Already a subscriber? - Login here
Not yet a subscriber? - Subscribe here

Browse by:



Displaying: 51-60 of 847 documents


51. Philosophical Topics: Volume > 44 > Issue: 1
Jennifer Hornsby “A Contrast between Two Pictures”: The Case of Perception
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
I speak to some of Frederick Stoutland’s thinking over the years. In his last published paper, Stoutland brought together Davidson’s accounts of action and of perception, taking both to belong in a picture “of how we are related to the world” which “has its roots in the Cartesian revolution.” I suggest that Stoutland’s early criticisms of Davidson’s account of action expose the faults in such a picture. And I try to point up the attractions of a different picture in which Davidson’s account of perception fits no better than his account of action.
52. Philosophical Topics: Volume > 44 > Issue: 1
Anton Ford On What Is in Front of Your Nose
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The conclusion of practical reasoning is commonly said to rest upon a diverse pair of representations—a “major” and a “minor” premise—the first of which concerns the end and the second, the means. Modern and contemporary philosophers writing on action and practical reasoning tend to portray the minor premise as a “means-end belief”—a belief about, as Michael Smith puts it, “the ways in which one thing leads to another,” or, as John McDowell puts it, “what can be relied on to bring about what.” On this point there is little difference between followers of Davidson and followers of Anscombe, or between those who invoke Hume’s legacy and those who invoke Aristotle’s. But Aristotle himself held a very different position. According to him, the minor premise concerns particulars, a sphere controlled by perception. The perception of particulars—that is, of the really-existing people and things confronted in the field of action—plays no essential role in the modern account of rational agency. Because it does not, the modern account fails to explain how one could act for a reason, or how practical reasoning could deliver any conclusion.
53. Philosophical Topics: Volume > 44 > Issue: 1
Stina Bäckström Expression and Self-Consciousness
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
This article argues that nonverbal spontaneous expressions of mental states in human beings involve self-consciousness. We—language-using rational creatures—are capable of knowing our smiles, winces, and frustrated frowns in a self-conscious way. This distinguishes expressions from mere reflexes and mere physiological responses. Such a capacity is, further, essential to such forms of behavior. This is shown by the difficulty of constructing a coherent scenario where we—keeping our rational and conceptual capacities otherwise intact—can nonverbally express our mental states but where we lack a capacity to self-consciously self-ascribe them. Moreover, the article argues that we should not take the connection between nonverbal spontaneous expression and self-consciousness to imply that expressions are intentional actions. Such an implication is due to a commonly accepted but false dichotomy of intentional action and mere behavior.
54. Philosophical Topics: Volume > 44 > Issue: 1
Will Small Bodily Movement and Its Significance
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
I trace the development of one aspect of Fred Stoutland’s thought about action by considering the central role given by contemporary philosophy of action to bodily movement. Those who tell the so-called standard story of action think that actions are bodily movements (arm raisings, leg bendings, etc.) caused by beliefs and desires, that cause further effects in the world (switch flippings, door movements, etc.) in virtue of which they can be described (as flippings of switches, shuttings of doors, etc.). Those who hold a disjunctive conception of bodily movement think that actions are bodily movements that involve intentions essentially, but they too think that when an agent raises a glass, there is an action (an arm raising, perhaps) that causes a distinct event (a glass rising), in virtue of which the action (= the bodily movement) may be redescribed as a raising of a glass. Against both views, it might be held that actions may constitutively involve the changes wrought on their patients—that action is, in the first instance, transaction. But if action consists fundamentally not in an agent’s moving herself, but in her moving (or otherwise changing) something else, then how should we think about the nature and philosophical significance of bodily movement?
55. Philosophical Topics: Volume > 44 > Issue: 1
Martin Gustafsson Anscombe’s Bird, Wittgenstein’s Cat: Intention, Expression, and Convention
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
This paper offers an interpretation of Anscombe’s account of animal versus human intention, and of her notorious claim that the expression of intention is purely conventional. It engages in a criticism of Richard Moran’s and Martin Stone’s recent exegesis of these views of Anscombe’s, and proposes an alternative reading which explains how she can accept both that speechless brutes have intentions and that human intention is essentially linguistic.
56. Philosophical Topics: Volume > 44 > Issue: 1
Elinor Hallén Film Noir and Weakly Intentional Actions: An Anscombian Analysis
