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Displaying: 51-60 of 11825 documents


51. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 113 > Issue: 2
Sam Baron, Mark Colyvan, Time Enough for Explanation
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The present paper advances an analogy between cases of extra-mathematical explanation (mathematical explanations of physical facts) and cases of what might be termed ‘extra-logical explanation’: the explanation of a physical fact by a logical fact. A particular case of extra-logical explanation is identified that arises in the philosophical literature on time travel. This instance of extra-logical explanation is subsequently shown to be of a piece with cases of extra-mathematical explanation. Using this analogy, we argue extra-mathematical explanation is part of a broader class of non-causal explanation. This has important implications for extra-mathematical explanation, for time travel and for theories of explanation more generally.
52. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 113 > Issue: 2
Philip Welch, Leon Horsten, Reflecting on Absolute Infinity
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This article is concerned with reflection principles in the context of Cantor’s conception of the set-theoretic universe. We argue that within such a conception reflection principles can be formulated that confer intrinsic plausibility to strong axioms of infinity.
book reviews
53. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 113 > Issue: 2
Anil Gomes, Manifest Reality: Kant’s Idealism and his Realism
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54. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 113 > Issue: 1
J. E. Wolff, Using Defaults to Understand Token Causation
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Recent literature on causation invokes a distinction between deviant and default behavior to account for token causation. Critical examination of two prominent attempts to employ a distinction between deviants and defaults reveals that the distinction is far from clear. I clarify and develop the distinction by appeal to the notion of a modally robust process, and show how the distinction can be employed by causal process theorists to respond to cases of causation by omission. This shows that the default/deviant distinction is not so much a tool for counterfactual accounts of causation, but rather for causal process theory.
55. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 113 > Issue: 1
Mark Walker, Externalism, Skepticism, and Skeptical Dogmatism
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A claimed benefit of epistemic externalism is that it alone can avoid skepticism. Most epistemic externalists, however, allow a residual amount of internalism in terms of a defeasibility condition. The paper argues that this internal condition is sufficient for skeptics to cast doubt on many claims to justified belief about perceptual matters about the world. Furthermore, the internal defeasibility condition also opens the door to a darker form of skepticism; skeptical dogmatism, which maintains that many of our perceptually based beliefs are probably false. Thus, the claimed benefits of externalism in avoiding skepticism are greatly exaggerated.
56. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 113 > Issue: 1
New Books
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57. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 112 > Issue: 12
Miriam Schoenfield, Bridging Rationality and Accuracy
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This paper is about the connection between rationality and accuracy. I show that one natural picture about how rationality and accuracy are connected emerges if we assume that rational agents are rationally omniscient (have credence 1 in all of the facts about rationality). I then develop an alternative picture that allows us to relax this assumption, in order to accommodate certain views about higher order evidence.
58. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 112 > Issue: 12
Manolo Martínez, Modalizing Mechanisms
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It is widely held that it is unhelpful to model our epistemic access to modal facts on the basis of perception, and postulate the existence of a bodily mechanism attuned to modal features of the world. In this paper I defend modalizing mechanisms. I present and discuss a decision-theoretic model in which agents with severely limited cognitive abilities, at the end of an evolutionary process, have states which encode substantial information about the probabilities with which the outcomes of a certain Bernoulli process occur. Thus, in the model, a process driven by very simple, thoroughly naturalistic mechanisms eventuates in modal sensitivity.
book reviews
59. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 112 > Issue: 12
Michael Kremer, Penelope Maddy: The Logical Must: Wittgenstein on Logic
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60. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 112 > Issue: 12
Daniel Stoljar, Uriah Kriegel: The Varieties of Consciousness
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