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Displaying: 51-60 of 11751 documents


51. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 111 > Issue: 7
Darren Bradley, A Relevant Alternatives Solution to the Bootstrapping and Self-Knowledge Problems
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The main argument given for relevant alternatives theories of knowledge has been that they answer scepticism about the external world. I will argue that relevant alternatives also solve two other problems that have been much discussed in recent years, a) the bootstrapping problem and b) the apparent conflict between semantic externalism and armchair self-knowledge. Furthermore, I will argue that scepticism and Mooreanism can be embedded within the relevant alternatives framework.
52. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 111 > Issue: 7
New Books: Translations
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53. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 111 > Issue: 6
Eric Swanson, Ordering Supervaluationism, Counterpart Theory, and Ersatz Fundamentality
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54. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 111 > Issue: 6
Neil Mehta, The Limited Role of Particulars in Phenomenal Experience
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Consider two deeply appealing thoughts: first, that we experience external particulars, and second, that what it’s like to have an experience – the phenomenal character of an experience – is somehow independent of external particulars. The first thought is readily captured by phenomenal particularism, the view that external particulars are sometimes part of the phenomenal character of experience. The second thought is readily captured by phenomenal generalism, the view that external particulars are never part of phenomenal character. Here I show that a novel version of phenomenal generalism can capture both thoughts in a satisfying fashion. Along the way, I reveal severe problems facing phenomenal particularism and also shed light on the mental kinds under which experiences fall.
55. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 111 > Issue: 6
New Books
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56. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 111 > Issue: 6
New Anthologies
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57. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 111 > Issue: 5
David Enoch, A Defense of Moral Deference
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This paper has two aims – the first is to mount a defense of moral deference, and the second is to offer a (non-debunking) diagnosis of its suspiciousness. The paper defends moral deference by arguing that in the face of moral uncertainty, it is morally obligatory to minimize the risk of one's wrongdoing, and this moral requirement entails that deferring to a moral expert is sometimes not just morally permissible but also admirable, and indeed morally required. I explain the suspiciousness of moral deference by noting that the need to defer indicates a failure to respond to the right- or wrong-making features of the situation de re. The combination of this vindication of moral deference and diagnosis of its fishiness nicely accommodates some related phenomena, like the status of moral beliefs that are based on opaque evidence, and the fact that the scope of suspected deference includes also other normative domains.
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58. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 111 > Issue: 5
Shen-yi Liao, Tyler Doggett, The Imagination Box
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Imaginative immersion refers to a phenomenon in which one loses oneself in make-believe. Susanna Schellenberg says that the best explanation of imaginative immersion involves a radical revision to cognitive architecture. Instead of there being an attitude of belief and a distinct attitude of imagination, there should only be one attitude that represents a continuum between belief and imagination. We argue otherwise. Although imaginative immersion is a crucial data point for theorizing about the imagination, positing a continuum between belief and imagination is neither necessary nor sufficient for explaining the phenomenon. In addition, arguing against Schellenberg’s account reveals important but underappreciated lessons for theorizing about the imagination and for interpreting boxological representations of the mind.
59. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 111 > Issue: 5
Brian Embry, Counterfactuals without Possible Worlds? A Difficulty for Fine’s Exact Semantics for Counterfactuals
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60. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 111 > Issue: 5
New Books
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