirituality
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
68. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 32 > Issue: 1
About the Contributors
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
symposium: kidney for sale by owner, revisited
69. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 31 > Issue: 2
James Stacey Taylor Introduction to Symposium: Kidney for Sale By Owner, Revisited
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
70. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 31 > Issue: 2
Simon Rippon Organ Markets and Disrespectful Demands
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
There is a libertarian argument for live donor organ markets, according to which live donor organ markets would be permitted if we simply refrained from imposing any substantive and controversial moral assumptions on people who reasonably disagree about morality and justice. I argue that, to the contrary, this endorsement of live donor organ markets depends upon the libertarians’ adoption of a substantive and deeply controversial conception of strong, extensive property rights. This is shown by the fact that these rights would prevent states intervening in cases of preventable and intuitively impermissible wronging of others that can arise when free individuals engage in voluntary offers and exchanges. I outline two forms of such wronging: discrimination and disrespectful demands. I argue that although these types of acts are morally impermissible, the policy question of whether and how they should be regulated by states is non-trivial. I then argue that there is good reason to think that organ markets would rely on disrespectful demands. This may help explain the widespread moral repugnance people feel toward organ trading. It also provides a , though not decisive, case for states to prohibit such markets.
71. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 31 > Issue: 2
Julian J. Koplin Consequences and Kidneys
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Kidney for Sale by Owner discusses a range of different arguments that can be offered in defence of live donor kidney markets. Although Cherry’s case for establishing such markets does not rest on consequentialist considerations, Cherry nonetheless suggests that allowing the sale of organs would have net positive consequences. He argues that both renal failure patients and people living in poverty could benefit from participating in the market, and further claims that a legal trade in organs would not shape society in harmful ways. This paper argues that the likely consequences of establishing an open market in kidneys are less benign than Cherry suggests. Specifically, I argue that a live donor kidney market could plausibly harm sellers, give rise to harmful pressures to participate in the market, and reinforce unjust political and social structures. I conclude by considering the implications of these arguments for the organ market debate.
72. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 31 > Issue: 2
Cansu Canca On Coercive Offers: In Support of a Market in Kidneys
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
A prominent argument against a market in kidneys is the Argument from Coercion (AfC). AfC claims that a market would violate the autonomy of typical suppliers by presenting them with coercive offers. Engaging with Cherry’s response to AfC, this paper argues that while a consistent AfC could be constructed, it would still fail to justify a prohibition of a market. AfC, as fully formulated, only holds if we assume that the state is obligated to provide for the basic needs of its citizens. Once such a state functions ideally, a market ceases to involve coercion, thus making a prohibition redundant. In fact, such a state’s obligation to care for its citizens supports a market in kidneys. On the other hand, if the state is dysfunctional, then while a market could involve coercive offers, a prohibition would not restore, and would present a further constraint on, individual autonomy.
73. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 31 > Issue: 2
Peter Jaworski How to do Applied Ethics Right
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Mark Cherry’s Kidney for Sale by Owner is a book that illustrates how to do applied ethics right. Mark Cherry recognizes the important role of empirical facts in bridging a gap between our moral prescriptions, and our public policy or institutional prescriptions. In Kidney for Sale by Owner this method is on full display. While there is nothing the matter with Ideal Theory, we stand in need of what might be called bridge principles between the ideals of justice and some specific set of institutions that, we intend and hope, will actually realize those ideals. The bridge between Ideal and Actual will consist of empirical facts that require the tools of the social scientists.
74. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 31 > Issue: 2
Mark J. Cherry Kidney for Sale by Owner: Endorsing a Secular Heresy
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
This paper defends an in principle understanding of the authority of persons over themselves and, in consequence, argues for significant limits on morally permissible state authority. It also defends an account of the limits of permissible state action that distinguishes between (a) the ability of persons to convey authority to common projects and (b) what may be judged virtuous, good, safe, or proper to do. In terms of organ transplantation policy, it concludes that it is morally acceptable, and should be legally permissible, for individuals to sell one of their kidneys while living, pocketing the cash to use as that person sees fit to advance their own understanding of their own best interests. Morally objectionable policy proposals, I argue, are not those that encourage individuals to sell a redundant kidney while living or families to sell the organs of a recently deceased loved one, but those that seek coercively to confiscate the organs of the recently deceased. Recognizing the authority of persons over themselves, and their ability to convey moral authority to common projects, including the sale of human organs for transplantation, would shed light on the medical marketplace and clarify public policy, while increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of procuring human organs for transplantation.
articles
75. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 31 > Issue: 2
Jennifer Mei Sze Ang Moral Dilemmas and Moral Injury
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Psychiatrists working with war veterans have, in recent years, constructed ‘moral injury’ as a separate manifestation of war trauma that is distinct from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). This paper argues that for moral degradation to occur, it necessarily involves one’s commissions or omissions that transgresses one’s personal morality, and hence, distinguishes sufferers of moral injury from PTSD sufferers who were witnesses to traumatic and morally abhorrent events. To this end, it clarifies how some of the situations surrounding moral injury are misunderstood, by discussing the process of moral reasoning in the context of moral dilemmas, dirty hands, and moral blind alleys. Finally, it concludes that when we conceptualise moral injury as being caused by one’s commissions and omissions in moral dilemmas, we find that shame and guilt are situation-appropriate responses with a role to play in what ethics mean.
76. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 31 > Issue: 2
Susan T. Gardner Human Agency: Its Pedagogical Implications
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Let us suppose that we accept that humans can be correctly characterized as agents (and hence held responsible for their actions). Let us further presume that this capacity contrasts with most non-human animals. Thus, since agency is what uniquely constitutes what it is to be human, it must be of supreme importance. If these claims have any merit, it would seem to follow that, if agency can be nurtured through education, then it is an overarching moral imperative that educational initiatives be undertaken to do that. In this paper, it will be argued that agency can indeed be enhanced, and that the worldwide educational initiative called Philosophy for Children (P 4C), and others like it, are in a unique position to do just that, and, therefore, that P4C deserves our praise and support; while denigrations of such efforts for not being “real philosophy” ought to be thoroughly renounced.
77. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 31 > Issue: 2
Rodney C. Roberts The Idea of an Age of Majority
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
This paper gives a brief history of the idea of an age of majority and argues that no age of majority should exceed the fighting age, i.e., the age at which a person becomes eligible to serve in (or liable to conscription into) a military unit. Several objections to the proposed constraint on ages of majority are raised and answered.
78. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 31 > Issue: 2
Michael S. Pritchard, Elaine E. Englehardt Moral Development and Professional Integrity
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
We rely on doctors, accountants, engineers, and other professionals to be committed to the basic values of their professions and to exercise their ex­pertise in competent, reliable ways, even when no one is watching them do their work. That is, we expect them to have professional integrity. Children obviously do not yet have professional integrity, even if someday they will become professionals. Nevertheless, the moral development of children who will become professionals plays an important role in the eventual emergence of their professional integrity. We will discuss both what this integrity involves and how the basic moral development of children contributes to its emergence in professional life.
79. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 31 > Issue: 2
About the Contributors
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
symposium on trump and conflicts of interest
80. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 31 > Issue: 1
Elliot D. Cohen Introduction
view |  rights & permissions | cited by