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Displaying: 41-50 of 59 documents


41. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 37
Mauro L. Engelmann Wittgenstein's New Method and Russell's The Analysis of Mind
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I argue that Wittgenstein’s engagement with Russell’s The Analysis of Mind was crucial for the development of his new method. First, I show that Wittgenstein’s criticism of the causal theory of meaning (namely: that it generates an infinite regress and that it does not determine the depiction of a fact) is motivated by its incompatibility with the pictorial conception of language. Second, I show that in reacting against that theory he comes to invent the calculus conception of language. Third, I argue that the calculus conception is vulnerable to critiques that parallel those presented against Russell’s theory (a rule-following regression and the indeterminacy of depicted facts). Fourth, the striking similarity between the problems present in Russell’s theory and in Wittgenstein’s own views makes him realize that both were working under misleading trains of thought and false analogies. It is this realization that brings Wittgenstein to the view that his task is to investigate the genesis of philosophical puzzlement in order to stop philosophical theorizing right from the beginning. Thus, in explaining the invention of Wittgenstein’s new method I show its relation to Russell’s philosophy and indicate the origins of the rule-following problem.
bioethics, environmental ethics, and future generations
42. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 37 > Issue: Supplement
Marie-Hélène Parizeau Towards an Ethic of Technology? Nanotechnology and the Convergence of Applied Ethics
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The hypothesis I develop involves that we have been witnessing, during the last ten years or so, an interpenetration in the area of applied ethics of certain concepts originally belonging to different areas of ethics, namely bioethics, environmental ethics, and also business ethics. Certain concepts such as “future generations,” “consent,” “precautionary principle,” “intrinsic value,” “global governance,” “sustainable development,” or “scientific uncertainty” are becoming “thick ethical concepts,” in the terminology of metaethics; or in the terminology of American pragmatism: “living beliefs.” They are now charged with strong moral contents that unfolds a new horizon of meaning at the heart of Western Modernity, a horizon largely defined by science and technical actions. Nevertheless, is this conceptual convergence in the area of applied ethics the sign of the coming of a new ethic of technique? I will discuss this topic taking as an example the case of nanotechnology.
tradition, modernity, and post-modernity: eastern and western perspectives
43. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 37 > Issue: Supplement
Bengt Kristensson Uggla Nowhere is always Now and Here
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This paper presents a critical reflection on the attempts to determine the historical meaning of the present situation as a philosophical topic. To determine the specific interpretative character of the diagnostics of our contemporary situation—beyond both absolute knowledge and arbitrary thinking—this paper argues that “now” and “here” need to be defined in accordance with the concepts of “historical time” and “inhabited space.” This has been made possible as a result of the recent metamorphosis within the hermeneutical tradition.
44. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 37
Struan Jacobs Tradition as a Topic of Philosophic Interest in Britain in the 1940s
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Between 1945 and 1948, Michael Polanyi, Michael Oakeshott, and Karl Popper respectively discussed the nature of tradition, and the part that traditions play in free societies. This article analyzes these thinkers’ ideas of tradition. Polanyi depicted tradition as knowledge that is embodied in skilled practice, and tradition for Oakeshott consists in activities that are suffused with practical knowledge and technique. Popper emphasized rational criticizability, whereas Polanyi and Oakeshott emphasized the tacit dimension of traditions.
tradition, modernity, and post-modernity: eastern and western perspectives
45. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 37 > Issue: Supplement
Elmar Holenstein Overcoming Dichotomies
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A symposium with the title “Tradition, Modernity and Postmodernity: Eastern and Western Perspectives” is in need of a subtitle auch as “Overcoming Dichotomies.” Societies, as well as historical epochs, are complex and overlapping phenomena. A clash between complex civilizations will naturally be a complex encounter. The conflicting parties will always find kindred souls on the other side, motivated by converging interests and values. Modernity and secularism are not inseparable, and tradionality and secularism are not incompatible (see Confucian politology). Two main philosophical reasons for the complexity of civilizations are the heterarchical structure of the human value system and the creative potential of human individuals. These highest values cannot be optimally realized at the same time. The potential for self-fulfillment that every human being has, thanks to his mental structures, excedes the potential for self-fulfillment a singular culture can provide.
