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Displaying: 51-60 of 89 documents


doctoral candidates
51. Maynooth Philosophical Papers: Volume > 4
John Haydn Gurmin Edith Stein and Tania Singer: A Comparison of Phenomenological and Neurological Approaches to the Problem of Empathy
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This paper compares Edith Stein’s phenomenological approach to empathy in On the Problem of Empathy (1917) with that of more recent neurological explanations of empathy, broadly exemplified by Tania Singer’s (2006) work. Given that we are dealing with two different methodologies that reflect the general debate that exists between phenomenology and natural science (neurology), a consideration of ‘method’ will be discussed prior to our comparative analysis of Stein and Singer’s account of empathy. In conclusion, we argue that Stein’s phenomenological understanding of empathy provides the most comprehensive description of the act of empathy to date for neurologists to ‘reflect ’ on.
52. Maynooth Philosophical Papers: Volume > 4
Denise Ryan Jean de La Rochelle’s Formulation of the Distinction between Being and Essence
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The distinction between ‘being’ and ‘essence’ arose in the elaboration of the theory of universal hylomorphism, defended by the Franciscans, which maintained that there is a composition of matter and form in all beings other than the First cause. This paper focuses on a formula which Jean de La Rochelle (1190/ 1200-1245) borrows from Boethius (c. 480-524) to explain how the ‘being’ of the soul is distinct from the ‘essence’ of the soul. It concludes by raising the question whether Jean’s formulation anticipates that of St Thomas Aquinas’s (1224-1274) in his early writings on De Ente et Essentia.
53. Maynooth Philosophical Papers: Volume > 3
Thomas A. F. Kelly Foreword
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54. Maynooth Philosophical Papers: Volume > 3
Michael Dunne Editor’s Introduction
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faculty
55. Maynooth Philosophical Papers: Volume > 3
Michael Dunne Magister Riccardus filius Radulfi de Ybemia: Richard fitzRalph as Lecturer in early 14th Century Oxford
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56. Maynooth Philosophical Papers: Volume > 3
Thomas A. F. Kelly Anselm’s Cosmological Argument for God’s Existence: An interpretation of Monologion Chapter Three
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57. Maynooth Philosophical Papers: Volume > 3
Patrick Gorevan Knowledge as Participation in Scheler and Aquinas
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58. Maynooth Philosophical Papers: Volume > 3
Paul Lyttle An Aristotelian-Thomistic Perspective on the Phenomenon of Grief
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59. Maynooth Philosophical Papers: Volume > 3
Paul Lyttle Newman on Friendship
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60. Maynooth Philosophical Papers: Volume > 3
Cyril McDonnell Brentano’s Modification of the Medieval-Scholastic Concept of ‘Intentional Inexistence’ in Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (1874)
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Brentano is perhaps most famously renowned for his re-deployment of Scholastic terminology of ‘intentional act’ and ‘intentional object’ in the elaboration of his novel science of ‘descriptive psychology’ in the mid-1870s and 1880s. In this re-deployment, however, Brentano adapted the original Scholastic meanings of both of these terms. Thus Brentano advanced not one but two descriptive-psychological theses of intentionality.1 These theses, however, are often not properly distinguished, and consequently they are more often confused. Nevertheless, once the two theses are distinguished, Brentano’s basic descriptive-psychological tenet of the intentionality of consciousness is more readily understandable on its own terms. Whether Brentano’s descriptive-psychological tenet is entirely acceptable philosophically, or not, of course, is another matter but this presupposes understanding in a straightforward sense what Brentano’s doctrine is. In this article, I will be concerned mainly with Brentano’s re-introduction of ‘what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object’ in Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (1874),2 even though it is Brentano’s (second) thesis on ‘intentional act’, one that he developed after his 1874 publication, that is more generally well known and examined. While acknowledging that many versions of ‘Brentano’s thesis’, as it is usually (and loosely) referred to by commentators today, have been re-worked in modern philosophy of mind, this article focuses attention on some of the main points of convergence and deviance between the original Scholastic concept and Brentano’s ‘new’ concept of intentionality in Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint.