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Displaying: 51-59 of 59 documents


51. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 37
David Alexander Weak Inferential Internalism
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Inferential internalism holds that for one to be inferentially justified in believing P on the basis of E one must be justified in believing that E makes probable P. Inferential internalism has long been accused of generating a vicious regress on inferential justification that has drastic skeptical consequences. However, recently Hookway and Rhoda have defended a more modest form of internalism that avoids this problem. They propose a form of weak inferential internalism according to which internalist conditions are restricted to only certain kinds of inferential justification. In this paper, I clarify and argue against weak internalism. I contend that while weak internalism avoids the vicious regress, it does so at the cost of compromising its internalist credentials. For I show that unless weak internalism makes an arbitrary distinction between individuals who believe for the very same reasons, the view collapses into externalism.
philosophy in korea
52. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 37 > Issue: Supplement
In-Suk Cha Modernization, Counter-Modernization, and Philosophy
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The ennobling vision of modernity asserts that the benefits of identifying individual citizens as subjectivity are realized only when each subject is aware of the self as free in decisions and actions. Modernization through industrialization and urbanization has been seen as a means by which society can, through market contractual relationships, allow each citizen to become a self-determining subject. In Korean society this self-awakening has already set in and ought to deepen through dynamic economic growth. However, the authoritarian political power combined by technocracy obstructs the emergence of mature subjectivity. This is what can be called a phenomenon of counter-modernization. Citizenship training through philosophical dialogue may find ways to resolve this impasse by reconceptualizing modernity’s goals and means in terms of enabling the potentiality inherent in subjectivity.
lectures
53. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 37 > Issue: Supplement
Ioanna Kuçuradi Rethinking Philosophy for the Resurrection of the Object of Knowledge
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The author of the paper starts by calling our attention to problems that make it necessary to rethink philosophy and puts her finger on one common factor at the origin of these problems. This is what she calls “the loss of the object of knowledge” in epistemology.After she shows how the object of knowledge is lost in two prevailing epistemologies of the twentieth century—in pragmatism and logical empiricism—and the consequences of this loss for our lives, she gives examples of rethinking certain philosophical questions. These are the questions of what knowledge is and problems of norms related to the lack of distinction between epistemological kinds of norms. This rethinking also implies the necessity of rethinking philosophical education.
54. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 37
Alan R. Rhoda In Defense of Weak Inferential Internalism: Reply to Alexander
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David Alexander has argued that “weak inferential internalism” (WII), a position which amounts to a qualified endorsement of Richard Fumerton’s controversial “principle of inferential justification,” is subject to a fatal dilemma: Either it collapses into externalism or it must make an arbitrary epistemic distinction between persons who believe the same proposition for the same reasons. In this paper, I argue that the dilemma is a false one, for weak inferential internalism does not entail internalism simpliciter. Indeed, WII is compatible with modest externalism, and so is consistent with what Armstrong calls “Type II justification,” the rejection of which leads to the arbitrary epistemic distinctions to which he rightly objects.
55. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 37
David Alexander Weak Inferential Internalism is Indistinguishable from Externalism: A Reply to Rhoda
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In “Weak Inferential Internalism” I defended the frequently voiced criticism that any internalist account of inferential justification generates a vicious regress. My defense involved criticizing a recent form of internalism, “Weak Inferential Internalism” (WII), defended by Hookway and Rhoda. I argued that while WII does not generate a vicious regress, the position is only distinguishable from externalism insofar as it makes an arbitrary distinction between individuals who believe for the very same reason. Either way, WII is not a defensible internalist account of inferential justification. In his “In Defense of Weak Inferential Internalism,” Rhoda has responded to my dilemma argument. He argues that it is mistaken to assume that WII must be incompatible with externalism, and that contrary to my claims, WII is distinguishable from externalism in several ways. In this reply, I explain why none of Rhoda’s replies suggest that there is a defensible internalist account of inferential justification.
