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Displaying: 41-43 of 43 documents


41. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 113 > Issue: 1
J. E. Wolff Using Defaults to Understand Token Causation
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Recent literature on causation invokes a distinction between deviant and default behavior to account for token causation. Critical examination of two prominent attempts to employ a distinction between deviants and defaults reveals that the distinction is far from clear. I clarify and develop the distinction by appeal to the notion of a modally robust process, and show how the distinction can be employed by causal process theorists to respond to cases of causation by omission. This shows that the default/deviant distinction is not so much a tool for counterfactual accounts of causation, but rather for causal process theory.
42. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 113 > Issue: 1
Mark Walker Externalism, Skepticism, and Skeptical Dogmatism
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A claimed benefit of epistemic externalism is that it alone can avoid skepticism. Most epistemic externalists, however, allow a residual amount of internalism in terms of a defeasibility condition. The paper argues that this internal condition is sufficient for skeptics to cast doubt on many claims to justified belief about perceptual matters about the world. Furthermore, the internal defeasibility condition also opens the door to a darker form of skepticism; skeptical dogmatism, which maintains that many of our perceptually based beliefs are probably false. Thus, the claimed benefits of externalism in avoiding skepticism are greatly exaggerated.
43. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 113 > Issue: 1
New Books
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