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Displaying: 51-60 of 1834 documents


features
51. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 38 > Issue: 1
David E. Storey, Nietzsche and Ecology Revisited: The Biological Basis of Value
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There has been relatively little debate about Nietzsche’s place in environmental ethics, but the lines of the debate are well marked. He has been viewed as an anthropocentrist by Michael E. Zimmerman, a humanist by Ralph Acampora, a biocentrist and deep ecolo­gist by Max Hallman, a constructivist by Martin Drenthen, and an ecocentrist by Graham Parkes. Nietzsche does provide a theory of intrinsic value and his philosophy of nature is germane to an environmerntal ethic. His philosophical biology grounds his value theory. The secondary literature contains three main claims plaguing the debate about his views. First, commentators tend to ignore or downplay Nietzsche’s biology. Second, his value theory is not adequatey addressed. Third, does Nietzsche’s emphasis on hierarchy enable him to maintain that human life is more valuable than that of other life forms, but that the lower life forms have a different kind of value insofar as they enable and support higher life forms? This view is roughly parallel in many respects to the views of Paul Taylor, David Ray Griffin, and Michael E. Zimmerman.
discussion papers
52. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 38 > Issue: 1
Jonathan Parker, Stoic Quietude: Rethinking Stoicism in Relation to the Soundscape
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Soundscapes are comprised of biological sounds (biophony), non-biological sounds (geophony), and sounds introduced through human activity (anthrophony). These sounds provide us with the opportunity to both better understand and enjoy the natural world. Di­verse soundscapes across the globe are being degraded and disappearing altogether in the face of global climate change and habitat alteration. Humility and quietude are required as a means to confront the devastating loss of soundscapes. Stoicism offers fruitful accounts of these virtues that can be useful to us in our modern lives as we attempt to appreciate and protect natural soundscapes.
53. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 38 > Issue: 1
Tony Lynch, Stephen Norris, On the Enduring Importance of Deep Ecology
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It is common to hear that deep ecology “has reached its logical conclusion and exhausted itself” in a vacuous anthropomorphism and absurd nonanthropocentrism. These conclusions should be rejected. Properly understood, neither objection poses a serious problem for deep ecology so much as for the ethic of “ecological holism” which some philosophers—wrongly—have taken to arise from deep ecology. Deep ecology is not such an ethic, but is best understood as an aesthetically articulated conception of what, following Robinson Jeffers, may be called “Wild Mind,” and such a Wild Mind is characterized—not criticized and condemned—by just that anthropomorphism and nonanthropocentrism critics focus on when they attack the ethic of ecological holism.
54. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 38 > Issue: 1
Willis Jenkins, The Turn to Virtue in Climate Ethics: Wickedness and Goodness in the Anthropocene
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Ethicists regularly turn to virtue in order to negotiate features of climate change that seem to overwhelm moral agency. Appeals to virtue in climate ethics differ by how they connect individual flourishing with collective responsibilities and by how they interpret Anthropocene relations. Differences between accounts of climate virtue help critique proposals to reframe global ecological problems in terms of resilience and planetary stewardship, the intelligibility of which depends on connecting what would be good for the species with what would be good for an individual life. A pragmatic way of establishing that connection may need a strong role for respect of nature.
55. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 38 > Issue: 1
Nin Kirkham, Recognizing Our Place in the World
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What might a modern environmental or technological virtue or vice look like? That is, what virtues or vices might relate to our environmental place in the world, rather than our social place in the world? This question is particularly pressing in light of the unique chal­lenges presented by the current environmental and technological milieu. A recurring theme that arises in response to advances in certain technologies, particularly technologies that are seen in some way as “interfering in nature,” is that humans are indulging in the vice of hubris, often referred to by the phrase “playing God.” Taking the notion of hubris as a starting point, the notion of “living in place” can be developed as a primary environmental and technological virtue, with reference to Heidegger’s analysis of the role of technology in human life. A pre-eminent environmental and technological virtue—living in place—can be understood in the light of Heidegger’s notion of “poetic dwelling,” where the role of human art and technology, rather than being primarily to dominate or manipulate nature, is to bring the natural world “into being.”
book reviews
56. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 38 > Issue: 1
Melissa Clarke, Earth Stewardship: Linking Ecology and Ethics in Theory and Practice
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57. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 38 > Issue: 1
Frank Schalow, The Logos of the Living World: Merleau-Ponty, Animals, and Language
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comment
58. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 38 > Issue: 1
Dale E. Miller, Mill’s “Nature”: A Reply to Piers H. G. Stephens
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news and notes
59. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 37 > Issue: 4
News and Notes
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features
60. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 37 > Issue: 4
Workineh Kelbessa, African Environmental Ethics, Indigenous Knowledge, and Environmental Challenges
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Unlike mainstream Western ethics, African environmental ethics has recognized the inter­connectedness and interdependence of all beings and the more-than-human world. To be an object of moral concern, rationality, intelligence, and language are not required, although different beings have different mental capacities and roles. The unity of the whole estab­lishes an ethical obligation for human beings toward nature. Africa has different cultures that have helped to shape positive moral attitudes toward the natural environment and its human and nonhuman components. Although African environmental ethics is increasingly being marginalized by educational establishments and policy makers in Africa, it has the potential to contribute to human well-being and environmental sustainability. However, it is not a panacea for all global environmental challenges, as it has its own limitations and needs improvement. The solution of environmental problems requires multidisciplinary approaches and the cooperation of all nations. African and other concerned scholars should critically study African environmental ethics and identify its positive elements that can en­able humanity to save Mother Earth and its inhabitants.