lectures
56. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 37 > Issue: Supplement
Tu Weiming A Spiritual Turn in Philosophy: Rethinking the Global Significance of Confucian Humanism
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An exposition of the core Confucian text, the Analects, is a rich resource for thinking philosophically about aesthetics, ethics, and religion. Indeed, the Analects is an inspiration for doing philosophy as a dialogical, rather than a dialectic, dialogue and an edifying conversation. The four integrated dimensions of Confucian humanism as embodied in Confucius’ “anthropocosmic” philosophy encompass the sacredness of earth, body, family, community, and the world. Specifically, it envisions that the full realization of the way of learning to be human consists of (1) the integration of the body and mind, (2) the fruitful interaction between the individual and society, (3) the sustainable and harmonious relationship between humanity and nature, and (4) the mutual responsiveness between the human hear-mind and the Way of Heaven. Furthermore, it transcends the concepts of rationality in the Enlightenment mentality and provides a philosophy of life rooted in the sensitivity, sympathy, and compassion inherent in human nature. Confucius’ “anthropocosmic” philosophy is one of the most profound spiritual legacies in rethinking the human in the twenty-first century.
57. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 37
John M. Valentine A Note on Sartre and the Spirit of Seriousness
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At the end of Being and Nothingness, Sartre defines the spirit of seriousness in the following way: “The spirit of seriousness has two characteristics: it considers values as transcendent givens independent of human subjectivity, and it transfers the quality of ‘desirable’ from the ontological structure of things to their simple material constitution.” My aim in this paper is to show how Sartre is susceptible to a tu quoque in terms of how he describes the threataspect of the world of objects. That is, in works such as Nausea, Sartre appears to regard the world of objects as inherently threatening, and thus he has transferred the quality of threatening from the ontological structure of things to their simple material constitution.
lectures
58. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 37 > Issue: Supplement
Mark C. Taylor Time and Self
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Kierkegaard’s critique of Hegel and Hegelianism anticipates major twentieth-century philosophical movements ranging from structuralism, existentialism, and phenomenology, to post-structuralism and postmodernism. This paper analyzes Kierkegaard’s interpretation of the relationship between subjectivity and temporality in pivotal passages in The Sickness Unto Death and The Concept of Anxiety. Heidegger’s account of the interplay between presentation (Darstellung) and representation (Vorstellung) imagination points to Kant’s theory of the imagination and suggests the way in which the Kierkegaardian subject is constituted by an irreducible alterity that is never present but is always already past. The infinite qualitative difference of the divine is reflected in the inescapable interiority of the subject. Kierkegaard’s abyssal other returns in Barth’s wholly other God, Heidegger’s aletheia, Derrida’s différance, and Lacan’s real. For each of these writers, subjectivity is haunted by another it can neither exclude nor appropriate. This interior exteriority is the condition of the possibility of both desire and hope.
opening address
59. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 37 > Issue: Supplement
Peter Kemp Rethinking Philosophy as Power of the Word: Opening address to the XXII Congress of Philosophy
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If ‘power’ means cultural and political influence, philosophy has become a global world power. Philosophical argumentation and reflection constitute a non-economical, non-technological, and non-military power by the word that is capable of challenging the other powers, exposing lies and illusions, and proposing a better world as dwelling for humanity.Often the power of the philosophical word has been ignored, when philosophy was seen as pure description, pure reference, an innocent mirror, that forgets itself and make us present to things. However, if philosophy has the power of the word, not all kinds of philosophizing are necessarily good for humanity. It can be very seducing for a group, and give food for mass suggestion making that appeals to the worst part of ourselves. We have learnt to understand how philosophy in itself may not only enlighten and liberate, but also seduce and manipulate. Today, philosophy has lost its innocence; we cannot philosophize without reflection on our linguistic practice. But we philosophers are not only called to understand ourselves. We must also contribute to developing an understanding of the power of the word more generally. And as citizens of the world, we must recognize that humiliation of others might be the most brutal violence we can practice without directly killing.