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Displaying: 51-60 of 124 documents


51. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 7
Nicholas Logan An Existentialist Critique of Punishment
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In this paper, I provide an account of the way in which practices of punitive justice in the United States permanently foreclose the possibility of an open future for the punished. I argue that participation in a system where those forms of punishment are utilized is an act of bad faith because it involves the denial of the existential freedom of others as well as our own. Using Hannah Arendt’s account of Adolf Eichmann, I show how such acts of bad faith are both natural modes of thought as well as inherently dangerous. Finally, I demonstrate that existentialism provides us with the ability to recreate our relationship to others and resist acts of bad faith, especially when it comes to crime and punishment.
52. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 7
Nicholas James Alcock The Insubstantial and Exclusionary Nature of Plato’s Aesthetic Theory
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In this paper, I argue that Plato’s conversance with art is insubstantial and exclusionary. Art warrants not only subjects in virtue of utility, morality, and pleasure, but also subjects in virtue of feeling, impression, spirituality, and art itself. I will begin by providing Plato’s view and then provide my threefold objection, utilizing examples from art history and the history of aesthetic theory.
53. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 7
Jenna Blake Feminist Critique of Joseph Stiglitz’s Approach to the Problems of Global Capitalism
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In his book Making Globalization Work, Joseph Stiglitz proposes reforms to address problems arising from the global spread of capitalism, problems that he asserts are not inherent to globalization or capitalism but are due to the way those systems have been “managed.” Conversely, postcolonial feminist theorist Chanda Talpade Mohanty’s analysis of those same systems demonstrates that capitalism is not compatible with global justice. In this essay I use Mohanty’s analysis to argue that Stiglitz’s proposed reforms would not achieve his stated goals and that the global capitalist system must be dismantled if global justice is to be achieved.
54. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 7
Jessa Wood An Examination of Disgust and Its Relation to Morality
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In his book Yuck!: The Nature and Moral Significance of Disgust, Daniel Kelly synthesizes a growing body of research on disgust and briefly explores the philosophical role of the emotion. This paper presents arguments for the position that disgust should not be considered a source of moral knowledge, a position that Kelly suggests but fails to illustrate. The paper also explores implications of this view, specifically concerning the ways we should seek to manipulate our disgust reactions in order to improve moral reasoning.
55. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 7
Betty Stoneman Ideological Domination: Deconstructing the Paradox of the American Dream and the Working Class Promise
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The “American Dream” and “Working Class Promise” ideologies are ubiquitously dispersed in American society. These ideologies posit values of equality and opportunity. In this paper, I deconstruct these two ideologies in order to examine the effects these ideologies have on income inequality, social inequality, and social immobility. I argue these ideologies create a paradox in society whereby the more these ideologies are believed, the more the ideologies exacerbate income inequality, social inequality, and social immobility.
56. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 7
Esther Wolfe, Elizabeth Grosz Bodies of Philosophy: An Interview with Elizabeth Grosz
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57. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 7
Author Biographies
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58. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 6
Jenna Tomasello Sexual Harassment and Objectivity: Why We Need Not Ask Women If They Are Victims
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Sexual harassment is often understood as a subjective notion that asks the woman if she has been victimized. This paper argues that we need not ask women if they are victims by conceptualizing sexual harassment as an objective notion that holds the perpetrator accountable for his actions. In making my case, I will apply an objective conception of sexual harassment to the U.S. Supreme Court case Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson by drawing on the feminist view of sexual harassment given by Anita Superson and the role of equality and autonomy as motivated by Ronald Dworkin and James Griffin, respectively.
59. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 6
Max Siegel Revising the Principle of Alternate Possibilities
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This paper examines the position in moral philosophy that Harry Frankfurt calls the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP). The paper first describes the principle as articulated by A.J. Ayer. Subsequently, the paper examines Frankfurt’s critique and proposed revision of the principle and argues that Frankfurt’s proposal relies on an excessively simplistic account of practical reasoning, which fails to account for the possibility of moral dilemmas. In response, the paper offers a further revision of PAP, which accounts for Frankfurt’s critique, moral dilemmas, and the challenge of causal determinism.
60. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 6
Kyle Curran Change and Moral Development in Kant’s Ethics
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This paper is concerned with an ambiguous aspect of Kant’s ethics, namely, how moral change is possible. Kant conceives that change is possible, indeed desirable, without making clear the mechanism by which this change occurs. I conclude that one’s moral development must come about through the autonomous rationality of humanity. This allows for the moral law to be held at all times and for the rejection of immoral sentiments and inclinations. Further, it is constant soul-searching that allows one to keep a check on their maxims, facilitating the development of a moral disposition.