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Displaying: 51-60 of 11760 documents


51. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 111 > Issue: 9/10
Amie L. Thomasson, Quizzical Ontology and Easy Ontology
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This paper examines what’s at stake in which form of metaontological deflationism we adopt. Stephen Yablo has argued for a ‘quizzicalist’ approach, holding that many ontological questions are ‘moot’ in the sense that there is simply nothing to settle them. Defenders of the ‘easy approach’ to ontology, by contrast, think not that these questions are unsettled, but that they are very easily settled by trivial inferences from uncontroversial premises—so obviously and easily settled that there is no point debating them. The views may differ in terms of how far the deflation extends—while easy ontology deflates debates about ordinary objects, Yablo doesn’t think his view does. But the crucial underlying difference lies in whether we think there are ontological presuppositions for introducing terminology.
52. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 111 > Issue: 9/10
Kristie Lyn Miller, Defending Substantivism about Disputes in the Metaphysics of Composition
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53. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 111 > Issue: 9/10
Shamik Dasgupta, The Possibility of Physicalism
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54. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 111 > Issue: 8
Kai Hauser, W. Hugh Woodin, Strong Axioms of Infinity and the Debate About Realism
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One of the most distinctive and intriguing developments of modern set theory has been the realization that, despite widely divergent incentives for strengthening the standard axioms, there is essentially only one way of ascending the higher reaches of infinity. To the mathematical realist the unexpected convergence suggests that all these axiomatic extensions describe different aspects of the same underlying reality.
55. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 111 > Issue: 8
Matthew Braham, Martin van Hees, The Impossibility of Pure Libertarianism
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book reviews
56. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 111 > Issue: 8
Fred Rush, The Romantic Absolute: Being and Knowing in Early German Romantic Philosophy, 1795–1804 by Dalia Nassar
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57. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 111 > Issue: 8
New Books
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58. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 111 > Issue: 7
Lei Zhong, Sophisticated Exclusion and Sophisticated Causation
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The Exclusion Argument, which aims to deny the causal efficacy of irreducible mental properties, is probably the most serious threat to non-reductive physicalism. Many non-reductivist responses can only reject simplified versions of the exclusion argument, but fail to refute a sophisticated version. In this paper, I attempt to show that we can block the sophisticated exclusion argument by appeal to a sophisticated understanding of causation, what I call the ‘Dual-condition Conception of Causation’. Specifically, I argue that the dual-condition account of causation motivates an Autonomy approach to solving the exclusion problem (whereas this account of causation challenges the Overdetermination approach). According to the autonomy solution, even if mental properties are unable to cause fundamental physical properties, they can still cause higher-level properties (such as mental, behavioral, and social properties)—if so, human agency would be preserved in the physical world.
59. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 111 > Issue: 7
Jan Almäng, Tense as a Feature of Perceptual Content
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In recent years the idea that perceptual content is tensed in the sense that we can perceive objects as present or as past has come under attack. In this paper the notion of tensed content is to the contrary defended. The paper argues that assuming that something like an intentionalistic theory of perception is correct, it is very reasonable to suppose that perceptual content is tensed, and that a denial of this notion requires a denial of some intuitively very plausible principles. The paper discusses some common objections against the notion of tensed content and concludes that none of them succeeds in showing that perceptual content cannot be tensed.
60. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 111 > Issue: 7
Darren Bradley, A Relevant Alternatives Solution to the Bootstrapping and Self-Knowledge Problems
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The main argument given for relevant alternatives theories of knowledge has been that they answer scepticism about the external world. I will argue that relevant alternatives also solve two other problems that have been much discussed in recent years, a) the bootstrapping problem and b) the apparent conflict between semantic externalism and armchair self-knowledge. Furthermore, I will argue that scepticism and Mooreanism can be embedded within the relevant alternatives framework.