Already a subscriber? - Login here
Not yet a subscriber? - Subscribe here

Browse by:



Displaying: 41-50 of 1002 documents


philosophical notes
41. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 20 > Issue: 1
Benjamin C. F. Shaw, Gary Habermas Miracles, Evidence, and Agent Causation: A Review Article
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Here we interact critically with the volume The Miracle Myth: Why Belief in the Resurrection and the Supernatural Is Unjustified (Columbia University, 2016) by University of Wisconsin philosopher Lawrence Shapiro, who contends that even if miracles occur, proper epistemological justification is unattainable. In addition, he argues that the historical evidence for Jesus’s resurrection is deeply problematic. We engage Shapiro’s philosophical and historical arguments by raising several significant issues within his own arguments, while also briefly providing some positive reasons to think that if a miracle did occur, one may be epistemologically justified in believing it.
42. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 20 > Issue: 1
John Warwick Montgomery God and Gödel
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
One of the perennial defenses of God’s existence is the ontological argument, associated particularly with St. Anselm. Ontological arguments are generally discounted in today’s philosophical circles, but a remarkably sophisticated version was developed by the preeminent mathematical logician Kurt Gödel. This short paper evaluates the major objection to ontological proofs and finds Gödel’s formulation convincing.
the epistemic significance of religious disagreement
43. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 20 > Issue: 1
Chad Bogosian, Paul Copan The Epistemology of Religious Disagreement: An Introduction
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Our introduction to the special topics forum provides a brief explanation of terms central to the general epistemology of disagreement literature that has developed over the past fifteen years. We then provide an overview of each contributor’s paper with an eye toward how each one relates to and extends the discussion about the epistemology of disagreement. Papers are arranged in an effort to draw readers into the discussion as follows: applying different general theories about disagreement to religious disagreement in particular, analyzing core principles related to disagreement, and then on to specific everyday issues related to navigating religious disagreements such as conversion and tolerance. Of special interest is the possibility of prospects for reasonable religious disagreement or lack thereof.
44. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 20 > Issue: 1
Jon Matheson Religious Disagreement and Divine Hiddenness
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In this paper, I develop and respond to a novel objection to conciliatory views of disagreement. Having first explained conciliationism and the problem of divine hiddenness, I develop an objection that conciliationism exacerbates the problem of divine hiddenness. According to this objection, conciliationism increases God’s hiddenness in both its scope and severity, and is thus incompatible with God’s existence (or at least make God’s existence quite improbable). I respond to this objection by showing that the problem of divine hiddenness is not made any worse by conciliationism.
45. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 20 > Issue: 1
Chad Bogosian Rowe’s Friendly Atheism and the Epistemology of Religious Disagreement
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In this paper, I engage William Rowe’s “Friendly Atheism” to illuminate the discussion of religious disagreement. I argue that his view gives way to an epistemic principle about how two “intellectual peers” might remain steadfast in what they believe their total available evidence supports and thereby reasonably disagree about their religious beliefs (or lack thereof ). I consider a key objection from Uniqueness thesis proponents and show how there are additional epistemic considerations to help fix the proposed problem.
46. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 20 > Issue: 1
Thomas D. Senor The Uniqueness Argument and Religious Rationality Pluralism
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In this paper, I offer a defense of what I dub “religious rationality pluralism”—that is, that people of various religions can be rational in holding a variety of religious perspectives. I distinguish two arguments against this position: the Uniqueness argument and the Disagreement argument. The aims of this essay are to argue (i) that the Uniqueness thesis is ambiguous between two readings, (ii) that while one version of the thesis is quite plausible, it cannot be successfully used to argue against rationality pluralism, and (iii) the version of the thesis that would support the argument is false.
47. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 20 > Issue: 1
John M. DePoe Hold on Loosely, But Don’t Let Go: Evaluating the Evidential Impact of Religious Disagreement
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The problem of peer disagreement represents a growing challenge to justified religious belief. After surveying the state of the dialectic of the problem, I explore three ways for religious believers to remain steadfast in light of religious disagreement. The first two ways focus on the believer’s basing his religious beliefs on a direct awareness of the truth or evidence of his beliefs. The third way considers the virtue of faith as a means for resisting peer disagreement.
48. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 20 > Issue: 1
Helen De Cruz Religious Conversion, Transformative Experience, and Disagreement
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Religious conversion gives rise to disagreement with one’s former self and with family and friends. Because religious conversion is personally and epistemically transformative, it is difficult to judge whether a former epistemic peer is still one’s epistemic peer post-conversion, just like it is hard for the convert to assess whether she is now in a better epistemic position than prior to her conversion. Through Augustine’s De Utilitate Credendi (The Usefulness of Belief) I show that reasoned argument should play a crucial role in assessing the evidential value of religious conversions, both for the person who converts and for her (former) peers.
49. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 20 > Issue: 1
Robert Audi Religious Disagreement: Structure, Content, and Prospects for Resolution
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Religious disagreement is pervasive in contemporary life, both internationally and inside pluralistic societies. Understanding it requires understanding both what constitutes a religion and what constitutes genuine disagreement. To resolve religious disagreements, we need principles for rationally approaching them and standards for law-making that are fair to all citizens. This paper considers what sorts of evidences parties to a religious disagreement should present if they hope for resolution or at least mutual tolerance. The paper suggests some common ground as a basis for communication and partial agreement on issues likely to divide the religious. It concludes with some ethical principles intended to help those who seek peaceful resolution of religious disagreements in the framework of pluralistic democracy.
50. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 20 > Issue: 1
Bryan Frances The Epistemology of Real-World Religious Disagreement without Peers
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
When you learn that a large body of highly intelligent, fair-minded, reasonable, and relatively unbiased thinkers disagree with you, does that give you good reason to think you’re wrong? Should you think, “Wait a minute. Maybe I’ve missed something here”? Should you at least drastically reduce your confidence? There is a general epistemological problem here regarding controversial beliefs, one that has nothing especially to do with religious belief. I argue that applying this discussion to religion transforms the problem in unexpected and interesting ways, and that the religious believer is often epistemically reasonable in sticking with her controversial belief.