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Displaying: 51-60 of 1562 documents

51. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 92 > Issue: 3
Zachary M. Mabee Become What You Receive: A Eucharistic Approach to Faith
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Much work in the philosophy of religion has been devoted to exploring the virtue of faith. Very little of it, however, has done so from the perspective of Christian worship and liturgical practice. In this essay, I explore the virtue of faith, articulated in a traditionally Catholic manner, as it is practiced, engaged, and deepened through participation in the Eucharist. I begin by emphasizing both the cognitive and the volitional dimensions of a robust conception of the virtue of faith and then show how devout Eucharistic practice confirms and strengthens them, affording believers a unique opportunity to deepen their belief and concretely strengthen their trust in God. I conclude by noting how a Eucharistic approach to faith can avoid a common criticism—that faith is exceedingly passive—and also help us to understand why faith and religious practice can so easily become stagnant.
52. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 92 > Issue: 3
Joe Milburn Faith and Reason in the Oxford University Sermons: John Henry Newman and the Legacy of English Deism
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I argue that we can understand John Henry Newman as defending the Principle of Faith throughout the University Sermons. According to the Principle of Faith, belief in the Christian message is in itself a good act of the mind, and it has moral significance. I argue that Newman’s developed account of faith and its relation to reason in Sermons 10 through 12 are designed to defend the Principle of Faith. Finally, I argue that we can understand Newman’s defense of the Principle of Faith as a reaction against criticisms dating back to the English Deists.
53. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 92 > Issue: 3
Jonathan Matheson Gritty Faith
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Recently there has been renewed philosophical interest in both the nature and value of faith. A central issue in this literature is whether faith requires belief. Non-doxastic accounts of faith maintain that having faith that p does not require believing that p. In this paper I connect the literature on non-doxastic accounts of faith to the empirical literature on grit. Grit is passionate perseverance to obtain long term goals, and it has been found to be an excellent predictor of success. I argue that the motivations for non-doxastic accounts of faith support conceiving of faith as grit. I also argue that conceiving of faith as grit comes with a number of advantages. In particular, such a move shows how faith can be voluntary, rational, and valuable.
54. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 92 > Issue: 3
Blake McAllister The Perspective of Faith: Its Nature and Epistemic Implications
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A number of philosophers, going back at least to Kierkegaard, argue that to have faith in something is, in part, to have a passion for that thing—to possess a lasting, formative disposition to feel certain positive patterns of emotion towards the object of faith. I propose that (at least some of) the intellectual dimensions of faith can be modeled in much the same way. Having faith in a person involves taking a certain perspective towards the object of faith—in possessing a lasting, formative disposition for things to seem as though the object of faith is worthy of one’s trust. After developing the view, I briefly discuss its epistemic implications. I suggest that, by systematically reorienting how one experiences the world, faith can actually change one’s total body of evidence (or perhaps even how one weighs that evidence), thereby altering what one is justified in believing about the object of faith.
55. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 92 > Issue: 2
Beau Branson Ahistoricity in Analytic Theology
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Analytic theology has sometimes been criticized as ahistorical. But what this means, and why it is problematic, have often been left unclear. This essay explicates and supports one way of making that charge while simultaneously showing this ahistoricity, although widespread within analytic theology, is not essential to it. Specifically, some analytic theologians treat problematic doctrines as metaphysical puzzles, constructing speculative accounts of phenomena such as the Trinity or Incarnation and taking the theoretical virtues of such accounts to be sufficient in themselves to defend traditional doctrines with no need for additional, historical premises. But due to the different epistemic structures of metaphysical and theological puzzles, I argue that importing this methodology into philosophical theology results in invalid or question-begging arguments, and it is unclear how a virtue-centric methodology could be repaired without collapsing into a more historical methodology, which some of the best (but unfortunately not all) analytic theologians follow.
56. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 92 > Issue: 2
Brian T. Carl The Transcendentals and the Divine Names in Thomas Aquinas
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Interpreters of Aquinas tend to posit a seamless transition from knowledge of the transcendentals in the abstract to naming God as one, true, and good. Some even suggest that the convertibility of the transcendentals with being implies the unity, truth, and goodness of esse divinum. Others hold simply that the meaning and order of these divine names is founded upon the meaning of the transcendentals. This study: (1) explains why Aquinas avoids “transcendental arguments” for these divine names; (2) argues that truth and goodness, as divine names, are derived not only from the transcendental meanings of these terms but also from specific perfections: namely, truth of intellect and moral goodness; (3) shows that the order of these divine names in the two Summae (being, good, one, true) better reflects the order of the transcendentals as received perfections than their more familiar order in the abstract (being, one, true, good).
57. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 92 > Issue: 2
Matthew Kent Siebert Testimonial Trustworthiness: Truthfulness and Trust
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Believing someone is, as Elizabeth Anscombe said, “trusting him for the truth.” Recent accounts of how we trust speakers for the truth have given a central role to speaker trustworthiness but have said little about what speaker trustworthiness is. I argue that it is best to think of speaker trustworthiness as the virtue of truthfulness. I give an account of truthfulness, show how that account solves problems for other accounts of speaker trustworthiness, and then use my account to explain the epistemic benefits of trusting a truthful speaker.
58. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 92 > Issue: 2
Matthew Shea Aquinas on God-Sanctioned Stealing
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A serious challenge to religious believers in the Abrahamic traditions is that the God of the Old Testament seems to command immoral actions. Thomas Aquinas addresses this objection using the biblical story of God ordering the Israelites to plunder the Egyptians, which threatens to create an inconsistency among four of Aquinas’s views: (1) God did indeed command this action; (2) God is perfectly good and cannot command any evil actions; (3) the objective moral goodness or badness of actions is not based on arbitrary divine commands; and (4) the prohibition of theft is an immutable principle of the natural moral law. I examine Aquinas’s views on metaethics, stealing, justice, property, and collective responsibility to show that there is not a genuine inconsistency in his position, and that his strategy provides a helpful model for responding to the objection from divinely-sanctioned evil.
59. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 92 > Issue: 2
Daniel J. Simpson Reframing Aquinas on Art and Morality
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Can a work of art be defective aesthetically as art because it is defective morally? Étienne Gilson and Jacques Maritain both develop Thomistic accounts of the arts based on Aquinas’s distinction between the virtues of art and prudence, but they answer this question differently. Although their answers diverge, I will argue that both accounts make a crucial assumption about the metaphysics of goodness that Aquinas denies: that moral and aesthetic goodness are distinct species, not inseparable modes, of metaphysical goodness. I propose a new way to develop a Thomistic account of the arts that begins with Aquinas’s treatment of the three inseparable modes of metaphysical goodness: the virtuous, the useful, and the pleasant. This foundation seems metaphysically, methodologically, and explanatorily prior to the accounts of Gilson and Maritain, because art is a virtue, and virtue is related to goodness, and goodness is “divided” into three inseparable modes.
disputed question: are names said of god and creatures univocally?
60. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 92 > Issue: 2
Richard Cross Are Names Said of God and Creatures Univocally?
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