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Displaying: 51-60 of 1820 documents

51. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 37 > Issue: 4
Eric Katz, Geoengineering, Restoration, and the Construction of Nature: Oobleck and the Meaning of Solar Radiation Management
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An old book by children’s author Dr. Seuss can be an inspiration to examine the ethical and ontological meaning of geoengineering. My argument is based on my critique of the process of ecological restoration as the creation of an artifactual reality. When humanity intentionally interferes with the processes and entities of nature, we change the ontological reality of the natural world. The world becomes a garden, or a zoo, an environment that must be continually managed to meet the goals of human purposes. Geoengineering is a more radical and comprehensive example of this process of planetary management. Thus, as with ecological restoration, geoengineering reinforces the paradigm of human mastery and domination of nature. To counteract this dream of domination, we must, as Dr. Seuss instructed us when we were children, learn to live in the natural world with humility.
book reviews
52. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 37 > Issue: 4
Ronnie Hawkins, The Master and His Emissary: The Divided Brain and the Making of the Western World
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53. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 37 > Issue: 4
Paul Keeling, Keeping the Wild: Against the Domestication of Nature
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54. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 37 > Issue: 4
Referees 2015
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55. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 37 > Issue: 4
Index for 2015
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56. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 37 > Issue: 3
News and Notes
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57. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 37 > Issue: 3
Nicole Marshall, Toward Special Mobility Rights for Climate Migrants
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The conditions of climate change are increasingly shaping the modern era of international migration; yet the principles and norms that shape the international regime are struggling to keep pace with this reality. Because forced environmental migration is becoming more prominent, it is necessary to respond at the international level. Not only is it the ethical responsibility of the international community to recognize special mobility rights for envi­ronmentally displaced peoples, but further, these rights should be maximized with policy-oriented solutions that sacrifice neither feasibility nor ethical robustness. The mechanisms of dual, tiered, and deterritorialized citizenship are a way to bring special mobility rights for climate migrants into fruition.
58. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 37 > Issue: 3
Shannon Brincat, Global Climate Change Justice: From Rawls’ Law of Peoples to Honneth’s Conditions of Freedom
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The problem of global climate changes has raised fundamental questions of justice in world politics centered around the vast discrepancies between the causes and the effects of global warming and the uneven levels of consumption/enjoyment of fossil fuels. The overwhelming majority of approaches in environmental ethics have focused on either distributive justice or rights-based frameworks. Climate change justice, however, can be explored through an alternative framework, an approach based on the recognition theory of Axel Honneth that has not been systematically engaged with in this field. A critique of John Rawls’ The Law of Peoples as an exemplar of distributive approaches reveals a number of limitations inherent in Rawlsian models of climate-change justice. Honneth’s theory of recognition is an advance on distributive models toward a notion of climate justice in which the conditions necessary for the “functioning and flourishment” of human freedom includes climatic stability as a basic social condition. The ideal of mutual recognition provides a basis for environmental protections, including but not limited to the global atmosphere as a necessary condition for the realization of self-autonomy for all human kind.
discussion papers
59. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 37 > Issue: 3
Christopher J. Preston, The Multiple Anthropocenes: Toward Fracturing a Totalizing Discourse
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60. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 37 > Issue: 3
Tom Greaves, Rupert Read, Where Value Resides: Making Ecological Value Possible
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Distinguishing between the source and the locus of value enables environmental philosophers to consider not only what is of value, but also to try to develop a conception of valuation that is itself ecological. Such a conception must address difficulties caused by the original locational metaphors in which the distinction is framed. This is done by reassessing two frequently employed models of valuation, perception and desire, and going on to show that a more adequate ecological understanding of valuation emerges when these models are fully contextualized in the intersecting life worlds of the ecological community. Ecological evaluation takes place in ongoing encounters between these worlds and a crucial part in this process is assigned to living beings that are “open-endedly open,” that is, open not only to what the world affords them and others, but open to an indefinite field of possible valuational encounters between all kinds of beings. Ecological valuation overcomes some of the conceptual failings of contemporary attempts to evaluate nature: “The Economics of Ecology and Biodiversity” and “Valuing Nature.”