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Displaying: 51-60 of 11789 documents


51. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 112 > Issue: 5
T. Parent, Rule Following and Metaontology
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Wittgenstein’s rule-following argument suggests that linguistic understanding does not consist in knowing interpretations, whereas Kripkenstein’s version suggests that meaning cannot be metaphysically fixed by interpretations. In the present paper, rule-following considerations are used to suggest that certain ontological questions cannot be answered by interpretations. Specifically, if the aim is to specify the ontology of a language, an interpretation cannot answer what object an expression of L denotes, if the interpretations (e.g., “ ‘Hesperus’ denotes Hesperus” or “ ‘Hesperus’ denotes the evening star”) are themselves L-expressions. Briefly, that’s because the ontology of such interpretations would naturally be in question as much as the expressions they interpret. So in order to settle the question of ontology, the interpretations themselves would need to be interpreted, and thus a regress. I conclude that knowing the answer to what ontology underlies L cannot be a matter of knowing interpretations. The paper ends with a quietist conclusion; the slogan is that empirical science is ontology enough, or rather, it is about all the ontology one should expect.
52. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 112 > Issue: 5
Michael C. Rea, Time Travelers Are Not Free
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In this paper I defend two conclusions: that time travel journeys to the past are not undertaken freely and, more generally, that nobody is free between the earliest arrival time and the latest departure time of a time travel journey to the past. Time travel to the past destroys freedom on a global scale.
53. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 112 > Issue: 5
New Books
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54. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 112 > Issue: 4
Annalisa Coliva, How to Commit Moore’s Paradox
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Moore’s paradox is taken to be emblematic of peculiarities in the first person point of view, and to have significant implications for several issues in epistemology, in philosophy of language and mind. Yet, its nature remains elusive. In the first part of the paper, the main kinds of analysis of it hereto proposed in the literature are criticized. Furthermore, it is claimed that there are cases in which its content can be legitimately judged. Close inspection of those cases reveals that they depend on self-ascriptions of beliefs as dispositions. These are kinds of belief that are not normative in nature. In the second part of the paper, it is argued that, in order to save the paradox, one must resort to a thoroughly normative notion of beliefs as first-personal commitments. Its bearing on the paradox is explored and, in closing, a defence of it from possible objections is presented.
55. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 112 > Issue: 4
Daniel J. Singer, Mind the Is-Ought Gap
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The is-ought gap is Hume’s claim that we can’t get an ‘ought’ from just ‘is’s. Prior (“The Autonomy of Ethics,” 1960) showed that its most straightforward formulation, a staple of introductory philosophy classes, fails. Many authors attempt to resurrect the claim by restricting its domain syntactically or by reformulating it in terms of models of deontic logic. Those attempts prove to be complex, incomplete, or incorrect. I provide a simple reformulation of the is-ought gap that closely fits Hume’s description of it. My formulation of the gap avoids the proposed counterexamples from Prior and offers a natural explanation of why they seem compelling. Moreover, I show that my formulation of the gap is guaranteed by standard theories of the semantics of normative terms, and that provides a more general reason to accept it.
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56. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 112 > Issue: 4
Brian Kogelmann, Stephen G. W. Stich, The Irrelevance of the Impossibility of Pure Libertarianism
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In “The Impossibility of Pure Libertarianism” Braham and van Hees prove that four conditions on rights—completeness, conclusiveness, non-imposition, and symmetry—cannot be satisfied simultaneously. If Braham and van Hees’s proof is to have any relevance, at least some prominent libertarians must endorse their four conditions, and libertarianism as a philosophical position must in some way be committed to all the axioms. In this paper we demonstrate the irrelevance of Braham and van Hees’s proof by showing that some of the most prominent libertarians do not endorse the completeness and conclusive conditions, and that there is nothing about libertarianism as a philosophical position that commits the libertarian to these two axioms. Indeed, we show that, more generally, there are strong reasons for libertarians to reject both conditions. As such, libertarians should not lose any sleep over Braham and van Hees’s proof.
57. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 112 > Issue: 3
A. J. Cotnoir, Douglas Edwards, From Truth Pluralism to Ontological Pluralism and Back
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Ontological pluralism holds that there are different ways of being. Truth pluralism holds that there are different ways of being true. Both views have received growing attention in recent literature, but so far there has been very little discussion of the connections between the views. The authors suggest that motivations typically given for truth pluralism have analogue motivations for ontological pluralism; they argue that while neither view entails the other, those who hold one view and wish to hold the other will find natural routes by which to do so. The authors additionally identify some disanalogies between the views, by considering whether certain “mixed” problems commonly pressed against truth pluralism have analogues for ontological pluralism.
58. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 112 > Issue: 3
Ran Wolff, Emergent Privacy
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Defining privacy is a long-sought goal for philosophers and legal scholars alike. Current definitions lack mathematical rigor. They are therefore impracticable for domains such as economics and computer science in which privacy needs to be quantified and computed. This paper describes a game-theoretic framework in which privacy requires no definition per se. Rather, it is an emergent property of specific games, the strategy by which players maximize their reward. In this context, key activities related to privacy, such as methods for its protection and ways in which it is traded, are given concrete meaning. Based in game theory, emergent privacy demonstrates that the right to privacy can be derived, at least in part, on a utilitarian philosophical basis.
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59. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 112 > Issue: 3
Gil Sagi, The Modal and Epistemic Arguments against the Invariance Criterion for Logical Terms
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The essay discusses a recurrent criticism of the isomorphism-invariance criterion for logical terms, according to which the criterion pertains only to the extension of logical terms, and neglects the meaning, or the way the extension is fixed. A term, so claim the critics, can be invariant under isomorphisms and yet involve a contingent or a posteriori component in its meaning, thus compromising the necessity or apriority of logical truth and logical consequence. This essay shows that the arguments underlying the criticism are flawed since they rely on an invalid inference from the modal or epistemic status of statements in the metalanguage to that of statements in the object-language. The essay focuses on McCarthy’s version of the argument, but refers to Hanson and McGee’s versions as well.
60. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 112 > Issue: 3
New Books
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