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Displaying: 51-60 of 2350 documents


book symposium
51. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 87 > Issue: 1
Hannah Ginsborg, Kant's Perceiver
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52. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 87 > Issue: 1
Lucy Allais, Kitcher on the Deduction
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53. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 87 > Issue: 1
Patricia Kitcher, Replies to Rödl, Ginsborg, and Allais
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54. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 87 > Issue: 1
Recent Publications
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articles
55. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 86 > Issue: 3
John Bengson, Experimental Attacks on Intuitions and Answers
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56. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 86 > Issue: 3
Matthew McGrath, Dogmatism, Underminers and Skepticism
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57. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 86 > Issue: 3
Aaron J. Cotnoir, Validity for Strong Pluralists
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58. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 86 > Issue: 3
Andrew Sepielli, Moral Uncertainty and the Principle of Equity among Moral Theories
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59. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 86 > Issue: 3
Liam P. Dempsey, Itay Shani, Stressing the Flesh: In Defense of Strong Embodied Cognition
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In a recent paper, Andy Clark (2008) has argued that the literature on embodied cognition reveals a tension between two prominent strands within this movement. On the one hand, there are those who endorse what Clark refers to as body-centrism, a view which emphasizes the special contribution made by the body to a creature's mental life. Among other things, body centrism implies that significant differences in embodiment translate into significant differences in cognition and consciousness. On the other hand, there are those who endorse what Clark calls extended functionalism, a view which sees the mind as the joint product of the computational resources presented by (i) intracranial processing, (ii) bodily input, and (iii) environmental scaffolding. As such, extended functionalism allows for the possibility that any contribution of the body to cognition and consciousness can be compensated for by the other two contributing factors. While Clark's sympathies lie with the latter approach, we argue in favour of the former. In particular, we focus on consciousness and argue that the unique contribution the body makes to a creature's manifold of phenomenal experience cannot be compensated for, in the manner, and on the scale, that Clark envisages.
60. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 86 > Issue: 3
Edouard Machery, Ron Mallon, Shaun Nichols, Stephen P. Stich, If Folk Intuitions Vary, Then What?
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We have recently presented evidence for cross-cultural variation in semantic intuitions and explored the implications of such variation for philosophical arguments that appeal to some theory of reference as a premise. Devitt (2011) and Ichikawa and colleagues (forthcoming) offer critical discussions of the experiment and the conclusions that can be drawn from it. In this response, we reiterate and clarify what we are really arguing for, and we show that most of Devitt's and Ichikawa and colleagues' criticisms fail to address our concerns.