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51. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 111 > Issue: 11
New Books
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52. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 111 > Issue: 9/10
Wolfgang Mann, Achille C. Varzi, Foreword
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53. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 111 > Issue: 9/10
C. S. I. Jenkins, Serious Verbal Disputes: Ontology, Metaontology, and Analyticity
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This paper builds on some important recent work by Amie Thomasson, wherein she argues that recent disputes about the existence of ordinary objects have arisen due to eliminiativist metaphysicians’ misunderstandings. Some, she argues, are mistaken about how the language of quantification works, while others neglect the existence and significance of certain analytic entailments. Thomasson claims that once these misunderstandings are cleared away, it is trivially easy to answer existence questions about ordinary objects using everyday empirical methods of investigation. She reveals how two conflicting metaontologies can lead to different positions in the first-order debate. In this paper, I bring a third metaontological perspective to the table: one that enables us to maintain that ontological disputes about ordinary objects are not trivially easy to settle, even if we agree with Thomasson that they are merely verbal. These are serious verbal disputes.
54. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 111 > Issue: 9/10
Stephen Yablo, Carnap’s Paradox and Easy Ontology
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55. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 111 > Issue: 9/10
Amie L. Thomasson, Quizzical Ontology and Easy Ontology
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This paper examines what’s at stake in which form of metaontological deflationism we adopt. Stephen Yablo has argued for a ‘quizzicalist’ approach, holding that many ontological questions are ‘moot’ in the sense that there is simply nothing to settle them. Defenders of the ‘easy approach’ to ontology, by contrast, think not that these questions are unsettled, but that they are very easily settled by trivial inferences from uncontroversial premises—so obviously and easily settled that there is no point debating them. The views may differ in terms of how far the deflation extends—while easy ontology deflates debates about ordinary objects, Yablo doesn’t think his view does. But the crucial underlying difference lies in whether we think there are ontological presuppositions for introducing terminology.
56. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 111 > Issue: 9/10
Kristie Lyn Miller, Defending Substantivism about Disputes in the Metaphysics of Composition
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57. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 111 > Issue: 9/10
Shamik Dasgupta, The Possibility of Physicalism
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58. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 111 > Issue: 8
Kai Hauser, W. Hugh Woodin, Strong Axioms of Infinity and the Debate About Realism
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One of the most distinctive and intriguing developments of modern set theory has been the realization that, despite widely divergent incentives for strengthening the standard axioms, there is essentially only one way of ascending the higher reaches of infinity. To the mathematical realist the unexpected convergence suggests that all these axiomatic extensions describe different aspects of the same underlying reality.
59. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 111 > Issue: 8
Matthew Braham, Martin van Hees, The Impossibility of Pure Libertarianism
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book reviews
60. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 111 > Issue: 8
Fred Rush, The Romantic Absolute: Being and Knowing in Early German Romantic Philosophy, 1795–1804 by Dalia Nassar
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