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Displaying: 41-47 of 47 documents


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41. The Southern Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 45 > Issue: Supplement
Nicholas Georgalis First-Person Methodologies: A View From Outside the Phenomenological Tradition
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It is argued that results from first-person methodologies are unacceptable for incorporation into a fundamental philosophical theory of the mind unless they satisfy a necessary condition, which I introduce and defend. I also describe a narrow, nonphenomenal, first-person concept that I call minimal content that satisfies this condition. Minimal content is irreducible to third-person concepts, but it is required for an adequate account of intentionality, representation, and language. Consequently, consciousness is implicated in these as strongly—but differently—than it is in our phenomenal states. Minimal content provides a foundation for an objective philosophical theory of the mind and language. (Some support for these claims is given here. They are extensively argued for in my The Primacy of the Subjective.)
42. The Southern Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 45 > Issue: Supplement
Charles W. Harvey Comments on Nicholas Georgalis’s “First-Person Methodologies”
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Three problems are raised for Nicholas Georgalis’s recent work: (1) a problem with regard to the supposed noninferential knowledge of minimal content, (2) a problem with the “necessary condition” Georgalis stipulates for the legitimate application of a first-person methodology to a science of the mind, and (3) a problem with regard to denying phenomenal content to intentional acts.
43. The Southern Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 45 > Issue: Supplement
Nicholas Georgalis PostScript
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44. The Southern Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 45 > Issue: Supplement
Susanna Siegel How Can We Discover the Contents of Experience?
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How can we discover the contents of experience? I argue that neither introspection alone nor naturalistic theories of experience content are sufficient to discover these contents. I propose another method of discovery: the method of phenomenal contrast. I defend the method against skeptics who doubt that the contents of experience can be discovered, and I explain how the method may be employed even if one denies that experiences have contents.
45. The Southern Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 45 > Issue: Supplement
Joseph Thomas Tolliver Sensing, Perceiving, and Thinking: On the Method of Phenomenal Contrast
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I apply the Method of Phenomenal Contrast to examples involving aesthetic experience and sensory illusion. While the method can provide reasons to prefer one form of content hypothesis over others, it may be of no help in answering substantive questions about the nature and structure of such content. I suggest that successful application of the method can leave us with a difficult question. Why would a sensory system have the function of representing a property that it cannotdetect?
46. The Southern Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 45 > Issue: Supplement
Merold Westphal The Prereflective Cogito as Contaminated Opacity
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The “I think” that accompanies all my intentional acts is the prereflective cogito. It can be declined in the nominative, genitive, dative, and accusative cases: nominative because I am given to myself as a subject, genitive because each experiential awareness is mine, dative because the content of each awareness is given to me, and accusative because even as subject I am always given to myself as the object of the look and address of another. But it is a mistake to think ofconsciousness as “pure” by virtue of the formality of this structure. Even at the transcendental level, consciousness is contaminated by contingency and particularly in ways that render it opaque to itself in its relation to nature, society, and God.
47. The Southern Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 45 > Issue: Supplement
Klaus Erich Kaehler Comments on Merold Westphal’s “The Prereflective Cogito as Contaminated Opacity”
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The intention of my comments is mainly to draw attention to a necessary distinction between that prereflective cogito of post-metaphysical subjectivity that is analysed in Westphal’s paper and the subject of the cogito that can be identified and verified as the very principle of modern philosophy from Descartes to Hegel, namely, as the subject of reason. This means first of all to step back from the conviction, taken as self-evident, that the subject of reason—and thereby the truth claims of that entire philosophical epoch—are illusionary, that is, without any right of their own. Instead we should be ready to ask how it is brought about philosophically that the subject is “shattered,” “humiliated,” “declared forfeit,” etc. My thesis is that post-metaphysical subjectivity with its contaminated opacity can be made understandable in principle out of the endogenous crisis of the fully developed “absolute” subject of reason, if this crisis is carried out and decided as the transformation of the subject from its absolute to its decentered status.