Already a subscriber? - Login here
Not yet a subscriber? - Subscribe here

Displaying: 51-60 of 1660 documents


articles
51. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 34 > Issue: 4
Andrew Moon Plantinga’s Religious Epistemology, Skeptical Theism, and Debunking Arguments
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Alvin Plantinga’s religious epistemology has been used to respond to many debunking arguments against theistic belief. However, critics have claimed that Plantinga’s religious epistemology conflicts with skeptical theism, a view often used in response to the problem of evil. If they are correct, then a common way of responding to debunking arguments conflicts with a common way of responding to the problem of evil. In this paper, I examine the critics’ claims and argue that they are right. I then present two revised versions of Plantinga’s argument for his religious epistemology. I call the first a religion-based argument and the second an intention-based argument. Both are compatible with skeptical theism, and both can be used to respond to debunking arguments. They apply only to theistic beliefs of actual persons who have what I call doxastically valuable relationships with God—valuable relationships the goods of which entail the belief that God exists.
52. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 34 > Issue: 4
Eleanor Helms On Climacus’s “Against Reason” Thesis: A Challenge to Westphal
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
I object to Merold Westphal’s characterization in Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith (2014) of faith as “against reason.” I argue that Kierkegaard scholars emphasize the tension between faith and reason more than Kierkegaard does, affirming and perpetuating a broader antagonism in our own cultural climate. I suggest that the view of faith as “transforming vision” developed by M. Jamie Ferreira and others makes better sense of the different facets of faith pointed out by Westphal and the strengths of his account (especially faith as a passion) while avoiding conceptual and practical problems with the account Westphal has recently offered.
book reviews
53. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 34 > Issue: 4
Michael Pace Evidentialism and the Will to Believe, by Scott F. Aikin
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
54. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 34 > Issue: 4
Mary Leng God Over All: Divine Aseity and the Challenge of Platonism, by William Lane Craig
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
55. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 34 > Issue: 4
Emily Kelahan The Will to Reason: Theodicy and Freedom in Descartes, by C. P. Ragland
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
articles
56. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 34 > Issue: 3
Pavel Butakov The Eucharistic Conquest of Time
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox theologians claim that the unique event of Christ’s sacrifice on Calvary is present in Eucharistic liturgies. A popular explanatory strategy for this miraculous presence suggests that due to its supernatural character the Eucharist “conquers time,” transcends its boundaries, and allows for temporal coincidence of two chronologically distant events. I discuss the four main approaches within this strategy that can be discovered in contemporary theological writings. The first approach implies a time travel of the Calvary event. The second suggests the time travel of Eucharistic participants. The third eliminates the chronological distance by relocating one of the events into a timeless reality. The fourth assumes multilocation of the event across time. I argue that each of these approaches is untenable on philosophical or theological grounds.
57. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 34 > Issue: 3
Jada Twedt Strabbing Divine Forgiveness and Reconciliation
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
I argue that divine forgiveness is God’s openness to reconciliation with us, the wrongdoers, with respect to our wrongdoing. The main advantage of this view is that it explains the power of divine forgiveness to reconcile us to God when we repent. As I show, this view also fits well with the parable of the prodigal son, which is commonly taken to illustrate divine forgiveness, and it accounts for the close connection between divine forgiveness and Christ’s atonement. Finally, I demonstrate that this view is particularly well-suited, although not committed, to the idea that God forgives us without our repentance.
58. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 34 > Issue: 3
Rico Vitz “What is a Merciful Heart?”: Affective-Motivational Aspects of the Second Love Command
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In this paper, I argue that Christ’s second love command implies not only that people’s volitions and actions be Christ-like, but also that their affective-motivational dispositions be Christ-like. More specifically, I argue that the command implies that people have aretaic obligations to strive to cultivate a merciful heart with the kind of affective depth described by St. Isaac of Syria in his 71st ascetical homily—i.e., one that is disposed to becoming inflamed, such that it is gripped by “strong and vehement mercy.”
59. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 34 > Issue: 3
Scott M. Williams Unity of Action in a Latin Social Model of the Trinity
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
I develop a Latin Social model of the Trinity that is an extension of my previous work on indexicals and the Trinity. I focus on the theological desideratum of the necessity of the divine persons’ unity of action. After giving my account of this unity, I compare my account with Swinburne’s and Hasker’s social models and Leftow’s non-social model. I argue that their accounts of the divine persons’ unity of action are theologically unsatisfactory and that this unsatisfactoriness derives from a modern conception of personhood according to which distinct and incommunicable intellectual acts and volitional acts are necessary conditions for one’s being a person. I argue that the Latin Social model is preferable to the modern-personhood models because it is simpler in explanatory economy with regard to securing the necessity of the divine persons’ unity of action.
60. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 34 > Issue: 3
Benedikt Paul Göcke Christian Cyborgs: A Plea For a Moderate Transhumanism
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Should or shouldn’t Christians endorse the transhumanist agenda of changing human nature in ways fitting to one’s needs? To answer this question, we first have to be clear on what precisely the thesis of transhumanism entails that we are going to evaluate. Once this point is clarified, I argue that Christians can in principle fully endorse the transhumanist agenda because there is nothing in Christian faith that is in contradiction to it. In fact, given certain plausible moral assumptions, Christians should endorse a moderate enhancement of human nature. I end with a brief case study that analyses the theological implications of the idea of immortal Christian cyborgs. I argue that the existence of Christian cyborgs who know no natural death has no impact on the Christian hope of immortality in the presence of God.