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51. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 41 > Issue: 1
Nicholas Rescher Kant’s Platonism
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52. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 41 > Issue: 1
Dietmar Hübner Three Remarks on “Reflective Equilibrium“: On the Use and Misuse of Rawls’ Balancing Concept in Contemporary Ethics
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John Rawls’ “reflective equilibrium” ranges amongst the most popular conceptions in contemporary ethics when it comes to the basic methodological question of how to justify and trade off different normative positions and attitudes. Even where Rawls’ specific contractualist account is not adhered to, “reflective equilibrium” is readily adopted as the guiding idea of coherentist approaches, seeking moral justification not in a purely deductive or inductive manner, but in some balancing procedure that will eventually procure a stable adjustment of relevant doctrines and standpoints. However, it appears that the widespread use of this idea has led to some considerable deviations from its meaning within Rawls’ original framework and to a critical loss of conceptual cogency as an ethico-hermeneutical tool. This contribution identifies three kinds of “balancing” constellations that are frequently, but inadequately brought forth under the heading of Rawlsian “reflective equilibrium”: (a) balancing theoretical accounts against intuitive convictions; (b) balancing general principles against particular judgements; (c) balancing opposite ethical conceptions or divergent moral statements, respectively. It is argued that each of these applications departs from Rawls’ original construction of “reflective equilibrium” and also deprives the idea of its reliability in clarifying and weighing moral stances.
53. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 41 > Issue: 1
Mateo Pietropaoli Around God Everything Becomes World: On the Disharmony Between Will and Conscience in Nietzsche’s Moral Thought
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The article aims to show the peculiar relationship in Nietzsche’s moral thought between the notions of will and life, on the one hand, and of conscience and truth, on the other. Central to any understanding of this relation is the concept of world, which represents the manifestation of a founding and unconscious will to power, namely the constant generation of a horizon of sense. Recalling several passages from Nietzsche’s works, the article expounds the possibility of a moral thought focused on a self-interpretation of man as the positing of a real world, neither true nor false. This world might be recognized as a real world only if the will is no longer understood as freedom of conscience, but as enhancement of life, namely as foundation of sense.
54. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 41 > Issue: 1
Geoff Boucher Ultimate Questions: Habermas on Philosophy and Religion
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55. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 41 > Issue: 1
Stefano Bertea Why One’s Practical Reasons Are Not Just One’s Own Private Affair
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56. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 41 > Issue: 1
D. Christopoulou, D. Anapolitanos, M. Alexiadou Hume’s Problem of Enumerative Induction Reconsidered: Building on Armstrong and Harman’s Accounts
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This paper addresses Harman’s approach to enumerative induction as a case of inference to the best explanation. Αfter taking under brief consideration Hume’s critique to induction, the paper argues that Harman’s proposal does not improve the situation since the same characteristics of induction and the kind of skepticism associated with it reappear in case of inference to the best explanation. Then the paper questions Armstrong’s attempt to upgrade Harman’s suggestion by regarding a necessitation relation among two universals (a natural law) as the best explanans of the n observed cases of an enumerative induction procedure. It holds that Armstrong’s modification of Harman’s approach faces some difficulties which arise in the context of his views about instantiated universals. Instead, the paper investigates the possibility to assign the role of the explanans to a metaphysically stronger condition. It suggests that accounts of natural laws as metaphysically necessary facts concerning natural kinds can contribute in an attempt for a more fertile application of Harman’s approach.
57. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 41 > Issue: 1
Enrico Cipriani The Syntax of Proper Names
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In this paper, I will focus on the debate between descriptivism and antidescriptivism theory about proper names. In Section I, I will propose an historical reconstruction of the debate, and I will focus in particular on Russell and Kripke's treatments of proper names. Some criticisms will be advanced against Kripke's hypothesis of rigid-designator and, more clearly, against the consequent distinction between the epistemic and metaphysical level that Kripke proposes to explain identity assertions between proper names. Furthermore, I will argue, that, pace Kripke, Russellian treatment of proper names allows to capture all our semantic intuitions, and also those semantic interpretations which concern context-belief sentences. I will close Section I by focusing on a criticism that Kripke rightly points out against an example that Russell proposes in his On Denoting. Section II will be devoted to Russellian solution: I will show that not only Russell's logical treatment of proper names allows to answer to Kripke's criticism to Russell's example, but also that such treatment can disambiguate and express all our semantic intuitions about Frege's puzzle sentence “Hesperus is Phosphorus”. I will then show that, contrarily, Quinian solution (discussed in Section III) and Kripkian one (see Section IV) are not satisfactory to capture our semantic knowledge about Frege's sentence. Furthermore, in Section IV I will focus on Kripke's distinction between epistemic and metaphysical level to deal with identity assertions between proper names, and I will logically show that such distinction is not plausible. In Section V, then, I will show that Russellian solution allows to explain context-belief sentences, contrarily to what Kripke thinks. In VI, I will summarize what I have argued in the text and I will draw some morals.
58. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 41 > Issue: 1
Andrew Cooper For the (Philosophical) Love of Poetic Beauty: Plato’s Hope in Republic
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It is a well-worn trope to view Plato’s banishment of the poets in Republic as a crude form of philistinism. In this paper I defend Plato against this charge. I argue that Republic does not present a final view of poetry, for it leaves room for a philosophical love of poetic beauty. First I analyse the political nature of Plato’s critique of poetry. I suggest that Plato does not reject the political order of change and decay, but opens space for a new kind of political project. I then suggest that Plato’s discussion of tragic poetry in Book X supports this claim, for it contains the hope for a reconfigured love of poetic beauty. I conclude that Plato does not limit aesthetic experience to artistic solace or metaphysical escapism, but opens a way to see aesthetic experience as a vital part of building a world in which it makes sense to live.
59. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 41 > Issue: 1
Alberto Abadia Review of the Fundamentals of Metaphysics
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book review
60. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 41 > Issue: 1
Eva-Maria Klinkisch, Eirini Patsi Cosmopolitan Modernity
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