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Displaying: 51-60 of 11782 documents


51. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 112 > Issue: 3
Ran Wolff, Emergent Privacy
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Defining privacy is a long-sought goal for philosophers and legal scholars alike. Current definitions lack mathematical rigor. They are therefore impracticable for domains such as economics and computer science in which privacy needs to be quantified and computed. This paper describes a game-theoretic framework in which privacy requires no definition per se. Rather, it is an emergent property of specific games, the strategy by which players maximize their reward. In this context, key activities related to privacy, such as methods for its protection and ways in which it is traded, are given concrete meaning. Based in game theory, emergent privacy demonstrates that the right to privacy can be derived, at least in part, on a utilitarian philosophical basis.
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52. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 112 > Issue: 3
Gil Sagi, The Modal and Epistemic Arguments against the Invariance Criterion for Logical Terms
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The essay discusses a recurrent criticism of the isomorphism-invariance criterion for logical terms, according to which the criterion pertains only to the extension of logical terms, and neglects the meaning, or the way the extension is fixed. A term, so claim the critics, can be invariant under isomorphisms and yet involve a contingent or a posteriori component in its meaning, thus compromising the necessity or apriority of logical truth and logical consequence. This essay shows that the arguments underlying the criticism are flawed since they rely on an invalid inference from the modal or epistemic status of statements in the metalanguage to that of statements in the object-language. The essay focuses on McCarthy’s version of the argument, but refers to Hanson and McGee’s versions as well.
53. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 112 > Issue: 3
New Books
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54. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 112 > Issue: 2
Justin Bledin, Modus Ponens Defended
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Is modus ponens valid for the indicative conditional? McGee [1985] famously presents several alleged counterexamples to this inference rule. More recently, Kolodny and MacFarlane [2010] and Willer [2010] argue that modus ponens is unreliable in certain hypothetical contexts. However, none of these attacks undermines an informational conception of logic on which modus ponens is valid.
55. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 112 > Issue: 2
Stephan Leuenberger, The Contingency of Contingency
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Where does the line between the possible and the impossible fall? One influential answer to this question is succinctly expressed by the thesis that there are no brute necessities. Typically, that thesis is taken to be non-contingent by its proponents. In this paper, I shall argue that if it is necessary, it is so brutely. From this, it follows that there could be brute necessities. But this has no tendency to show that there are any. On the resulting view, the world is full of contingency—but only contingently so.
56. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 112 > Issue: 1
Chrisoula Andreou, Parity, Comparability, and Choice
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It is often supposed that, given two potential objects of choice X and Y, a specific set of circumstances, and a specific choosing agent, one of the following must be true: (1) opting for X is a better choice than opting for Y, (2) opting for Y is a better choice than opting for X, or (3) opting for X and opting for Y are exactly equally good choices. My aim in this paper is to show how some philosophical insights concerning color perception can illuminate the possibility of two options, X and Y, being such that, even given a specific set of circumstances and a specific choosing agent, none of (1), (2), or (3) holds, but X and Y are positively related to one another as “on a par.”
57. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 112 > Issue: 1
Alan Carter, A Solution to the Purported Non-Transitivity of Normative Evaluation
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Derek Parfit presents his Mere Addition Paradox in order to demonstrate that it is extremely difficult to avoid the Repugnant Conclusion. And in order to avoid it, Parfit has embraced perfectionism. However, Stuart Rachels and Larry Temkin, taking their lead from Parfit, have concluded, instead, that the Repugnant Conclusion can be avoided by denying the axiom of transitivity with respect to the all-things-considered-better-than relation. But this seems to present a major challenge to how we evaluate normatively. In this article I show how the Mere Addition Paradox and the Repugnant Conclusion can both be avoided without subscribing to perfectionism, and without sacrificing the axiom of transitivity.
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58. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 112 > Issue: 1
John N. Williams, Neil Sinhababu, The Backward Clock, Truth-Tracking, and Safety
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We present Backward Clock, an original counterexample to Robert Nozick’s truth-tracking analysis of propositional knowledge, which works differently from other putative counterexamples and avoids objections to which they are vulnerable. We then argue that four ways of analyzing knowledge in terms of safety, including Duncan Pritchard’s, cannot withstand Backward Clock either.
59. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 112 > Issue: 1
New Books
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60. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 111 > Issue: 12
Justin Tiehen, A Priori Scrutability and That’s All
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At the heart of David Chalmers’s book Constructing the World is his defense of A Priori Scrutability, the thesis that there is a compact class of truths such that for any truth p, a Laplacean intellect could know a priori that if the truths in the class hold, then p. In this paper I develop an objection to Chalmers’s defense of A Priori Scrutability that focuses on his reliance on a so-called that’s-all truth. After reviewing preliminaries in section 1, my objection, which draws heavily on Theodore Sider’s discussion of border-sensitive properties, is developed in sections 2 and 3. Section 2 argues against Chalmers’s analysis of the distinction between positive and negative truths, while section 3 argues that the that’s-all sentence formulated by Chalmers is a falsehood rather than a truth. Section 4 offers a concluding discussion of my argument.