philosophy in korea
46. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 37 > Issue: Supplement
Hee-Sung Keel Asian Naturalism: An Old Vision for a New World
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Naturalism is a pan-Asian view of the world and way of life. Unlike the atheistic naturalism in the West, Asian naturalism, which rests upon an organic view of the world as represented by key concepts such as the Dao, Heaven, and Emptiness, is basically spiritual. Going beyond the traditional Western antithesis of naturalism and supernaturalism, matter and spirit, it can even be called “supernatural naturalism.” As a living example of Asian naturalism, this article examines the ethics of threefold reverence: reverence toward Heaven, all human beings, and all beings, animate and inanimate. Threefold reverence constitutes the cardinal teaching of Cheondogyo or the Eastern Learning, a native Korean religio-philosophical movement which arose in the latter half of the nineteenth century. The ecological-environmental crisis of our age cannot be overcome without a fundamental change in our attitude toward nature. Recovering humanity’s primal sense of reverence toward all beings in nature is a vital part of this change.
47. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 37 > Issue: Supplement
Yersu Kim Philosophy in Korea and Cultural Synthesis
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This an attempt to present, in analytic-descriptive terms, the complex and multi-layered legacy of the way philosophy has been done in Korea throughout history. It is panoramic and selective, largely intended for colleagues who are encountering philosophy in Korea for the first time. This presentation will be carried out in four parts. First, I examine how Korea’s geographical location on the periphery of the Asian continent has made it imperative to make use of philosophical influences coming from the continent to solve the existential and political problematique faced by Korea. Second, I describe the encounter of Korea with the West, and particularly with Westernized Japan, as a clash of civilizations that has led to a century-long total rejection of the tradition in Korea. Third, I describe the present day philosophical scene in Korea, as it attempts to deal with direct exposure to Western philosophy and revival and renewal of the traditional philosophy. Finally, I advance the thesis that it is philosophy’s task to forge a cultural synthesis adequate to deal with the problems facing humanity that will engage philosophy in Korea in the future.
48. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 37
Paul Prescott What Pessimism Is
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On the standing view, pessimism is a philosophically intractable topic. Against the standing view, I hold that pessimism is a stance, or compound of attitudes, commitments and intentions. This stance is marked by certain beliefs—first and foremost, that the bad prevails over the good—which are subject to an important qualifying condition: they are always about outcomes and states of affairs in which one is personally invested. This serves to distinguish pessimism from other views with which it is routinely conflated— including skepticism and nihilism—and to allow for the extent to which pessimism necessarily involves more than the intellectual endorsement of a doctrine.
philosophy in korea
49. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 37 > Issue: Supplement
Kwang-Sae Lee Heidegger’s Seyn, Ereignis, and Dingen as Viewed from an Eastern Perspective
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In Being and Time, Heidegger undertakes fundamental ontology. Heidegger conceives of Being as temporality. Being (Sein) is unconcealment which is replaced by be-ing (Seyn), that is, the disjunction between unconcealment and concealment. In the topological phase as in Contributions to Philosophy (CP), The Thing and Building Dwelling Thinking be-ing yields to enowning. “B-ing holds sway as enowning” (CP section 10). But be-ing holding sway entails that a being (Seiende) “is”. Which means that a thing things. Enowning is Dasein’s thinkingresponding to the call of Be-ing. Hence be-inghistorical thinking (Seynsgeschichtes Denken) which is enowned thinking. When a thing things, world worlds (Die Welt weltet). Be-ing-historical thinking is thinkingthinging, that is, thinking space-time or thinking gathering (Versammlung) of elements that “belong together”. Thinging is the mirror interplay of the fourfold. In Four Seminars, Heidegger says: “There is no longer room for the very name of being. . . . Being is enowned through enowning. Sein ist durch Ereignis ereignet.” But enowning means thinking thinging.
50. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 37 > Issue: Supplement
Taesoo Lee Philosophy as Self-examination and Korean Philosophy
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The purpose of this paper is to clarify the issue of the meaning to be attributed to our talk of Korean philosophy. Of course, the answer to all the questions that can be raised concerning this issue depends on our conception of philosophy. I start by claiming that philosophy should be an ars vivendi aiming at making our life worth living. Drawing on Socrates’s saying that the unexamined life is not worth living, I try to show that philosophical inquiry has to start with the reflection upon the belief-system underpinning our way of life. Through this reflective activity we are inevitably led to tackle the problem of cultural identity constituted by such belief system; there is no belief-system that is not culturally conditioned. Korean philosophy is an ongoing endeavor of the Korean people to renew their cultural identity—by way of philosophical reflection upon their cultural identity.