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Displaying: 51-60 of 73 documents


51. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi / Cilicia Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 3
Ralph D. Ellis Moral Hermeneutics, Coherence Epistemology, and the Role of Emotion
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Coherence requires more than logical consistency. Self-consistent viewpoints notoriously conflict with each other. Besides avoid logical selfcontradiction, coherent viewpoints must of course be consistent with empirical facts, including any social and interpersonal emotional facts that may be shared by all humans. But since these sets of facts are inherently probabilistic, they again lend themselves to motivated hermeneutical tweaking to make them fit one’s initial prejudices and presuppositions, trapping us again in the “hermeneutic circle” – the fact that we cannot know how much our previously-existing worldview motivates selective facts, proliferation of ad hoc hypotheses, choice of “moral intuitions,” etc. The problem of ad hoc hypotheses thus becomes crucial. Proliferation of ungrounded assumptions is motivated emotionally in the same way that believing a “conspiracy” theory requires positing unproven assumptions. Moral theory requires studying the way our emotions play into these moral “conspiracy theories.” Contemporary neuropsychology of emotion suggests that a certain kind of inner conflict model – one that grants autonomy to the exploratory drive, but in conflict with other hermeneutically relevant emotions – is especially useful in addressing the complexities of incoherence in ethical thinking.
52. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi / Cilicia Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 3
James Wetzel Scenes of Inner Devastation: Confessional Improvisation
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Wittgenstein and Cavell have both been alerting me over the years to unsettling possibilities: that secularization is not always a lessening of religious intensity, that philosophy can be a religious calling, that God is less real in our theories than in the grammar of our lives. In short, I have been made aware of the possibility of a secular confession, not as an amputated version of the religious original, but as a genuine improvisation: a way of speaking to God without having to say much, if anything, about God. When Cavell’s hefty memoir came out in 2010, some thirty years after my first encounter with his writing, I assumed I would have my chance to test this possibility. This essay is the outcome of that testing.
53. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi / Cilicia Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 3
Gert-Jan van der Heiden Technology and Formation: Stiegler on Event and Self-Care
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This essay critically examines how Bernard Stiegler addresses the question of present-day technological developments and how they affect our understanding of education and self-formation. The first section is devoted to an account of the basics of Stiegler’s understanding of the relationship between technology and humanity as well as of his characterization of the specific problems that characterize technology today. The main part of the essay analyzes how the questions of self-care, self-formation and education are addressed in relation to these specific problems. Stiegler addresses these problems in terms of the Derridean vocabulary of the pharmakon, and accounts for the present-day technological inventions in terms of pharmacological events. It is shown that Stiegler’s account of education is difficult to combine with his attention to the pharmakon as well as to the event. In the concluding section, it is suggested that the question of self-formation in relation to pharmacological events should be reinterpreted in terms of the concept of experience.
54. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi / Cilicia Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 3
Barry Stocker Ethical Life in Kierkegaard and Williams
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A discussion of how the criticisms of ethical theory in Søren Kierkegaard and Bernard Williams both reinforce each other and also provide some challenges to each other. Despite Williams’ brief and dismissive encounter with Kierkegaard around the reading of a ancient tragedy, both oppose any tendency to see the characters in those tragedies as lacking in agency. Both are consistently concerned with how the individual struggles for some ethical agency and how no individual can be free of the influence of chance or error. Kierkegaard and Willliams are shown to both oppose relativism and communitarianism in ethics, along with utilitarianism and to both have an interest in plurality of ethical ideas of how to live.
55. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi / Cilicia Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 3
Raşit Çelik Adalet Ölçütü Olarak İki Önemli Yaklaşım: Birincil Değerler ve Kabiliyetler
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Adaletin ölçütü konusu çağdaş siyaset felsefesi içerisinde önemli bir yer tutar. John Rawls’un birincil değerler anlayışı ve Amartya Sen’in kabiliyetler yaklaşımı adaletin ölçütüne dair önemli bakış açıları sunmuştur. Sen’in oluşturduğu ve Martha Nussbaum’un geliştirdiği kabiliyetler yaklaşımı, Rawls’un tanımladığı birincil değerlere karşı önemli eleştiriler ortaya koyar. Bu çalışmada, bu iki önemli yaklaşımın karşıt görüşleri ve karşılıklı eleştirilerinin ötesinde, birbirlerini tamamlayıcı yanları vurgulanmaktadır. Kabiliyetler yaklaşımının, Rawls’un siyasi liberal teorisinde belirttiği örtüşen konsensüse ulaşmada önemli etkiler oluşturabileceği savunulmaktadır. Metric of justice is an important issue in contemporary political philosophy. John Rawls’s notion of primary goods and Amartya Sen’s capabilities approach have provided some important perspectives on the metric of justice. As developed by Sen and advanced by Martha Nussbaum, capabilities approach has offered a serious criticism about Rawls’s primary goods. This study, however, places an emphasis upon the complementary aspects of these two perspectives on the metric of justice, rather than their opposing ideas and criticisms against one another. It is also argued that capabilities approach may have significant effects on the way of arriving to an overlapping consensus as described in Rawls’s politically liberal theory.
56. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi / Cilicia Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Philip Pettit Three Mistakes about Democracy
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57. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi / Cilicia Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Bosuk Yoon A Critique of Epistemological Disjunctivism
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58. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi / Cilicia Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Soraj Hongladarom Metaphysics of Change and Continuity: Exactly What is Changing and What Gets Continued?
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This is a metaphysical and conceptual analysis of the concepts ‘change’ and ‘continuity’. The Buddhists are in agreement with Heraclitus that all are flowing and nothing remains. However, the Buddhists have a much more elaborate theory about change and continuity, and this theory is a key element in the entire Buddhist system of related doctrines, viz., that of karma and rebirth, the possibility of Liberation (nirv na) and others. Simply put, the Buddhist emphasizes that change is there in every aspect of reality.According to a later developed form of the Buddhist teaching, change is absolutely pervasive, and even these particles are subject to change as they are nothing more than putative objects which are conceptualized to be such and such, and without the conceptualization they are ‘nothing’ at all. (This is known as the Doctrine of Emptiness). Hence it seems that continuity is not possible. But in fact according to the later theory, change is not only possible, it is accepted as part and parcel of everyday life. The fact that nothing at all remains the same does not imply that continuity is not possible, since continuity does not always have to be that of an inherently existing object. A changing object can be continued also, in roughly the same sense as we say that an event, like a drama, continues even though everything in it is changing. The thread that ties the disparate elements of the event together in this case lies within our own conceptual imputation. This does not imply that everything is subjective, since the distinction between subject and object presupposes the idea of an absolutely existing individual self, which all Buddhist schools rejects. So in this later theory, absolute change is not possible because there is, ultimately speaking nothing to change, and when there is no change there is no continuation either. This is not to deny the empirical fact of changes and continuities that are present to us; things are there and they are indeed changing. What is being denied here is the belief that that there are essences to things which endure through all the changes. Since things are empty (of inherently existing nature) they can change, and continuity is only possible, not because there is something that exists and endures, but because there is change. A drama that does not move cannot be continued.The foregoing discussions of the Buddhist theories have many implications for the dialog between science and religion. One point is that science still seems to subscribe to the object/subject distinction. But if change and continuity are not real in the ultimate sense, then perhaps the distinction should be reconsidered. Another point concerns how to find continuity amidst all the change. But perhaps in some important sense continuity depends on us.
59. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi / Cilicia Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
William Simkulet On Derivative Moral Responsibility and the Epistemic Connection Required for Moral Responsibility
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Derivative moral responsibility is not moral responsibility at all. Much of the confusion found in the literature concerning moral responsibility and the free will problem can be traced back to a penchant to reconcile our philosophical theories of moral responsibility with our folk commonsense linguistic accounts of moral responsibility, a tradition that is notable for its utter lack of making two important distinctions - (1) the distinction between derivative moral responsibility and non-derivative moral responsibility (what Galen Strawson calls “true moral responsibility”) and (2) the distinction between the scope and degree of one’s moral responsibility.1 The failure to make such distinctions, ultimately, leads to confusion in interpreting the content of folk intuitions about moral responsibility, and as a result leads many philosophers to adopt watered down, or overly complex theories of moral responsibility. In “The Epistemic Requirements for Moral Responsibility,” Carl Ginet fails to make such distinctions, and as a result the requirement he arrives at is unwieldy at best. By making such distinctions, I will provide a much more straightforward account of what moral responsibility requires.
60. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi / Cilicia Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Erhan Demircioğlu The Puzzle of Consciousness
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In this article, I aim to present some of the reasons why consciousness is viewed as an intractable problem by many philosophers. Furthermore, I will argue that if these reasons are properly appreciated, then McGinn’s so-called mysterianism may not sound as far-fetched as it would otherwise sound.