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41. The Monist: Volume > 96 > Issue: 4
Chris Daly Psychology and Indispensability
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42. The Monist: Volume > 96 > Issue: 4
Daniel Hutto Fictionalism about Folk Psychology
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43. The Monist: Volume > 96 > Issue: 4
T. Parent In the Mental Fiction, Mental Fictionalism Is Fictitious
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44. The Monist: Volume > 96 > Issue: 4
Miklós Márton, János Tözsér Mental Fictionalism As an Undermotivated Theory
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Our paper consists of three parts. In the first part we explain the concept of mental fictionalism. In the second part, we present the various versions of fictionalism and their main sources of motivation.We do this because in the third part we argue that mental fictionalism, as opposed to other versions of fictionalism, is a highly undermotivated theory.
45. The Monist: Volume > 96 > Issue: 4
Scope of Forthcoming Issues
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46. The Monist: Volume > 96 > Issue: 4
Contents of Volume 96
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47. The Monist: Volume > 96 > Issue: 3
Justin L. Barrett, Ian M. Church Should CSR Give Atheists Epistemic Assurance? On Beer-Goggles, BFFs, and Skepticism Regarding Religious Beliefs
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Recent work in cognitive science of religion (CSR) is beginning to converge on a very interesting thesis—that, given the ordinary features of human minds operating in typical human environments, we are naturally disposed to believe in the existence of gods, among other religious ideas (e.g., see Atran [2002], Barrett [2004; 2012], Bering [2011], Boyer [2001], Guthrie [1993], McCauley [2011], Pyysiäinen [2004; 2009]). In this paper, we explore whether such a discovery ultimately helps or hurts the atheist position—whether, for example, it lends credence to atheism by explaining away religious belief or whether it actually strengthens some already powerful arguments against atheism in the relevant philosophical literature.We argue that the recent discoveries of CSR hurt, not help, the atheist position—that CSR, if anything, should not give atheists epistemic assurance.
48. The Monist: Volume > 96 > Issue: 3
John Teehan The Cognitive Bases of the Problem of Evil
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The problem of evil is a central issue in the philosophy of religion, for countless believers and skeptics alike. The attempt to resolve the dilemma of positing the existence of an omnipotent, omnibenevolent, creator while recognizing the presence of evil in the world has engaged philosophers and theologians for millennia. This article will not seek to resolve the dilemma but rather to explore the question of why there is a problem of evil. That is, why is it that gods are conceived in ways that give rise to this dilemma? The topic will be approached using insights into the religious mind being developed by the disciplines contributing to the Cognitive Science of Religion. The thesis to be developed is that this problem is a product of natural cognitive processes that give rise togod-beliefs, beliefs that are shaped by evolved moral intuitions.
49. The Monist: Volume > 96 > Issue: 3
Jason Marsh Darwin and the Problem of Natural Nonbelief
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Problem one: why, if God designed the human mind, did it take so long for humans to develop theistic concepts and beliefs? Problem two: why would God use evolution to design the living world when the discovery of evolution would predictably contribute to so much nonbelief in God? Darwin was aware of such questions but failed to see their evidential significance for theism. This paper explores this significance. Problem one introduces something I call natural nonbelief, which is significant because it parallels and corroborates well-known worries about natural evil. Problems one and two, especially when combined, support naturalism over theism, intensify the problem of divine hiddenness, challenge Alvin Plantinga’s views about the naturalness of theism, and advance the discussion about whether the conflict between science and religion is genuine or superficial.
50. The Monist: Volume > 96 > Issue: 3
Steven Horst Notions of Intuition in the Cognitive Science of Religion
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This article examines the notions of “intuitive” and “counterintuitive” beliefs and concepts in cognitive science of religion. “Intuitive” states are contrasted with those that are products of explicit, conscious reasoning. In many cases the intuitions are grounded in the implicit rules of mental models, frames, or schemas. I argue that the pathway from intuitive to high theological concepts and beliefs may be distinct from that from intuitions to “folk religion,” and discuss how Christian theology might best interpret the results of studies in cognitive psychology of religion.