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Displaying: 51-60 of 12005 documents


51. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 115 > Issue: 3
Keren Gorodeisky, Eric Marcus Aesthetic Rationality
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We argue that the aesthetic domain falls inside the scope of rationality, but does so in its own way. Aesthetic judgment is a stance neither on whether a proposition is to be believed nor on whether an action is to be done, but on whether an object is to be appreciated. Aesthetic judgment is simply appreciation. Correlatively, reasons supporting theoretical, practical and aesthetic judgments operate in fundamentally different ways. The irreducibility of the aesthetic domain is due to the fact that aesthetic judgment is a sensory-affective disclosure of, and responsiveness to, merit: it is a feeling that presents an object, and is responsive to it, as worthy of being liked. Aesthetic judgment is thus shown to be, on the hand, first personal and non-transferable; and, on the other hand, a presentation of reality. We thereby capture what is right in both subjectivist and objectivist conceptions of aesthetic judgment.
52. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 115 > Issue: 3
Andrew Peet, Eli Pitcovski Normal Knowledge: Toward an Explanation-Based Theory of Knowledge
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In this paper we argue that knowledge is characteristically safe true belief. We argue that an adequate approach to epistemic luck must not involve indexing to methods of belief formation, but rather to explanations for belief. This shift is problematic for several prominent approaches to the theory of knowledge, including virtue reliabilism and proper functionalism (as normally conceived). The view that knowledge is characteristically safe true belief is better able to accommodate the shift in question.
review essays
53. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 115 > Issue: 3
Bob Hale Paolo Mancosu: Abstraction and Infinity
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54. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 115 > Issue: 3
New Books
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55. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 115 > Issue: 2
Bryan Pickel, Moritz Schulz Quinean Updates: In Defense of "Two Dogmas"
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Quine challenged traditional views of the a priori by appealing to two key premises: that any statement may be held true “come what may” and that no statement is immune to revision in light of new experience. Chalmers has recently developed a seemingly compelling response to each of these claims. The critique is particularly threatening because it seems to rest on the Bayesian premise that upon acquiring evidence E, a rational agent will update her credence in any statement S to equal her prior conditional credence in S given E. We argue that Chalmers’s criticisms misfire. When properly understood, Quine’s two theses are largely consistent with Bayesianism.
56. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 115 > Issue: 2
Kieran Setiya Must Consequentialists Kill?
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Opposing conventional wisdom, I argue that the ethics of killing and saving lives is best described by agent-neutral consequentialism, not by appeal to agent-centered restrictions. It does not follow that killings are worse than accidental deaths or that you should kill one to prevent more killings. The upshot is a puzzle about killing and letting die.
book reviews
57. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 115 > Issue: 2
Bill Brewer Susanna Siegel: The Rationality of Perception
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58. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 115 > Issue: 2
New Books
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59. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 115 > Issue: 1
Kevin J. S. Zollman The Credit Economy and the Economic Rationality of Science
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Theories of scientific rationality typically pertain to belief. In this paper, the author argues that we should expand our focus to include motivations as well as belief. An economic model is used to evaluate whether science is best served by scientists motivated only by truth, only by credit, or by both truth and credit. In many, but not all, situations, scientists motivated by both truth and credit should be judged as the most rational scientists.
60. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 115 > Issue: 1
Walter Horn Epistemic Closure, Home Truths, and Easy Philosophy
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In spite of the intuitiveness of epistemic closure, there has been a stubborn stalemate regarding whether it is true, largely because some of the “Moorean” things we seem to know easily (like that I’m sitting on a green chair) seem clearly to entail “heavyweight” philosophical things that we apparently cannot know easily—or perhaps even at all (like that I’m not actually lying in bed dreaming). In this paper, I will show that two widely accepted facts about what we do and don’t know—facts with which any minimally acceptable understanding of knowledge must comport—are jointly inconsistent with the truth of CLR. The proof works by supposing the truth of “Categorialism,” a thesis about the relation between basic categories and common nouns and predicates, which is itself a heavyweight claim that cannot be easily known to be either true or false.