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Human agency is typically thought of as intentional, purposeful, reflective and, in many cases, autonomous. This paper discusses human agency that is compromised in some of these respects, and actions that are actions only in a qualified sense. The object of study is the agency of the leading character, Jeff, in the film noir Out of the Past, and Elizabeth Anscombe’s Intention is the primary source in analyzing Jeff’s behavior.Two excerpts from the film are presented and analyzed. The analysis of the first excerpt reveals agency that is merely weakly intentional; that is lacking in purposiveness and which displays ambivalence. Anscombe’s example of the man pumping water helps us see that Jeff’s actions are only intentional under some, basic, descriptions; that there is no intention of the action. Jeff does not really know his way about and his actions are not sufficiently grounded in reason. This, it is argued, is largely because he is not the author of his own actions: he is thrown into a situation set up by someone else. He enters in medias res and feels forced to act although he has limited knowledge of the meaning or purpose of the full action in which he partakes. In Anscombian vocabulary, he lacks the first-person practical knowledge typical of intentional action.In the second episode, Jeff protects Kathie the femme fatale, even when knowing that she has killed a man, stolen money, lied to Jeff, and is trying to frame him for murder. It is argued, in dialogue with Anscombe and Stoutland, that this case may be understood in terms of a mental cause rather than as an intentional action: Jeff’s actions and neglect to act is motivated by his passion for Kathie, it blinds him from considering what is reasonable and right to do.
57. Philosophical Topics: Volume > 44 > Issue: 1
Lisa Van Alstyne Theory, Interpretation, and Law: Some Worries about Dworkin’s Account of Their Relation
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
This paper explores Ronald Dworkin’s influential theory of constructive interpretation. It points out that this theory admits of two readings, which I call the “undemanding” and the “demanding” conceptions of constructive interpretation respectively. As I argue, Dworkin’s own presentation of the theory equivocates between these two conceptions, the former of which is utterly unproblematic, but the latter of which incorporates certain philosophical prejudices as to what it must mean for a practice to be purposive.
58. Philosophical Topics: Volume > 44 > Issue: 1
Lars Hertzberg Stoutland vs. Metaphysics
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In his essay “Analytic Philosophy and Metaphysics,” Frederick Stoutland argues that an unspoken metaphysical spirit underlies much of twentieth-century analytic philosophy, in spite of the fact that the word “metaphysics” has had a pejorative ring. The metaphysical habit of mind results in an activity which at best is an unproductive diversion, at worst a dialectical illusion, making claims which only appear to be truth-evaluable. I agree with Stoutland’s diagnosis, which is inspired by Wittgenstein, Georg Henrik von Wright, and Cora Diamond, but argue that there is a bifurcation in the metaphysical temptation which Stoutland overlooks. One form is the assumption that questions of meaning can be raised outside the context of meaningful use of an expression, the other is the urge to impose a scientific form of inquiry onto philosophy, the aims of which are quite different from those of science. The former temptation is the deeper one, running through the history of philosophy, while the attempt to model philosophical inquiry onto scientific explanation is the contemporary form taken by this temptation. As an example of the metaphysical spirit Stoutland criticizes Marion David’s defense of the correspondence theory of truth. I argue that David’s progress could have been cut off at an earlier stage, by pointing out that the examples of truth claims David uses as his starting points are themselves bewildering and far removed from anything that would intelligibly be said in the course of a normal conversation.
59. Philosophical Topics: Volume > 43 > Issue: 1/2
Catherine Wilson Before, Above, Beneath, Below: Metaphysics and Science in Descartes
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In this paper I discuss the largely obsolete notion of ‘metaphysical foundations for science’ and the problems of representation, truth, and embodiment in Descartes identified by Adrian Moore. I explain why rather than enaging in a project of pure inquiry Descartes needed to fit the pursuit and findings of the physical and life sciences into a theological framework. His much misunderstood scientifc image of the human being as a psychosomatic unity is defended as coherent and influential, as is his rejection of the correspondence theory of veridical perception.
60. Philosophical Topics: Volume > 43 > Issue: 1/2
Susan James Metaphysics and Empowerment: Moore on the Place of Metaphysics in Spinoza’s Philosophy
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In the discussion of Spinoza contained in his Evolution of Modern Metaphysics, Adrian Moore argues that Spinoza views metaphysics as a kind of sense-making that enables us to live more affirmative and joyful lives. I engage with two aspects of Moore’s argument. Where he claims that Spinoza regards metaphysics as the fruit of reasoning, and thus as a species of what is labeled in the Ethics as knowledge of the second kind, I argue that metaphysics also belongs with what Spinoza calls imagining or knowledge of the first kind. And where Moore holds that, in order to render metaphysical knowledge practical, one must take a leap to a kind of knowledge that is partly ineffable (so-called knowledge of the third kind), I argue that each of Spinoza’s three kinds of knowledge is practically oriented.