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Displaying: 51-60 of 11808 documents


book reviews
51. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 112 > Issue: 10
Graham Priest, Ian Rumfitt: The Boundary Stones of Thought: An Essay in the Philosophy of Logic
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52. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 112 > Issue: 10
New Books
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53. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 112 > Issue: 9
Shannon Spaulding, Imagination, Desire, and Rationality
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We often have affective responses to fictional events. We feel afraid for Desdemona when Othello approaches her in a murderous rage. We feel disgust toward Iago for orchestrating this tragic event. What mental architecture could explain these affective responses? In this paper I consider the claim that the best explanation of our affective responses to fiction involves imaginative desires. Some theorists argue that accounts that do not invoke imaginative desires imply that consumers of fiction have irrational desires. I argue that there are serious worries about imaginative desires that warrant skepticism about the adequacy of the account. Moreover, it is quite difficult to articulate general principles of rationality for desires, and even according to the most plausible of these possible principles, desires about fiction are not irrational.
54. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 112 > Issue: 9
Michael Zhao, Intervention and the Probabilities of Indicative Conditionals
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A few purported counterexamples to the Adams thesis have cropped up in the literature in the last few decades. I propose a theory that accounts for them, in a way that makes the connections between indicative conditionals and counterfactuals clearer.
comments and criticism
55. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 112 > Issue: 9
Diana B. Heney, Reality as Necessary Friction
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In this paper, I argue that Huw Price’s widely read “Truth as Convenient Friction” overstates the onerousness, and underrates the utility, of the ontological commitments involved in Charles S. Peirce’s version of the pragmatist account of truth. This argument comes in three parts. First, I briefly explain Peirce’s view of truth, and relate it to his account of assertion. Next, I articulate what I take Price’s grievance against Peirce’s view to be, and suggest that this criticism misses the target. Finally, I argue that Peirce’s version of the pragmatist account of truth has greater explanatory power than the narrowly linguistic version put forward by Price, such that even the ontology-averse should accept it.
56. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 112 > Issue: 9
New Books
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57. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 112 > Issue: 9
New Books: Anthologies
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58. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 112 > Issue: 8
P. Kyle Stanford, "Atoms Exist" Is Probably True, and Other Facts That Should Not Comfort Scientific Realists
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Critics who use historical evidence to challenge scientific realism have deployed a perfectly natural argumentative strategy that has created a profoundly misguided conception of what would be required to vindicate that challenge. I argue that the question fundamentally in dispute in such debates is neither whether particular terms in contemporary scientific theories will be treated as referential nor whether particular existential commitments will be held true by future scientific communities, but whether the future of science will exhibit the same broad pattern of repeated, profound, and unpredictable changes in theoretical orthodoxy that such historicist critics argue characterizes its past.
59. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 112 > Issue: 8
Jennifer Wang, Actualist Counterpart Theory
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Actualist counterpart theory replaces David Lewis’s concrete possible worlds and individuals with ersatz worlds and individuals, but retains counterpart theory about de re modality. While intuitively attractive, this view has been rejected for two main reasons: (i) the problem of indiscernibles and (ii) the Humphrey objection. I argue that in insisting that ersatz individuals play the same role as Lewisian individuals, actualists commit the particularist fallacy. The actualist should not (as commonly believed) require stand-ins for every Lewisian individual. Ersatz individuals should instead be construed as representations of actually existing qualitative ways for individuals to be, or qualitative properties individuals can instantiate. This necessitates changes elsewhere. Non-instrumental uses of Kripke semantics and standard counterpart semantics also require stand-ins for particular non-actual individuals. I argue that the actualist should instead adopt a non-standard counterpart semantics that more clearly illuminates the role that actual properties and relations play in explaining de re possibilities and necessities. The result is an intuitive and forceful reply to both the problem of indiscernibles and the Humphrey objection.
60. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 112 > Issue: 8
Matthew Rendall, Mere Addition and the Separateness of Persons
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How can we resist the repugnant conclusion? James Griffin has plausibly suggested that part way through the sequence we may reach a world—let us call it “J”—in which the lives are lexically superior to those that follow. If it would be preferable to live a single life in J than through any number of lives in the next one (“K”), then it would be strange to judge K the better world. Instead, we may reasonably “suspend addition” and judge J superior, as if aggregating the lives in the larger world intrapersonally. I argue that the addition of new people with separate preferences renders this inference illicit when comparing J+ and K. When one pairwise comparison suspends addition and the other does not, the result is an intransitive value judgement: J ≤ J+ < K < J, producing the mere addition paradox.